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Abstract
We present a new logic, Linc, which is designed to be used as a framework for
specifying and reasoning about operational semantics. Linc is an extension of ¯rst-
order intuitionistic logic with a proof theoretic notion of de¯nitions, induction and co-
induction, and a new quanti¯er r. De¯nitions can be seen as expressing ¯xed point
equations, and the least and greatest solutions for the ¯xed point equations give rise
to the induction and co-induction proof principles. The quanti¯er r focuses on the
intensional reading of 8 and is used to reason about encodings of object systems involving
abstractions. The logic Linc allows quanti¯cation over ¸-terms which makes it possible
to reason about encodings involving higher-order abstract syntax, a clean and declarative
treatment of syntax involving abstraction and substitution. All these features of Linc
co-exist within the same logic, allowing for expressing proofs involving induction and co-
induction on both ¯rst-order and higher-order encodings of operational semantics. We
prove the cut-elimination and the consistency results for Linc, extending the reducibility
technique due to Tait and Martin-LÄ of. We illustrate the applications of Linc in a number
of areas, ranging from data structures, abstract transition systems, object logic and
functional programming. The expressive power of the full logic is demonstrated in the
encoding of ¼-calculus, where we show that the notion of names in the calculus can
naturally be interpreted in the quanti¯cation theory of Linc.iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The operational semantics of computation systems are commonly speci¯ed as
deductive systems, in the style of Plotkin's structural operational semantics [46] or Kahn's
natural semantics [26]. Computation in this setting is represented as deduction. In this
representation, it is possible to use the structure of deduction to prove properties of the
speci¯ed computation system, by structural induction for example. A deductive system
is usually given as a set of inference rules, which typically admit simple logical reading.
Consider for example the evaluation relation in functional programming language, e.g.,
M +¸x:P P[N=x]+V
(MN)+V
where P[N=x] denotes a term obtained from P by substituting all free occurrences of x
in P with N (of course, incidental capturing of free variables in N must be avoided). The
reading of the rule is usually described at the meta-language (English for example) as
something like \if M evaluates to ¸x:P and P[N=x] evaluates to V , then (MN) evaluates
to V ". We may formalize 1 this informal speci¯cation as the logical theory
M +¸x:P ^ P[N=x]+V ¾ (MN)+V
Given this logical speci¯cation, evaluation (computation) of an expression M is inter-
preted as proof search for the formula 9V:M +V . We thus can equally represent a
deductive system (and hence operational semantics) in logic as logical theories, based on
which proof search is used to model computation. This idea of using logic to represent
computation system is in line with the study of logical frameworks [44].
Reasoning about the properties of computation in its encoding in logic can bene¯t
from the structural properties of formal (normal) proofs, compositionality of proofs, and
other meta-theories of the speci¯cation logic. In this thesis, we introduce a new logic,
called Linc (for a logic with ¸-terms, induction, r and co-induction), to be used as a
framework for specifying and reasoning about operational semantics. Linc is an exten-
sion of ¯rst-order intuitionistic logic presented in sequent calculus [18]. More speci¯cally,
Linc can be seen as an extension of the logic FO¸¢IN [28]. The main novelties of Linc
are the formalization of induction and co-induction [43] proof principles as explicit proof
rules, and the introduction of a new quanti¯er, r, to facilitate reasoning about generic
judgments, i.e., judgments which involve universal quanti¯cations. The induction rules
1Of course, to be fully formal, we need to formalize substitution as well. We leave out the
explicit representation of substitution to simplify the illustration.2
extend FO¸¢IN's natural number induction to allow induction proofs over iterative in-
ductive de¯nitions [27]. Both induction and co-induction proof principles are essential
in reasoning about recursively de¯ned objects, such as ¯xed points construction in func-
tional programming languages or process calculi, while the r quanti¯er naturally encodes
the dynamics of names in computation systems. The notion of names abstracts the use
of identi¯ers in performing computation, such as reference to location in memories or
networks, pointers, encryption keys, nonces in security protocols, etc. Underlying these
uses of names are the notions of scoping and freshness of names and distinction among
names. These notions ¯nd natural interpretation in the quanti¯cation theory of Linc, in
which r plays an essential role.
Our formalization of (co-)induction is actually based on a proof theoretic notion
of de¯nition, following on work by Schroeder-Heister [50], Eriksson [14], Girard [21],
StÄ ark [55] and McDowell and Miller [29]. De¯nitions are essentially logic programs
which are strati¯ed so as to avoid cyclic calling through negations. Deductive systems
can alternatively be encoded as de¯nitions. The introduction rules for de¯ned atoms
treat the de¯nitions as \closed" or de¯ning ¯xed points. This alone gives us the ability
to perform case analyses, which can be used for reasoning about the must-behaviors
of computation systems, i.e., properties which are true for all computation paths. Our
approach to formalizing induction and co-induction is via the least and greatest solutions
of the ¯xed equations speci¯ed by the de¯nitions. Such least and greatest solutions
are guaranteed to exist by the strati¯cation on de¯nitions (which are basically some
monotonicity condition). The proof rules for the induction and co-induction makes use
of the notion of pre-¯xed points and post-¯xed points [43], respectively. In the inductive
case, this is simply the induction invariant, while in the co-inductive one it corresponds
to the so-called simulation.
Another important feature of Linc is that it allows quanti¯cation over ¸-terms
which makes it possible to support higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS). Higher-order
abstract syntax is a declarative treatment of syntax involving abstraction and substi-
tution. The idea of HOAS is to use ¸-abstraction to encode object-level (computation
system) abstraction and to use ¯-reduction to encode substitution. Linc has a built-in
equality predicate whose introduction rules make use of uni¯cation and matching, on
both ¯rst-order and higher-order ¸-terms. The full system with r and (co-)induction
allows for expressing a rich class of inductive and co-inductive proofs involving higher-
order abstract syntax, where the notion of freshness and scoping of variables plays an
essential role.
1.1 A logical treatment of names and abstractions
Part of the motivation in having a new quanti¯er, r, in our framework is that
the existing ones are not expressive enough for encoding certain uses of abstractions in
operational semantics. Consider for example the problem of encoding the ¼-calculus [40].
The static structure of the abstractions in the ¼-calculus is encoded in Linc as ¸-terms,
following the encoding style of higher-order abstract syntax. Name-binding operator in
this object system is mapped to function symbol which takes as argument an abstraction.3
Consider the following expressions in ¼-calculus:
(x)P and a(x):P;
where (x) and a(x) are the binding operators and P is a process expression. The binder
(x) is called restriction and a(x) is the input pre¯x. To represent these terms in Linc,
we ¯rst introduce the types n and p corresponding to the syntactic categories of names
and process expressions in ¼-calculus. We then de¯ne the constants
º : (n ! p) ! p in : n ! (n ! p) ! p:
The above process expressions are encoded as the meta-level terms º¸x:P and in a ¸x:P:
The use of higher-order abstract syntax produces a better reading of the inference rules
in ¼-calculus. In particular, complicated side conditions disappear from the description
of the rules, as they are now part of the description of meta-level syntax (see Chapter 6
for details).
The input pre¯x and the restriction operator have di®erent operational meaning.
An input-pre¯xed process x(y):P can evolve into the process P[w=y] for any name w,
while the process (y)P can evolve to P[a=y] for some \fresh" name a. These di®erent
dynamics of names are captured in Linc by the use of 8 (to encode \for all names") and r
(to encode the freshness of names). A common approach to encode fresh-name generation
is via the use of 8-quanti¯er. The use of universal quanti¯cation has been considered
in the extended natural semantics [23]. The operational behavior of this encoding in
proof search is given by eigenvariable, which provides a fresh, scoped constant in proof
search. Eigenvariable has been used in the encoding of restrictions in the ¼-calculus [34],
nonces in security protocols [6], reference locations in imperative programming [8, 35],
and constructors hidden within abstract data-types [32].
The 8-encoding is adequate as long as we are concerned only with encoding com-
putations but not with proving properties about the computations. In the latter case,
the use of 8 for fresh name generation is problematic. To see why, suppose we are given a
computation P xy involving two fresh names x and y. In the 8-encoding, we would have
a proof for 8x8y:P xy. However, since 8x8y:P xy ¾ 8z:P z z is a theorem of logic, we
would have another computation in which the names x and y are identi¯ed. Let us refer
to this theorem as the diagonal property of 8. Of course, this might not be the intended
meaning of the fresh names in the object system. One key idea in designing r is that
the diagonal property should fail for r, that is, rxry:P xy ¾ rz:P z z should not be
a theorem in Linc. Thus, r, by design, does not entails 8. That is, the extensionality
property, rx:Bx ¾ B t, for any term t, does not hold either. This suggests that r is
suitable for encoding object systems with fresh name generation, where in the course of
computation this fresh name stays unchanged, e.g., the º-binder in ¼-calculus and its
variants, and is less suitable for encoding abstraction which implies certain extensionality
behavior, e.g., the ¸-binder in ¸-calculus. The latter implies that Linc does not directly
capture fully the induction over higher-order abstract syntax, although it can still be
done via an indirect approach as it was done in FO¸¢IN.4
1.2 Outline of the thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the
logic Linc in an incremental fashion, starting from its core fragment, which is basically
Church's Simple Theory of Types with the quanti¯er r, followed by the introduction of
de¯nitions and induction and co-induction. Chapter 3 presents the meta-theories of the
logic, some of which are used in the proof of cut-elimination in Chapter 4. Chapter 4
presents the central result of this thesis, that is, the cut-elimination proof for Linc. The
consistency of Linc is shown to be a simple corollary of cut-elimination. Our proof
of cut-elimination extends the cut-elimination proof of FO¸¢IN which makes use of
the technique of reducibility due to Tait [56]. Chapter 5 illustrates the applications of
Linc in a number of areas, ranging from reasoning about (co-)inductive data structures
(natural numbers, ¯nite lists and lazy lists), abstract transition systems, object logic
and functional language (the lazy ¸-calculus). These examples illustrate the use of both
induction and co-induction rules, in the ¯rst-order and higher-order encodings. The
application of r, with induction and co-induction, is demonstrated in the encoding of
¼-calculus in Chapter 6. In this chapter we show that the quanti¯ers in Linc capture the
treatment of names in ¼-calculus, as illustrated in the encoding of strong late bisimulation
and strong late congruence. Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and discusses possible
future work.5
Chapter 2
The Logic Linc
In this chapter we de¯ne formally the sequent calculus of the logic Linc. Linc is an
extension of Church's Simple Theory of Types with a new quanti¯er r, a proof theoretic
notion of de¯nitions and induction and co-induction proof principles. The quanti¯er r
focuses on the intensional reading of 8, i.e., to provide fresh, scoped constants in proof
search. To incorporate this new quanti¯er, it is necessary to consider a richer context
in sequents. Section 2.1 shows how this can be done and gives the core rules of Linc.
Section 2.2 formalizes the notion of de¯nitions and Section 2.3 shows how to extend the
notion of de¯nitions to de¯ne the induction and co-induction rules. Section 2.4 shows
some derived rules which are useful later in applications. Section 2.5 reviews some related
work.
2.1 Intuitionistic logic with generic judgments
The usual intuitionistic sequent is of the form
§; B1;:::;Bn ¡! B0
where § is the (global) signature of the sequent, containing the eigenvariables, and
B0;:::;Bn are formulas. We can view sequent of this form as a binding structure,
that is, the free variables in the formulas in the sequent are bound by §. We consider
introducing a new layer of abstraction into the sequent, whose scope is local to each
formula. This additional layer of abstraction is motivated by applications in reasoning
about object systems involving abstractions [28]. The enriched sequent takes the form
§; ¾1 . B1;:::;¾n . Bn ¡! ¾0 . B0;
where each ¾i is a local signature, i.e., a list of variables locally scoped over the formula.
The dynamic of the local signature is provided by a new quanti¯er, r, in much the same
way as the dynamic of global signature (eigenvariables) is provided by 8.
Before we proceed with the inference rules for Linc, let us go through some no-
tational convention. Variables in both global and local signatures are simply typed,
following the type system of Church. That is, types are built from base types and the
binary type constructor !. The variables can have any types as long as they do not
contain the type o, which is reserved for the type of formulas. We refer to types which
do not contain o as object types, and variables and constants of object types are some-
times referred to as object variables and object constants, respectively. Thus variables
in signatures are of object types. Types will be denoted by ®;¯; and ¿, with or without
indexes. The typing judgment is of the form § ` t : ¿, where § is the type context (i.e.,6
set of type variables). Here we use Church's type system for simply typed ¸ terms. If
we need to be explicit about the type of a variable, like when describing signatures, the
type information will be written after the variable, separated by colon, e.g., x : ¿. Type
annotation will often be dropped when it is clear from context which type a variable has,
or when the type is irrelevant to the context of discussion.
Given a list of typed variables ¹ x = x1 : ®1;:::;xn : ®n we sometimes wish to
extract just the type information, in which case we would write ^ ¿(¹ x) to denote the list of
types ®1;:::;®n. In addition to signatures (which are basically variables), we shall also
assume a set of object-typed constants in proof-construction. Since the set of constants
does not grow during proof construction, it will not be written explicitly in the sequent.
We assume that the set of variables and constants are always distinct, i.e., there is no
accidental use of the same name for denoting both variable and constant.
We shall consider sequents to be binding structures in the sense that the signa-
tures, both the global and local ones, are abstractions over their respective scopes. The
variables in § and ¾ will admit ®-conversion by systematically changing the names of
variables in signatures as well as those in their scope, following the usual convention of
the ¸-calculus. In general, however, we will assume that the local signatures, ¾, contain
names di®erent than those in the global signature §. The expression ¾ . B is called a
generic judgment, or simply judgment. To simplify the presentation, we shall often write
a judgment (x;y;z) . B as xyz . B where xyz denotes the list x;y;z. Equality between
judgments follows from the notion of equality of ¸-terms, that is, two judgments ¹ x . B
and ¹ y . C are equal if and only if
¸¹ x:B =¯´ ¸¹ y:C:
We use script letters A, B, C, D etc. to denote judgments, and the letter S to denote
sequents. We write simply B instead of ¾ . B if the signature ¾ is empty.
The core fragment of Linc consists of introduction rules for the logical constants
^;_;¾;?;>;8;9 and r and the structural rules, initial rule and the cut rule. These
inference rules are given in Figure 2.1. The introduction rules for r a®ect only the local
signatures. The variable y in the r introduction rules follows the usual proviso that it
is not free in ¸x:B. The interaction between local and global signatures takes place in
9 and 8 introduction rules. The quanti¯ers are of type (® ! o) ! o, where ® is an
object type. Thus the logic is in a sense ¯rst-order. In the 8R (likewise, 9L), we use
raising [33] to denote that the bound variable x can range over the variables in the global
signature as well as the local signature ¾. Here the variable h must not be free in the
lower sequent. In these rules, we use the notation h¾ to denote the successive application
of the variable h to the variables in ¾. That is, suppose ¾ is the list x1;:::;xn, then h¾
is the term (hx1 :::xn). In 8L and 9R, the term t can have free variables from both
§ and ¾. The multicut rule mc is a generalization of the cut rule due to Slaney [53] to
simplify the presentation of cut-elimination proof. Notice that if we remove the r rules
and the local signatures from the sequents, then what we have is the usual intuitionistic
logic.
Note that the use of raising in 8R and 9L means that the eigenvariable introduced
(reading the rules bottom-up) might not be of the same type as the quanti¯ed variable.7
§; C;¡ ¡! C init §; ¾ . ?;¡ ¡! B ?L §; ¡ ¡! ¾ . > >R
§; ¾ . B;¡ ¡! D
§; ¾ . B ^ C;¡ ¡! D ^L
§; ¾ . C;¡ ¡! D
§; ¾ . B ^ C;¡ ¡! D ^L
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B §; ¡ ¡! ¾ . C
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B ^ C ^R
§; ¾ . B;¡ ¡! D §; ¾ . C;¡ ¡! D
§; ¾ . B _ C;¡ ¡! D _L
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B _ C _R
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . C
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B _ C _R
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B §; ¾ . C;¡ ¡! D
§; ¾ . B ¾ C;¡ ¡! D ¾ L
§; ¾ . B;¡ ¡! ¾ . C
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B ¾ C ¾ R
§;¾ ` t : ¿ §; ¾ . B[t=x];¡ ¡! C
§; ¾ . 8¿x:B;¡ ¡! C 8L
§;h; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B[(h ¾)=x]
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . 8x:B 8R
§;h; ¾ . B[(h ¾)=x];¡ ¡! C
§; ¾ . 9x:B;¡ ¡! C 9L
§;¾ ` t : ¿ §; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B[t=x]
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . 9¿x:B 9R
§; (¾;y) . B[y=x];¡ ¡! C
§; ¾ . rx:B;¡ ¡! C rL
§; ¡ ¡! (¾;y) . B[y=x]
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . rx:B rR
§; B;B;¡ ¡! C
§; B;¡ ¡! C cL
§; ¡ ¡! C
§; B;¡ ¡! C wL
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢ §; ¢n ¡! Bn §; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc, where n ¸ 0
Fig. 2.1. The core rules of Linc8
This is illustrated in the following example.
fx : ®;h : ¿ ! ° ! ¯g; ¡ ¡! (a : ¿;b : °) . B (hab) b
fx : ®g; ¡ ¡! (a : ¿;b : °) . 8¯y:B y b 8L
fx : ®g; ¡ ¡! (a : ¿) . r°z:8¯y:B y z rR
Notice that the quanti¯ed variable y is of type ¯ while its corresponding eigenvariable h
is raised to the type ¿ ! ° ! ¯, taking into account its dependency on a : ¿ and b : °.
Below are some theorems of Linc involving r which can be proved by inspection
on the inference rules in Figure 2.1. In these formulas, we use :C to abbreviate C ¾ ?
and we write B ´ C to denote (B ¾ C) ^ (C ¾ B).
Proposition 2.1. The following formulas are provable in the core Linc.
rx:Bx ´ :rxBx rx(Bx ^ Cx) ´ rxBx ^ rxCx
rx(Bx _ Cx) ´ rxBx _ rxCx rx(Bx ¾ Cx) ´ rxBx ¾ rxCx
rx8yBxy ´ 8hrxBx(hx) rx9yBxy ´ 9hrxBx(hx)
rx8yBxy ¾ 8yrxBxy rx> ´ >; rx? ´ ?
As a consequence, r can always be given scope over atomic formulas with the cost of
raising the types of quanti¯ed variables in its scope. Operationally speaking, r provides
a declarative way of managing scoping. Below are some non-theorems of Linc involving
r.
rxryBxy ¾ rzBzz rxBx ¾ 9xBx
rzBzz ¾ rxryBxy rxBx ¾ 8xBx
8yrxBxy ¾ rx8yBxy 9xBx ¾ rxBx
rxB ´ B, x not free in B 8xBx ¾ rxBx
rxryBxy ´ ryrxBxy
A notational convention
In the following sections, we often need to perform substitution of terms or predi-
cates in formulas, e.g., in describing inference rules or other meta-theoretical properties.
To simplify the meta-theoretical discussions, we adopt the following convention: when a
scheme of term is written in the form
M x1 ::: xn
where x1;:::;xn are variables, we mean that x1;:::;xn are not free in any instantiation
of M. For example, under this convention the following formulas
8x:pxy (py ^ q y) (py ¾ (rz _ q z))
are all instances of the scheme M y: The corresponding instantiations of M are
¸y:8x:pxy ¸y:(py ^ q y) ¸y:(py ¾ (rz _ q z));9
respectively. Substitution of a term s for y in this representation is then simply denoted
by (the normal form of) M s.
We still keep the informal (¯rst-order) syntax we used previously, which would
allow us to do variable-capture instantiation in certain cases. For example, when we
write down the formula scheme
8x:B
we still mean that B can be instantiated with a formula containing x. In such cases,
substitution will be written explicitly, as in the inference ¯gure in Figure 2.1 for example.
However, in the scheme 8x:B x capture-avoiding instantiation is assumed.
We shall also use the above convention for abstracting predicate symbols in a
given formula or judgment whenever it is desired. For example, we would sometimes
write a formula scheme of the form B p ¹ x. Here the scheme variable B is an abstraction
with arguments p and ¹ x. With this scheme, instantiation of B must not contain free
occurrences of the predicate p or the variables ¹ x. Similar convention applies to judgments.
For example, we will use the notation C p to denote a judgment, where C is now an
abstraction over judgments. Using this notation we can express predicate substitution
as ¯-reduction, e.g., C S denotes the judgment C p with all occurrences of p replaced by
S.
Notice that this notational convention is rather similar to higher-order abstract
syntax (HOAS), in particular, the idea of using ¯-reduction to express substitution.
However, there is one main di®erence between this syntax and HOAS: using this con-
vention we cannot express the vacuousness of occurrence of variables in a term directly
in the syntax. That is, 8x:B does not indicate that x occurs vacuously in B. In such
cases we shall indicate explicitly whether or not a variable occurs vacuously in a term.
To avoid confusion with HOAS, it is best to keep in mind that this convention is just a
way of avoiding writing substitutions explicitly at the meta-level.
2.2 A proof theoretic notion of de¯nitions
We extend the core logic in Figure 2.1 by allowing the introduction of non-logical
constants. An atomic formula, i.e., a formula that contains no occurrences of logical
constants, can be de¯ned in terms of other logical or non-logical constants. Its left and
right rules are, roughly speaking, carried out by replacing the formula corresponding to
its de¯nition with the atom itself. A de¯ned atom can thus be seen as a generalized
connective, whose behaviour is determined by its de¯ning clauses.
The syntax of de¯nition clauses used by McDowell and Miller [29] resembles that
of logic programs, that is, a de¯nition clause consists of a head and a body, with the
usual pattern matching in the head; for example, the predicate nat for natural numbers
is written
fnat z
4
= >; nat s x
4
= nat xg:
We adopt a simpler presentation by putting all pattern matching in the body and combin-
ing multiple clauses with the same head in one clause with disjunctive body. Of course,
this will require us to have explicit equality as part of our syntax. The corresponding10
nat predicate in our syntax will be written
nat x
4
= [x = z] _ 9y:[x = s y] ^ nat y
and corresponds to the notion of i®-completion of a logic program [9]. Adopting this form
of syntax will help simplifying the meta-theoretical discussions to follow. However, in
doing examples and application, we shall use the more familiar syntax of logic program,
which we shall show at the end of this chapter to be derivable from the syntax with
explicit equations.
Definition 2.2. A de¯nition clause is written 8¹ x[p ¹ x
4
= B ¹ x], where p is a predicate
constant. The atomic formula p ¹ x is called the head of the clause, and the formula B ¹ x is
called the body, whose free variables are in ¹ x. The symbol
4
= is used simply to indicate
a de¯nition clause: it is not a logical connective. A de¯nition is a (perhaps in¯nite) set
of de¯nition clauses. A predicate may occur at most once in the heads of the clauses of
a de¯nition.
We will generally omit the outer quanti¯ers in a de¯nition clause to simplify the presen-
tation.
Not all de¯nition clauses are admitted in our logic, e.g., de¯nitions with circular
calling through implications (negations) must be avoided. The reason for this restriction
is that without it cut-elimination does not hold [49]. We introduce the notion of levels
of a formula to de¯ne a proper strati¯cation on de¯nitions. To each predicate p we
associate a natural number lvl(p), the level of p. The notion of level is extended to
formulas, judgments, sequents and derivations.
Definition 2.3. Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is de¯ned as follows:
1. lvl(p¹ t) = lvl(p)
2. lvl(?) = lvl(>) = 0
3. lvl(B ^ C) = lvl(B _ C) = max(lvl(B);lvl(C))
4. lvl(B ¾ C) = max(lvl(B) + 1;lvl(C))
5. lvl(8x:B) = lvl(9x:B) = lvl(rx:B) = lvl(B).
The level of a judgment ¾ . B is the level of B, the level of a sequent §; ¡ ¡! C is the
level of C and the level of a derivation ¦ is the level of its end sequent. A de¯nition
clause 8¹ x[p ¹ x
4
= B] is strati¯ed if lvl(B) · lvl(p). A de¯nition is strati¯ed if all its
de¯nition clauses are strati¯ed.
An occurrence of a formula A in a formula C is strictly positive if that particular
occurrence of A is not to the left of any implication in C. We see that the strati¯cation
of de¯nitions above implies that for every de¯nition clause all occurrences of the head in
the body are strictly positive.11
Given a de¯nition clause p ¹ x
4
= B ¹ x, the right and left introduction rules for
predicate p are
§; ¾ . B ¹ t;¡ ¡! C
§; ¾ . p¹ t;¡ ¡! C defL
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B ¹ t
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . p¹ t defR :
The rules for equality predicates makes use of substitutions. The notion of sub-
stitutions we use here is the usual capture-avoiding substitution. We recall some basic
de¯nitions related to substitutions. A substitution µ is a mapping (with application writ-
ten in post¯x notation) from variables to terms, such that the set fx j xµ 6= xg is ¯nite.
Substitutions are denoted by µ;½;±;°, with or without subscripts. We assume implicitly
that substitutions are well-typed. That is, given a substitution µ and § ` t : ®, the
substitution µ is applicable to t only if §µ ` tµ : ®. Here the signature §µ denotes the
signature that results from removing from § the variables in the domain of µ and adding
the variables that are free in the range of µ. Of course, any new variables introduced in
§µ is also assumed to be typed appropriately beforehand.
Substitutions are extended to mappings from terms to terms in the usual fashion.
But when we refer to the domain and the range of a substitution, we refer to those
sets de¯ned on this most basic function. Composition of substitutions is de¯ned as
x(µ ± ½) = (xµ)½, for every variable x. Two substitutions µ and ½ are considered equal
if for all variables x, x½ =´ xµ (equal modulo ´-conversion). The empty substitution is
written as ². The application of a substitution µ to a generic judgment x1;:::;xn . B,
written as (x1;:::;xn . B)µ, is y1;:::;yn . B0, if (¸x1 :::¸xn:B)µ is equal (modulo ¸-
conversion) to ¸y1 :::¸yn:B0. If ¡ is a multiset of generic judgments, then ¡µ is the
multiset fDµ j D 2 ¡g.
The left and right introduction rules for equality are as follows
f§½; ¡½ ¡! C½ j (¸¹ x:s)½ =¯´ (¸¹ x:t)½g
§; ¹ x . (s = t);¡ ¡! C
eqL
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ x . t = t
eqR
The substitution ½ in eqL is called a uni¯er of s and t. In general there can be more
than one uni¯er for a given pair of terms. We therefore specify a set of sequents as the
premise of the eqL rule to mean that each sequent in the set is a premise of the rule. This
set can be in¯nite since there can potentially be in¯nite numbers of uni¯ers for a given
pair of terms, and hence the eqL rule is in general not e®ective. However, in most cases
we need only to consider a ¯nite subset of the uni¯ers in proof search. We shall return
to this in Section 2.4. Note that in applying eqL, eigenvariables can be instantiated as
a result.
2.3 Induction and co-induction
A de¯nition px
4
= B px expresses logical equivalence between px and B px. This
means that pt is provable for some term t if and only if B pt is provable. Let us collect
all term t such that pt is provable, and call it S, and let F be a function from sets of12
terms to sets of terms:
F(T ) = fs j s 2 T and B ps is provable g:
Then S is a ¯xed point of F, that is, F(S) = S. To see why this holds, take any s 2 S,
then by logical equivalence B ps is provable, so s 2 F(S). Conversely, for any s 2 F(S),
B ps is provable and again by logical equivalence ps is provable and hence is in S. In
this sense, the de¯nition clause for p encodes a ¯xed point equation and provability of
pt means that t is in some solution of the ¯xed point equation. If we take into account
local signatures, the de¯nition of F would be
F(T ) = f¸¹ x:s j ¸¹ x:s 2 T and ¹ x . B ps is provable g;
and S would be the set f¸¹ x:s j ¹ x.ps is provableg. With similar arguments we can show
that S is a ¯xed point of F. Note that there is no ambiguity with respect to the extra
¸'s since the type of s is ¯xed.
The introduction rules for de¯nition in the previous section captures only arbitrary
¯xed points, not necessarily the least nor the greatest ones. (see e.g., [21] for an example).
Therefore we add extra rules that re°ect the least and the greatest solutions, and hence
capturing induction and co-induction in our system. Note that strati¯cation of de¯nitions
guarantee that the associated ¯xed point operator is monotone, and hence we can use the
notion of pre-¯xed point and the post-¯xed point to approximate the least and greatest
¯xed points, respectively. In the following we assume that de¯nitions are not mutual-
recursively de¯ned. We could deal with mutual recursion directly but we avoid to do
so for clarity of presentation. The results and the technical proofs to follow can be
generalized to the system with mutual recursion.
Let p ¹ x
4
= B p ¹ x be a de¯nition clause and let S be a closed term of the same type
as p. The induction rules for p are
¹ x; B S ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x §; ¡; ¹ y . S ¹ t ¡! C
§; ¡; ¹ y . p¹ t ¡! C
¹L
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . B p¹ t
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t
¹R
The closed term S, which is of the same type as p, is an invariant of the induction.
The variables ¹ x are new eigenvariables. We can consider S as encoding a set denoting a
pre-¯xed point. Notice that the right-rule for induction is defR.
The co-induction rules are de¯ned dually.
§; ¹ y . B p¹ t;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ y . p¹ t;¡ ¡! C ºL
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t ¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! (B S ¹ x)
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t
ºR; where lvl(S) · lvl(p)
Dual to the induction rules, S can be seen as denoting a post-¯xed point. The ºL rule
is the defL rule. The reason for the proviso in ºR is mainly technical; it allows us to
prove cut-elimination. We do not think that the proviso is essential (in the sense that13
inconsistency might result from its removal), but so far we have not encountered co-
inductive proofs which strictly require co-inductive invariants that violate this proviso.
To avoid inconsistency, some care must be taken in applying induction or co-
induction in a proof. One obvious pitfall is when the ¯xed point equation corresponding
to a de¯nition clause has di®erent least and greatest solutions. In such case, mixing
induction and co-induction on the same de¯nition clause can lead to inconsistency. For
example, let p
4
= p be a de¯nition clause. Given the scheme of rules above without any
further restriction, we can construct the following derivation
¡! > >R > ¡! > >R
¡! p ºR
? ¡! ? ?L ? ¡! ? ?L
p ¡! ?
¹L
¡! ? cut
In the above derivation we use > and ? as the invariants in the instances of ºR and ¹L
rules. This example suggests that we have to use a de¯nition clause consistently through
out the proof, either inductively or co-inductively, but not both. To avoid this problem,
we introduce markings into a de¯nition, whose role is to indicate which introduction
rules are applicable to the corresponding de¯ned atoms.
Definition 2.4. An extended de¯nition is a de¯nition D together with a label on each
de¯nition clause in D. The label on a clause indicates whether the clause is either
inductive, co-inductive, or regular. An inductive clause is written as p ¹ x
¹
= B ¹ x, a co-
inductive clause is written as p ¹ x
º = B ¹ x and a regular clause is written as p ¹ x
4
= B ¹ x. An
extended de¯nition is strati¯ed if it is a strati¯ed de¯nition, and it satis¯es the following
requirement: for every de¯nition clause p ¹ x
4
= B ¹ x (respectively,p ¹ x
¹
= B ¹ x, p ¹ x
º = B ¹ x) it
holds that for every predicate symbol q 6= p in B, lvl(q) < lvl(p).
The di®erence between extended de¯nition and de¯nition is the level restriction lvl(q) <
lvl(p) above, which is just a way of saying that there is no mutual recursion between p
and q.
Since we shall only be concerned with extended de¯nition from now on, we shall
refer to an extended de¯nition simply as a de¯nition. The induction and co-induction
rules need additional provisos. The ¹L and ¹R rules can be applied only to an inductively
de¯ned atom. Dually, the ºL and ºR rules can only be applied to a co-inductively de¯ned
atom. The defL and defR rules apply only to regular atoms. However, we can show that
defL and defR are derived rules for (co-)inductively de¯ned atoms.
Proposition 2.5. The defL and defR are admissible rules in the core Linc system with
the induction and/or the co-induction rules.
Proof We show here how to infer defL using the core rules of Linc and induction rules.
The other case with co-induction can be done dually. Let p ¹ x
4
= B p ¹ x be the de¯nition14
under consideration: defL can be inferred from ¹L using the body B p as the invariant.
¦
¹ x; B (B p) ¹ x ¡! B p ¹ x §; ¹ y . B p¹ t;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ y . p¹ t;¡ ¡! C
¹L
:
We construct the derivation ¦ by induction on the size of B, i.e., the number of logical
constants in B. In the inductive cases, the derivation is constructed by applying the
introduction rules for the logical connectives in B, coordinated between left and right
introduction rules. For example, if B p ¹ x is B1 p ¹ x ^ B2 p ¹ x we take ¦ as
¦1
¹ x; B1 (B p) ¹ x ¡! B1 p ¹ x
¹ x; B1 (B p) ¹ x ^ B2 (B p) ¹ x ¡! B1 p ¹ x ^L
¦2
¹ y ; B2 (B p) ¹ x ¡! B2 p ¹ x
¹ y ; B2 (B p) ¹ x ^ B2 (B p) ¹ x ¡! B2 p ¹ x ^L
¹ x; B1 (B p) ¹ x ^ B2 (B p) ¹ x ¡! B1 p ¹ x ^ B2 p ¹ x ^R
where ¦1 and ¦2 are obtained by induction hypothesis. Since p occurs strictly positively
in (B p) by strati¯cation, the only non-trivial base case we need to consider is when we
reach the sub-formula p¹ t of B p ¹ x in which case we just apply the ¹R rule
§; ¹ u . B p¹ t ¡! ¹ u . B p¹ t
init
§; ¹ u . B p¹ t ¡! ¹ u . p¹ t
¹R
The inference rules for equality, de¯nition and (co-)induction are summarized in
Figure 2.2. The inference rules of the logic Linc is obtained by augmenting the core
inference rules in Figure 2.1 with those in Figure 2.2. Note that in Linc the equality
predicate is treated as a logical constant.
2.4 Some derived rules
The description of the rules of Linc given in the previous section is mainly aimed
at simplifying the meta-theoretical discussions. In practice, however, when we actually
work with a concrete operational semantics, it would help to have more tractable and
descriptive rules and de¯nitions. One of the simpler derived rule is a variant of ^L.
B;D;¡ ¡! C
B ^ D;¡ ¡! C ^L¤
It is derived in Linc as follows.
B;D;¡ ¡! C
B;B ^ D;¡ ¡! C ^L
B ^ D;B ^ D;¡ ¡! C ^L
B ^ D;¡ ¡! C cL15
Equality:
f§½; ¡½ ¡! C½ j (¸¹ x:s)½ =¯´ (¸¹ x:t)½g
§; ¹ x . (s = t);¡ ¡! C
eqL
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ x . t = t
eqR
De¯nition:
§; ¾ . B ¹ t;¡ ¡! C
§; ¾ . p¹ t;¡ ¡! C defL
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . B ¹ t
§; ¡ ¡! ¾ . p¹ t defR ;
where p ¹ x
4
= B ¹ x.
Induction:
¹ x; B S ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x §; ¡; ¹ y . S ¹ t ¡! C
§; ¡; ¹ y . p¹ t ¡! C
¹L
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . B p¹ t
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t
¹R
;
where p ¹ x
¹
= B p ¹ x.
Co-induction:
§; ¹ y . B p¹ t;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ y . p¹ t;¡ ¡! C ºL
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t ¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! (B S ¹ x)
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t ºR
where p ¹ x
º = B p ¹ x and lvl(S ¹ x) · lvl(p).
Fig. 2.2. Inference rules for equality, de¯nition and (co-)induction.16
The more interesting derived rules are those concerning the equality and de¯ni-
tions. The eqL rule is not e®ective, since given a pair of terms (s;t), if there is a uni¯er
for the pairs, then there is an in¯nite number of them. For example we can take a uni¯er
µ of (s;t) and extend it with a substitution pair containing new variables which are not
in the domain of µ. We can also vary µ on the choice of new variables introduced. Of
course, these di®erences are not essential, so in practice we need only consider much
fewer cases. The notion of complete set of uni¯ers abstracts away from some of these
inessential details.
2.4.1 Complete set of uni¯ers
A complete set of uni¯ers for two terms s and t, written CSU(s;t), is a set of
uni¯ers for s and t with the following property: if µ is a uni¯er of (s;t), then there is
a uni¯er ½ 2 CSU(s;t) such that µ = ½ ± ° for some substitution °. In the ¯rst-order
case, for example, the set which contains only the most general uni¯er is a complete set
of uni¯ers. However, in the higher-order case the complete set of uni¯ers may contain
more than one uni¯er, sometimes in¯nitely many of them.
We de¯ne an inference rule eqLcsu as follows.
f§½; ¡½ ¡! C½ j ½ 2 CSU(¸¹ x:s;¸¹ x:t)g
§; ¹ x . s = t;¡ ¡! C eqLcsu
We show that this rule is interadmissible with the eqL rule. We refer to the logic Linc
with eqLcsu but without eqL as Linccsu.
Proposition 2.6. The rule eqL and eqLcsu are interadmissible, i.e., for every deriva-
tion of a sequent in Linc, there is a derivation of the same sequent in Linccsu, and vice
versa.
Proof Let ¦ be a derivation in Linc. The proof is by induction on the height of ¦.
The only non-trivial case is when ¦ ends with eqL.
½
¦µ
§µ; ¡µ ¡! Cµ
¾
µ
§; ¹ x . s = t;¡ ¡! C
eqL
where (¸¹ x:s)µ =¯´ (¸¹ x:t)µ. By the de¯nition of CSU, any ½ 2 CSU(¸¹ x:s;¸¹ x:t) also sat-
is¯es the equation (¸¹ x:s)½ =¯´ (¸¹ x:t)½. Therefore we construct a derivation in Linccsu
as follows. (
¦½
1
§½; ¡½ ¡! C½
)
½
§; ¹ x . s = t;¡ ¡! C eqLcsu
Here ½ is a uni¯er in CSU(¸¹ x:s;¸¹ x:t) and ¦½
1 is obtained by induction hypothesis on
¦½.17
Conversely, suppose we have a derivation ¦ in Linccsu ending with eqLcsu
½
¦½
§½; ¡½ ¡! C½
¾
½
§; ¹ x . s = t;¡ ¡! C eqLcsu
We need to show that for every uni¯er µ of (¸¹ x:s;¸¹ x:t) there is a derivation ¦µ of
§½; ¡½ ¡! C½. If µ 2 CSU(¸¹ x:s;¸¹ x:t), then by induction hypothesis we have a deriva-
tion ¦µ
1 (in Linc) of the sequent §µ; ¡µ ¡! Cµ. Otherwise, by the de¯nition of CSU,
there must be a substitution ° such that µ = ½ ± ° for some ½ 2 CSU(¸¹ x:s;¸¹ x:t) and
some substitution °. In this case we ¯rst apply the induction hypothesis on ¦½ to get
a derivation ¦½
1 of §½; ¡½ ¡! C½, and then we apply Lemma 3.5 (see Chapter 3) with
substitution ° to ¦½
1 to get the derivation ¦½
1° of the sequent §µ; ¡µ ¡! Cµ.
2.4.2 Patterned de¯nitions
In most applications, it is often more convenient to work with de¯nition clauses
with explicit pattern matching on the head. That is, instead of the de¯nition scheme
p ¹ x
4
= B ¹ x we would have a ¯nite list of clauses
p¹ t1
4
= B1; p¹ t2
4
= B2; ¢¢¢; p¹ tn
4
= Bn
We shall refer to these clauses as patterned clauses. Formal de¯nition follows.
Definition 2.7. A patterned de¯nition clause is written
8¹ y:p¹ t
4
= B
where the free variables in B are in the set of free variables of ¹ t, which in turn is in ¹ y.
A patterned de¯nition is a set of patterned clauses. There can be more than one
clause, but ¯nitely many of them, in the de¯nition with the same head. The strati¯cation
of the patterned de¯nition is the same as the usual de¯nition and mutual recursion is
not allowed. Patterned (co-)inductive clauses and de¯nitions are de¯ned analogously.
The patterned de¯nition serves only as an abbreviation for the usual de¯nition.
The corresponding de¯nition of a patterned de¯nition is de¯ned as follows.
Definition 2.8. Let D be a patterned de¯nition. The corresponding de¯nition of D is
obtained by replacing the set of de¯nition clauses for p
8¹ y1:p t11 ::: t1m
4
= B1;
. . .
8¹ yn:p tn1 ::: tnm
4
= Bn18
by the de¯nition clause
px1 :::xm
4
= 9¹ y1:(x1 = t11 ^ ::: ^ xm = t1m ^ B1) _
. . .
_ 9¹ yn:(x1 = tn1 ^ ::: ^ xm = tnm ^ Bn)
for every predicate p de¯ned in D.
We wish to derive the rules that apply directly to patterned de¯nition, similar to
the de¯nition rules in FO¸¢IN and FO¸¢r [38]. As in FO¸¢r, we need to take into
account the local signature when applying the rules for patterned de¯nition. This makes
the description of the rules slightly complicated. We need a couple more de¯nitions.
Definition 2.9. Let 8¿1x1 :::8¿nxn:H
4
= B be a patterned de¯nition clause. Let y1,
:::, ym be a list of variables of types ®1,:::,®m, respectively. A raised patterned def-
inition clause, or raised de¯nition clause for short, with respect to the signature fy1 :
®1;:::;ym : ®mg is de¯ned as
8h1 :::8hn:¹ y . Hµ
4
= ¹ y . Bµ
where µ is the substitution [(h1 ¹ y)=x1;:::;(hn ¹ y)=xn] and hi, for every i 2 f1;:::;ng, is
of type ®1 ! ::: ! ®m ! ¿i.
Definition 2.10. The four-place relation dfn(½;A;µ;B) holds for the atomic judgment
A, the judgment B, and the substitutions ½ and µ if there is a raised clause H
4
= B in
the given de¯nition such that A½ = Hµ.
Observe that in the above de¯nition, for the relation dfn(½;A;µ;B) to hold, the
judgments A, B and H must share the same local signature (up to ®-conversion). We
are now ready to describe the rules for patterned de¯nitions, which we refer to here as
defL= and defR=.
§; ¡ ¡! Bµ
§; ¡ ¡! A
defR=; where dfn(²;A;µ;B)
f§½; Bµ;¡½ ¡! C½ j dfn(½;A;µ;B)g
§; A;¡ ¡! C defL=
Proposition 2.11. The rules defL= and defR= are admissible in Linc.
Proof Follows immediately from De¯nition 2.8, De¯nition 2.9 and De¯nition 2.10.
The defR= is derived by using 9R, ^R and eqR rules, while the defL= is derived by
using 9L, cL, ^L, and eqL rules.
A variant of defL= rule is to use the notion of CSU, as the following.
f§½; B½;¡½ ¡! C½ j H
4
= B is a raised def. clause s.t. ½ 2 CSU(A;H)g
§; A;¡ ¡! C defLcsu19
where H
4
= B is a raised de¯nition clause. The admissibility of this rule is immediate
from the admissibility of eqLcsu.
Proposition 2.12. The rule defLcsu is admissible in Linc.
We now illustrate the use of Linc to prove a simple property about natural num-
bers in the following example. More elaborate examples are discussed in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6.
Example 2.13. We can specify the odd and even natural numbers as the following
inductive de¯nition clauses.
odd N
¹
= N = (s z) _ 9M:N = (s (s M)) ^ odd M:
even N
¹
= N = z _ 9M:N = (s (s M)) ^ even M:
Here the constants z : nt and s : nt ! nt, where nt is the type representing natural
numbers, denote the natural number zero and the successor function, respectively. We
prove that the successor of an odd number is an even number. This is stated formally as
8Nodd N ¾ even (s N):
This formula is proved by structural induction on odd, using the invariant
¸n even (s n):
The last three rules of the formal proof is as follows.
N ; odd N ¡! even (s N)
N ; : ¡! odd N ¾ even (s N)
¾ R
:; : ¡! 8Nodd N ¾ even (s N) 8R
Applying the ¹L-rule to the topmost sequent yields two premises
1. N0 ; N0 = (s z) _ 9M:N0 = s (s M) ^ even (s M) ¡! even (s N0), and
2. N ; even (s N) ¡! even (s N).
Notice that in the ¯rst premise, the left-hand side of the sequent is the body of the
de¯nition clause of odd with the odd predicate replaced by the invariant ¸n even (s n).
The second premise is immediately provable by using the init-rule. For the ¯rst premise,
we apply ¯rst the _L-rule, which gives us the following premises.
1.a. N0 ; N0 = (s z) ¡! even (s N0),
1.b. N0 ; 9M:N0 = s (s M) ^ even (s M) ¡! even (s N0).20
The proof for the sequent 1.a. is the following.
¡! s (s z) = s (s z)
eqR
¡! z = z eqR
¡! z = z _ 9M:z = s (s M) ^ even M _R
¡! even z defR
¡! s (s z) = s (s z) ^ even z ^R
¡! 9M:s (s z) = s (s M) ^ even M 9R
¡! (s (s z)) = z _ 9M:s (s z) = s (s M) ^ even M _R
¡! even (s (s z)) defR
N0 ; N0 = (s z) ¡! even (s N0)
eqLcsu
Notice that in the application of eqLcsu, the eigenvariable N0 is instantiated with the
term (s z), and it is removed from the signature of the premise sequent. The proof for
the sequent 1.b. is as follows.
M ; even (s M) ¡! even (s (s (s M)))
N0;M ; N0 = s (s M);even (s M) ¡! even (s N0)
eqLcsu
N0;M ; N0 = s (s M) ^ even (s M) ¡! even (s N0)
^L¤
N0 ; 9M:N0 = s (s M) ^ even (s M) ¡! even (s N0)
9L
It is easy to see that the remainder of the proof can be constructed by applying defR,
_R, 9R and init rules.
2.5 Related work
The notion of de¯nitions as it is in Linc has been previously studied by HallnÄ as
[22], Schroeder-Heister [50], Eriksson [14], Girard [21], StÄ ark [55] and McDowell and
Miller [29]. We adopt a simpler form of de¯nition clauses by putting all pattern matching
in the body of the de¯nition clause, and formulating separate free equality rules. This
separation corresponds to i®-completion in logic programming [9]. Our formulation of
de¯nitions closely resembles that of FO¸¢IN. In fact, Linc can be seen as a consistent
extension of FO¸¢IN with generalized induction and co-induction proof rules and the
r-quanti¯er.
It is natural to ask about possible connections between the r-quanti¯er and the
new quanti¯er of Gabbay and Pitts [17, 45]. Both are self dual and both have similar sets
of applications in mind. There are signi¯cant di®erences, however: r has a natural proof
theory with a cut-elimination theorem but has no set theoretic semantics, while Gabbay
and Pitts have a model theory based on set theory but no cut-elimination result. While
r neither implies nor is implied by 8 or 9, the quanti¯er of Gabbay and Pitts is entailed
by 8 and entails 9. Gabbay and Pitts quanti¯er allows quanti¯cation on type name,
which is presupposed to be non-empty, whereas r allows quanti¯cation over arbitrary
type and does not presuppose any type inhabitant.
There have been several works on formalization of (co)-induction in sequent sys-
tems. However, Linc is as far as we know the ¯rst sequent system which incorporates21
both generalized induction and co-induction in the same system and still admits cut-
elimination (Chapter 4), from which the consistency of the logic follows. The logic
FO¸¢IN has a formalization of induction, but it is restricted to natural number in-
duction. Eriksson's calculus of partial inductive de¯nitions [14] has a formalization of
generalized induction but the system has no cut-elimination. The logic CLP8 [11],
has both induction and co-induction rules, in the setting of constraint logic program-
ming. However, this system does not allow mixing of induction and co-induction in
the same proof, and cut-rule is not present in the system, thus composition of proofs is
not supported in the logic. There are also some recent works in the area of ¯xed pointed
logics [48, 52, 54, 10], where (co-)induction is formalized via the notion of circular proofs.
Linc can be seen as the meta-theory of the simply typed ¸-calculus, in the same
sense in which SchÄ urmann's M! [51] is the meta-theory of LF [24]. The logic M! is a
constructive ¯rst-order logic, whose quanti¯ers range over possibly open LF object over
a signature. In the meta-logic it is possible to express and inductively prove meta-logical
properties of an object logic. By the adequacy of the encoding, the proof of the existence
of the appropriate LF object(s) guarantees the proof of the corresponding object-level
property. However, M! does not support co-induction yet. The new quanti¯er r also
gives Linc more expressive power than M! in terms of reasoning about object-systems
with intrinsic notion of freshness and scoping of names (see Chapter 6).22
Chapter 3
Properties of Derivations
We discuss several properties of derivations in Linc. Some of them involve trans-
formations on derivations which will be used extensively in the cut-elimination proof
in the chapter to follow. The other properties are concerned with a particular class of
de¯nitions used in proof search, namely Horn de¯nitions (i.e., de¯nitions whose bodies
contain no implications). The interest in this class of de¯nitions is justi¯ed by the fact
that there are many speci¯cations of operational semantics that fall into this category,
as we shall see in the following chapters.
Before we proceed, some remarks on the use of eigenvariables in derivations must
be mentioned. In proof search involving 8R, 9L ¹L, ºR or eqL, new eigenvariables can
be introduced in the premises of the rules. Let us refer to such variables as internal
eigenvariables, since they occur only in the premise derivations. We view the choice of
such eigenvariables as arbitrary and therefore we identify derivations that di®er only in
the choice of the eigenvariables introduced by those rules. Another way to look at it is
to consider eigenvariables as proof-level binders. Hence when we work with a derivation,
we actually work with an equivalence class of derivations modulo renaming of internal
eigenvariables.
In this and the following chapters, we shall leave as much information implicit in
a sequent or a derivation, as long as no ambiguity arises. In particular, we shall avoid
writing the global signature explicitly whenever possible, e.g., when the signature can
be inferred from context. For example, in describing transformation on derivations that
involves only propositional connectives; often in such cases there is no change in the
global signature involved. We shall also omit the local signatures in certain cases. For
this to work, we shall allow a slight abuse of notation by writing for example B ^ C
instead of ¹ y . B ^ C. Whenever we do this, it is assumed implicitly that B and C share
the same local signature.
3.1 Instantiating derivations
The following de¯nition extends substitutions to apply to derivations. Since we
identify derivations that di®er only in the choice of variables that are not free in the end-
sequent, we will assume that such variables are chosen to be distinct from the variables in
the domain of the substitution and from the free variables of the range of the substitution.
Thus applying a substitution to a derivation will only a®ect the variables free in the end-
sequent.
Definition 3.1. If ¦ is a derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C and µ is a substitution, then we
de¯ne the derivation ¦µ of §µ; ¡µ ¡! Cµ as follows:23
1. Suppose ¦ ends with the eqL rule
½
¦½
§½; ¡0½ ¡! C½
¾
½
§; ¹ x . s = t;¡0 ¡! C
eqL
where (¸¹ x:s)½ =¯´ (¸¹ x:t)½: Observe that any uni¯er for the pair
((¸¹ x:s)µ;(¸¹ x:t)µ)
can be transformed to another uni¯er for (¸¹ x:s;¸¹ x:t), by composing the uni¯er with
µ. Thus ¦µ is (
¦µ±½0
§µ½0 ; ¡0µ½0 ¡! Cµ½0
)
½0
§µ; (¹ x . s = t)µ;¡0µ ¡! Cµ
eqL
;
where (¸¹ x:s)µ½0 =¯´ (¸¹ x:t)µ½0.
2. If ¦ ends with any other rule and has premise derivations ¦1;:::;¦n, then ¦µ
also ends with the same rule and has premise derivations ¦1µ;:::;¦nµ.
Among the premises of the inference rules of Linc, certain premises share the
same right-hand side judgment as in the sequent in the conclusion. We refer to such
premises as major premises. This notion of major premise will be useful in proving
cut-elimination, as certain proof transformations involve only major premises.
Definition 3.2. Given an inference rule ² with one or more premise sequents, we de¯ne
its major premise sequents as follows.
1. If ² is either ¾ L;mc or ¹L, then its right premise is the major premise
2. If ² is ºR then its left premise is the major premise.
3. Otherwise, all the premises of ² are major premises.
The de¯nition extends to derivations by replacing premise sequents with premise deriva-
tions.
The following two measures on derivations will be useful later in proving many
properties of the logic. Note that given the possible in¯nite branching of eqL rule, these
measure in general can be ordinals. Therefore in proofs involving induction on those
measures, trans¯nite induction is needed. However, in most of the inductive proofs to
follow, we often do case analyses on the last rule of a derivation. In such a situation,
the inductive cases for both successor ordinals and limit ordinals are basically covered
by the case analyses on the inference ¯gures involved, and we shall not make explicit use
of trans¯nite induction.
Definition 3.3. Given a derivation ¦ with premise derivations f¦igi, the measure
ht(¦) is the least upper bound of fht(¦i) + 1gi.24
Definition 3.4. Given a derivation ¦ with premise derivations f¦igi, the measure
ind(¦) is de¯ned as follows
ind(¦) =
(
lub(find(¦i)gi) + 1; if ¦ ends with ¹L,
lub(find(¦i)gi); otherwise.
Lemma 3.5. For any substitution µ and derivation ¦ of §; ¡ ¡! C, ¦µ is a derivation
of §µ; ¡µ ¡! Cµ.
Proof This lemma states that De¯nition 3.1 is well-constructed, and follows by in-
duction on ht(¦).
Lemma 3.6. For any derivation ¦ and substitution µ, ht(¦) ¸ ht(¦µ) and ind(¦) ¸
ind(¦µ).
Proof By induction on ht(¦). The measures may not be equal because when the
derivations end with the eqL rule, some of the premise derivations of ¦ may not be
needed to construct the premise derivations of ¦µ.
Lemma 3.7. For any derivation ¦ and substitutions µ and ½, the derivations (¦µ)½ and
¦(µ ± ½) are the same derivation.
Proof By induction on the measure ht(¦).
3.2 Atomic initial rule
It is a common property of most logics that the initial rule can be restricted to
atomic form, that is, the rule
§; ¹ x . p¹ t ¡! ¹ x . p¹ t
init
where p is a predicate symbol. The more general rule is derived as follows.
Definition 3.8. We construct a derivation IdC of the sequent §; C ¡! C inductively
as follows. The induction is on the size of the judgment C. If C is an atomic judgment we
simply apply the atomic initial rule. Otherwise, we apply the left and right introduction
rules for the topmost logical constant in C, probably with some instances of contraction
and weakening rule.
The proof of the following lemma is straightforward by induction on ht(IdC).
Lemma 3.9. For any judgment C, it holds that ind(IdC) = 0.
Restricting the initial rule to atomic form will simplify some technical de¯nitions
to follow. We shall use Id instead of IdC to denote identity derivations since the judgment
C is always known from context.25
3.3 Weakening and scoping of signatures
The following lemmas state that we can extend both the global and local signa-
tures in a provable sequent without a®ecting its provability. Again as before, when new
eigenvariables are introduced in the end sequent of a derivation, it is implicitly assumed
that they are di®erent from the eigenvariables occuring in the derivation but not free in
the end sequent.
Definition 3.10. Let ¦ be a derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C. Let §0 be a signature di®erent
from §. We construct a derivation §0:¦ by adding §0 to the signature of every sequent
in the derivation tree of ¦, except in the case ¹L where §0 is added only to the right
premise derivation, and in the case ºR where §0 is added to the left premise derivation.
Lemma 3.11. Let ¦ be a derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C and let §0 be a signature distinct
from §. Then §0 : ¦ is a derivation of §;§0 ; ¡ ¡! C, and ht(§0 : ¦) = ht(¦) and
ind(§0:¦) = ind(¦).
Proof By induction on ht(¦).
In the following, whenever we write §0 : ¦, it is assumed that the derivation is
well-formed. This means implicitly the signature §0 is distinct from the signature in the
end sequent of ¦.
Lemma 3.12. Scope weakening. Let ¦ be a derivation of
§;x; ¹ z¹ z1 . B1;:::; ¹ z¹ zn . Bn ¡! ¹ z¹ z0 . B0
where x is not in the lists of variables ¹ z and ¹ z0;:::; ¹ zn. Then there is a derivation ¦0 of
§; ¹ zx¹ z1 . B1;:::; ¹ zx¹ zn . Bn ¡! ¹ zx¹ z0 . B0
such that ht(¦0) · ht(¦) and ind(¦0) · ind(¦).
Proof By induction on ht(¦). We show here the non-trivial cases. In the following
we shall denote ¹ z¹ zi . Bi with Bi and ¹ zx¹ zi . Bi with B0
i.
1. Suppose ¦ ends with rR (the case with rL is symmetric).
¦1
B1;:::;Bn ¡! ¹ z¹ z0y . B0
B1;:::;Bn ¡! ¹ z¹ z0 . ry:B0 rR :
Then ¦0 is the derivation
¦0
1
B0
1;:::;B0
n ¡! ¹ zx¹ z0y . B0
B0
1;:::;B0
n ¡! ¹ zx¹ z0 . ry:B0 rR :
where ¦0
1 is obtained from induction hypothesis.26
2. Suppose ¦ ends with 8R (the case with 9L is symmetric).
¦1
§;x;h; B1;:::;Bn ¡! ¹ z¹ z0 . B0 (h ¹ z¹ z0)
§;x; B1;:::;Bn ¡! ¹ z¹ z0 . 8y:B0 y
8R
We apply the substitution µ = [(¸¹ z¸¹ z0:h0 ¹ zx¹ z0)=h] to ¦1 to get the derivation ¦1µ
of
§;x;h0 ; B1;:::;Bn ¡! ¹ z¹ z0 . B0 (h0 ¹ zx¹ z0):
Since ht(¦1µ) · ht(¦1) we can apply induction hypothesis to ¦1µ to get the
derivation ¦0
1 of
§;h0 ; B0
1;:::;B0
n ¡! ¹ zx¹ z0 . B0 (h0 ¹ zx¹ z0):
The derivation ¦0 is thus
¦0
1
§;h0 ; B0
1;:::;B0
n ¡! ¹ zx¹ z0 . B0 (h0 ¹ zx¹ z0)
§; B0
1;:::;B0
n ¡! ¹ zx¹ z0 . 8y:B0 y
8R :
3. Suppose ¦ ends with eqL
½
¦½
(§;x)½; B2½;:::;Bn½ ¡! B0½
¾
½
§;x; ¹ z ¹ z1 . s = t;B2;:::;Bn ¡! B0
eqL
where (¸¹ z¸¹ z1:s)½ =¯´ (¸¹ z¸¹ z1:t)½. We need to construct a derivation for the
sequent
§½0 ; B0
2½0;:::;B0
n½0 ¡! B0
0½0
for each uni¯er ½0 satisfying
(¸¹ z¸x¸¹ z1:s)½0 =¯´ (¸¹ z¸x¸¹ z1:t)½0:
If x 62 dom(½0) [ ran(½0), it can be shown by induction on the structure of terms
that
(¸¹ z¸¹ z1:s)½0 =¯´ (¸¹ z¸¹ z1:t)½0:
Hence in this case we can apply induction hypothesis to ¦½0
to get a derivation
¦½0
1 of the above sequent. In the case where x 2 dom(½0) [ ran(½0), notice that ½0
is also a uni¯er for the pair (¸¹ z¸w¸¹ z1:s[w=x];¸¹ z¸w¸¹ z1:t[w=x]) where w is chosen
to be di®erent from any variable in the above sequent. Therefore, the substitution27
½00 = [w=x] ± ½0 can be shown to satisfy
(¸¹ z¸¹ z1:s)½00 =¯´ (¸¹ z¸¹ z1:t)½00:
By the de¯nition of eqL, there is a derivation, that is, ¦[w=x]±½0
of
§½0;w; (¹ z¹ z2 . B2[w=x])½0;:::;(¹ z¹ zn . Bn[w=x])½0 ¡! (¹ z¹ z0 . B0[w=x])½0:
We can then apply induction hypothesis to get a derivation ¦½0
2 of
§½0 ; (¹ zw¹ z2 . B2[w=x])½0;:::;(¹ zw¹ zn . Bn[w=x])½0 ¡! (¹ zw¹ z0 . B0[w=x])½0
which is ®-equivalent to
§½0 ; (¹ zx¹ z2 . B2)½0;:::;(¹ zx¹ zn . Bn)½0 ¡! (¹ zx¹ z0 . B0)½0:
Lemma 3.13. Let ¦ be a derivation of
§; ¹ z¹ z1 . B1 a;:::; ¹ z¹ zn . Bn a ¡! ¹ z¹ z0 . B0 a
where a is a global constant. Then there is a derivation ¦0 of
§; ¹ zx¹ z1 . B1 x;:::; ¹ zx¹ zn . Bn x ¡! ¹ zx¹ z0 . B0 x
without the global constant a, such that ht(¦0) · ht(¦) and ind(¦0) · ind(¦).
Proof The proof is by induction on ht(¦). The case analysis is essentially the same
as the proof for Lemma 3.12 in most cases. The only di®erence is in case where ¦ ends
with eqL. In this case we need to show that the set of uni¯ers for the equation
¸¹ z¸x¸¹ zi:sx = ¸¹ z¸x¸¹ zi:tx
is included in the set of uni¯ers of
¸¹ z¸¹ zi:sa = ¸¹ z¸¹ zi:ta
where a is treated as a global constant. Let ½ be a uni¯er for the ¯rst equation. Since a
is not admitted as a constant in the ¯rst equation, it cannot occur free in the range of
the substitution ½. We can assume without loss of generality that the variables in ¹ z;x; ¹ zi
are all di®erent from the free variables in ½ (otherwise, apply renaming to both equation
so they are di®erent) so we can push the substitution under the binders. Therefore we
have (sx)½ = (s½)x = (t½)x = (tx)½ and (s½)a = (s½)a. Hence ½ is also a uni¯er for
the second equation.28
Lemma 3.14. Local signature weakening. Let ¦ be a derivation of
§; ¾1 . B1;:::;¾n . Bn ¡! ¾0 . B0
and let x be a variable di®erent from §;¾0;:::;¾n. Then there is a derivation l(¦;x) of
§; x¾1 . B1;:::;x¾n . Bn ¡! x¾0 . B0
such that ht(l(¦;x)) · ht(¦) and ind(l(¦;x)) · ind(¦)..
Proof Immediate consequence of Lemma 3.11 and Lemma 3.12.
Definition 3.15. Raised sequents. Let § be the signature
fh1 : ¿1;:::;hn : ¿ng
and let ¹ ® be the list of types ®1;:::;®m. An ¹ ®-raised signature of §, written §¹ ®, is the
set
fh0
1 : ®1 ! ::: ! ®m ! ¿1;:::;h0
n : ®1 ! ::: ! ®m ! ¿ng
where the variables h0
1;:::;h0
n are chosen to be distinct from the ones in §. Let ¹ y be the
list of pairwise distinct variables y1 : ®1;:::;yn : ®m; which are not already in § and
§¹ ®, and let µ be the substitution
[(h0
1 y1 :::ym)=h1;:::;(h0
n y1 :::ym)=hn]:
Given a sequent
§; ¾1 . B1;:::;¾n . Bn ¡! ¾0 . B0
such that variables in ¾0;:::;¾n are all di®erent from §¹ ® and ¹ y, we de¯ne the ¹ ®-raised
sequent as the sequent
§¹ ® ; ¹ y¾1 . B1µ;:::; ¹ y¾n . Bnµ ¡! ¹ y¾0 . B0µ
Lemma 3.16. Let ¦ be a proof of a sequent S. Then for every list of types ¹ ®, there is
a proof ¦"¹ ® of the ¹ ®-raised sequent S0 of S such that ht(¦"¹ ®) · ht(¦) and ind(¦"¹ ®) ·
ind(¦).
Proof We apply Lemma 3.11 to introduce the list of new variables ¹ y of type ¹ ® to the
global context, and then apply the substitution µ (as de¯ned in De¯nition 3.15), followed
by weakening of the scope of ¹ y by Lemma 3.12. Since each step in the construction does
not increase the measures of the derivation, the end derivation does not have higher
measure than the original one.
Definition 3.17. A derivation ¦ is a raised instance of a derivation ¥ if ¦ is ob-
tained from ¥ by raising the eigenvariables in the end sequent of ¥ (as described in the
construction in Lemma 3.16), followed by application of a substitution to the resulting
derivation.
Lemma 3.18. If ¦ is a raised instance of ¥, then ht(¦) · ht(¥) and ind(¦) · ind(¥).29
3.4 Unfolding of derivations
Definition 3.19. Inductive unfolding. Let p ¹ x
¹
= B p ¹ x be an inductive de¯nition. Let
¦ be a derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C p where p occurs strictly positively in C p. Let S be a
closed term of the same type as p and let ¦S be a derivation of the sequent
¹ x; B S ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x:
We de¯ne the derivation ¹(¦;¦S) of §; ¡ ¡! C S as follows.
If C p = C S, then ¹(¦;¦S) = ¦. Otherwise, we de¯ne ¹(¦;¦S) based on the last
rule in ¦.
1. Suppose ¦ ends with init
§; ¹ y . p¹ t ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t
init
:
Then ¹(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¦S
¹ x; B S ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
Id
§; S ¹ t ¡! S ¹ t
§; ¹ y . p¹ t ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t
¹L
2. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ L
¦1
§; ¡0 ¡! ¹ y . D1
¦2
§; ¹ y . D2;¡0 ¡! C p
§; ¹ y . D1 ¾ D2;¡0 ¡! C p
¾ L
Then ¹(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¦1
§; ¡0 ¡! ¹ y . D1
¹(¦2;¦S)
§; ¹ y . D2;¡0 ¡! C S
§; ¹ y . D1 ¾ D2;¡0 ¡! C S
¾ L
3. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ R
¦0
§; ¡; ¹ y . C1 p ¡! ¹ y . C2 p
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . C1 p ¾ C2 p ¾ R
By the restriction on the occurences of p in C p, it must be the case that C1 p = C1 S.
The derivation ¹(¦;¦S) is then de¯ned as follows.
¹(¦0;¦S)
§; ¡; ¹ y . C1 p ¡! ¹ y . C2 S
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . C1 p ¾ C2 S ¾ R30
4. Suppose ¦ ends with mc
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 :::
¦m
§; ¢m ¡! Bm
¦0
§; B1;:::;Bm;¡0 ¡! C p
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! C p
mc
Then ¹(¦;¦S) is
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 :::
¦m
§; ¢m ¡! Bm
¹(¦0;¦S)
§; B1;:::;Bm;¡0 ¡! C S
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! C S
mc
5. Suppose ¦ ends with ¹L on some predicate q given a de¯nition clause q ¹ z
¹
= Dq ¹ z.
ª
¹ z ; DI ¹ z ¡! I ¹ z
¦0
§; ¹ y . I ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C p
§; ¹ y . q ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C p
¹L
Then ¹(¦;¦S) is the derivation
ª
¹ z ; DI ¹ z ¡! I ¹ z
¹(¦0;¦S)
§; ¹ y . I ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C S
§; ¹ y . q ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C S
¹L
6. Suppose ¦ ends with ¹R
¦0
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . B p¹ t
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t
¹R
where ¹ t = t1;:::;tm. Then ¹(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¹(¦0;¦S)
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . B S ¹ t
¥
§; ¹ y . B S ¹ t ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t
mc
where the derivation ¥ is a raised instance of ¦S.
7. If ¦ ends with any other rules, and has premise derivations f¦igi2I for some index
set I, then ¹(¦;¦S) also ends with the same rule and has premise derivations
f¹(¦i;¦S)gi2I.
Definition 3.20. Co-inductive unfolding. Let p ¹ x
º = B p ¹ x be a co-inductive de¯nition.
Let S be a closed term of the same type as p and let ¦S be a derivation of
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x:31
Let C p be a judgment such that lvl(C p) · lvl(p), and let ¦ be a derivation of §; ¡ ¡!
C S. We de¯ne the derivation º(¦;¦S) of §; ¡ ¡! C p as follows.
If C p = C S, then º(¦;¦S) = ¦. If C p = ¹ y . p¹ t then C S = ¹ y . S ¹ t and º(¦;¦S)
is the derivation
¦
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t ºR
Otherwise, we de¯ne º(¦;¦S) based on the last rule in ¦.
1. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ L
¦1
§; ¡0 ¡! ¹ y . D1
¦2
§; ¹ y . D2;¡0 ¡! C S
§; ¹ y . D1 ¾ D2;¡0 ¡! C S
¾ L
Then º(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¦1
§; ¡0 ¡! ¹ y . D1
º(¦2;¦S)
§; ¹ y . D2;¡0 ¡! C p
§; ¹ y . D1 ¾ D2;¡0 ¡! C p
¾ L
2. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ R
¦0
§; ¡; ¹ y . C1 S ¡! ¹ y . C2 S
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . C1 S ¾ C2 S ¾ R
Since lvl(C p) · lvl(p), it must be the case that p occurs strictly positively in C p,
hence C1 S = C1 p. Therefore we construct the derivation º(¦;¦S) as follows.
º(¦0;¦S)
§; ¡; ¹ y . C1 S ¡! ¹ y . C2 p
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ y . C1 S ¾ C2 p ¾ R
3. Suppose ¦ ends with mc
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 :::
¦m
§; ¢m ¡! Bm
¦0
§; B1;:::;Bm;¡0 ¡! C S
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! C S
mc
Then º(¦;¦S) is
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 :::
¦m
§; ¢m ¡! Bm
º(¦0;¦S)
§; B1;:::;Bm;¡0 ¡! C p
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! C p
mc32
4. Suppose ¦ ends with ¹L on a predicate q ¹ t, given an inductive de¯nition q ¹ z
¹
= Dq ¹ z.
ª
¹ z ; DI ¹ z ¡! I ¹ z
¦0
§; ¹ y . I ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C S
§; ¹ y . q ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C S
¹L
Then º(¦;¦S) is the derivation
ª
¹ z ; DI ¹ z ¡! I ¹ z
º(¦0;¦S)
§; ¹ y . I ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C p
§; q ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C p
¹L
5. If ¦ ends with any other rules, and has premise derivations f¦igi2I for some index
set I, then º(¦;¦S) also ends with the same rule and has premise derivations
fº(¦i;¦S)gi2I.
Lemma 3.21. The derivations ¹(¦;¦S)µ and ¹(¦µ;¦S) are the same derivation.
Proof Suppose ¦ is a derivation of the sequent §; ¡ ¡! Cp and ¦S is a derivation of
the sequent ¹ x; B S ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x, given an inductive de¯nition p ¹ x
¹
= B p ¹ x and an invariant
S.
The proof is by induction on ht(¦) and case analysis on C. We make use of the
fact that S is a closed term and hence una®ected by the substitution µ, i.e., Sµ = S.
Most cases follow immediately from inductive hypothesis. We show here the interesting
ones. In the following, we omit some information from the sequents when they do not
play active role during the transformation steps.
1. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ R, then C p = ¹ y . C1 p ¾ C2 p. Since p has only strictly
positive occurrences in C p, it is the case that C S = ¹ y.C1 p ¾ C2 S. We show that
applying unfolding and substitution in any order produces the same derivation.
¦0
:::; ¹ y . C1 p ¡! ¹ y . C2 p
::: ¡! ¹ y . C1 p ¾ C2 p ¾ R
¹
=)1
¹(¦0;¦S)
:::; ¹ y . C1 p ¡! ¹ y . C2 S
::: ¡! ¹ y . C1 p ¾ C2 S ¾ R
+2 µ +3 µ
¦0µ
:::;(¹ y . C1 p)µ ¡! (¹ y . C2 p)µ
::: ¡! (¹ y . C1 p ¾ C2 p)µ
¾ R
¹
=)4
¹(¦0µ;¦S)
:::;(¹ y . C1 p)µ ¡! (¹ y . C2 S)µ
::: ¡! (¹ y . C1 p ¾ C2 S)µ
¾ R
In Step 3, we apply the inductive hypothesis ¹(¦0;¦S)µ = ¹(¦0µ;¦S).33
2. Suppose ¦ ends with eqL.
½
¦½
¡0½ ¡! (C p)½
¾
½
¹ y . s = t;¡0 ; C p ¡!
eqL
¹
=)1
(
¹(¦½;¦S)
¡0½ ¡! (C S)½
)
½
¹ y . s = t;¡0 ¡! C S
eqL
+2 µ +3 µ
(
¦µ±½0
¡0µ½0 ¡! (C p)µ½0
)
½0
(¹ y . s = t)µ;¡0µ ¡! (C p)µ
eqL
¹
=)4
8
<
:
¹(¦µ±½0
;¦S)
¡0µ½0 ¡! (C S)µ½0
9
=
;
½0
(¹ y . s = t)µ;¡0µ ¡! (C S)µ
eqL
In the transformation in Step 3, we apply eqL to (¹ y . s = t)µ. Note that, by
De¯nition 3.1, applying substitution to a derivation ending with eqL does not
change or add new premises. Therefore the premise derivations of ¹(¦;¦S)µ are
already contained in the premise set of ¹(¦;¦S). Hence inductive hypothesis is
not needed in this case. And since in Step 2 we apply eqL to the same judgment
(¹ y . s = t)µ, the set of uni¯ers obtained in Step 2 and Step 3 are exactly the same
and therefore applying Step 2 and 4 produces the same derivations as applying
Step 1 and 3.
3. Suppose ¦ ends with ¹R and C p = p¹ u for some ¹ u.
¦0
¡ ¡! ¹ y . B p ¹ u
¡ ¡! ¹ y . p ¹ u
¹R
¹
=)1
¹(¦0;¦S)
¡ ¡! ¹ y . B S ¹ u
¥
¹ y . B S ¹ u ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ u
¡ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ u
mc
+2 µ +3 µ
¦0µ
¡µ ¡! (¹ y . B p ¹ u)µ
¡µ ¡! (¹ y . p ¹ u)µ
¹R
¹
=)4
¹(¦0µ;¦S)
¡µ ¡! (¹ y . B S ¹ u)µ
¥0
(¹ y . B S ¹ u)µ ¡! (¹ y . S ¹ u)µ
¡µ ¡! (¹ y . S ¹ u)µ
In Step 3, we apply the inductive hypothesis ¹(¦0;¦S)µ = ¹(¦0µ;¦S). From the
construction of ¥ and ¥0 as de¯ned in De¯nition 3.19, we can verify that ¥µ = ¥0.
Lemma 3.22. The derivations º(¦;¦S)µ and º(¦µ;¦S) are the same derivation.
Proof By induction on the measure ht(¦). Most cases are similar to the proof of
Lemma 3.21. The only non-trivial case is when C p = ¹ y . p ¹ u, i.e., C S = ¹ y . S ¹ u. In this34
case, we have:
¦
¡ ¡! ¹ y . Si¹ u
º =)1
¦
¡ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ u
¦S
S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x
¡ ¡! ¹ y . p ¹ u ºR
+2 µ +3 µ
¦µ
¡µ ¡! (¹ y . S ¹ u)µ
º =)4
¦µ
¡µ ¡! (¹ y . S ¹ u)µ
¦S
S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x
¡µ ¡! (¹ y . p ¹ u)µ ºR
In Step 3, notice that since ¹ x are new eigenvariables, and hence not in the domain of µ
(by the de¯nition of substitution of derivations), ¦Sµ = ¦S.
The unfolding of derivations obviously commutes with weakening of global signa-
tures.
Lemma 3.23. The derivation ¹(§:¦;¦S) and §:¹(¦;¦S) are the same derivation.
Lemma 3.24. The derivation º(§:¦;¦S) and §:º(¦;¦S) are the same derivation.
3.5 Logical equivalence
Logical equivalence is de¯ned via implications, i.e., B ´ C if and only if B ¾
C ^C ¾ B is provable. For all known logics, logical equivalence is a congruence, that is,
it is preserved by arbitrary context. Since we have introduced a new connective r we
need to verify whether this property still holds. We de¯ne a context as a formula with a
hole [:], denoted by C[:]. Given a context C[:], C[A] denotes a formula obtained from C[:]
by replacing the hole [:] with A. Note that this replacement is a textual replacement,
hence there can be variable capture, i.e., free variables in A become bound in C[A].
Proposition 3.25. The logical equivalence relation ´ is a congruence relation, i.e., if
A ´ B then C[A] ´ C[B] for arbitrary context C[:].
Proof The proof is by induction on the size of the context C[:], i.e, the number of
logical connectives in C[:]. The non-trivial case is of course when C[:] = rx:C0[:]. By
induction hypothesis we know that C0[A] ´ C0[B]. We distinguish two cases based on
the occurrence of x in A and B. If x is not free in both A and B, by Lemma 3.14 we
have a derivation x . (C0[A] ´ C0[B]) and hence by applying rR rule we also have a
derivation of rx:(C0[A] ´ C0[B]). By Proposition 2.1 we can push r under implication
and conjunction, therefore we get a derivation of rx:C0[A] ´ rx:C0[B]. Otherwise,
suppose x is free in A or B. The free variable is treated as an eigenvariable. In this
case we apply Lemma 3.12 to weaken the scope of x so that we have a derivation of
x . C0[A] ´ C0[B] and hence also a derivation of rx:C0[A] ´ rx:C0[B].35
3.6 Horn de¯nitions and r
We observe that the main di®erence between r and 8 is in the left-behavior. We
therefore expect that r and 8 are interchangeable when the formula we are trying to
prove does not make any use of left-rules, especially eqL. In this section we look at
the properties of cut-free proofs (i.e., proofs which do not make use of the mc rule),
under a class of \essentially" Horn de¯nitions, which is characterized by the absence of
implications in the body of the de¯nitions.
Definition 3.26. An hc-goal (named for Horn clauses) is a formula built from the
base set of logic connectives >, ^, _, and 9. An hc8-goal is a formula built from these
connectives and 8; an hcr-goal is a formula built from the base set and r; and an hc8r-
goal is a formula admitting those connectives as well as both 8 and r. A de¯nition is
an hc-de¯nition (resp., hc8-de¯nition, hcr-de¯nition, and hc8r-de¯nition) if the body
of all of its clauses are hc-goals (resp., hc8-goals, hcr-goals, and hc8r-goals).
Notice that all of these kind of de¯nitions are trivially strati¯able. We shall now
show that when de¯nitions are essentially Horn clauses, the di®erence between r and 8
cannot actually be observed. In particular, we show that r and 8 can be interchanged
for hc8r-de¯nitions and hc8r-goals without a®ecting provability. In proving this state-
ment inductively we need a stronger hypothesis, that is, we can interchange the scope
of variables in this case (either global or local) without a®ecting provability. We con-
sider only the non co-inductive de¯nitions, i.e., de¯nitions which contain only regular or
inductive de¯nitions.
Lemma 3.27. Let D be a non co-inductive hc8r-de¯nition, and let G be an hc8r-goal.
The sequent §; : ¡! (¾1;x;¾2) . G is cut-free provable if and only if the sequent
§;h; : ¡! (¾1¾2) . G[(h¾1)=x]
is cut-free provable. Moreover, given a derivation ¦ of the ¯rst sequent, there is a
derivation ¦0 of the second sequent such that ht(¦0) · ht(¦), and vice versa.
Proof One direction is an easy consequence of Lemma 3.12. In the other direction,
we would like to construct the derivation ¦0 from the derivation ¦. Let us assume that
x is not in §. We examine the following non-trivial case.
Suppose ¦ ends with 8R
¦1
§;f ; : ¡! ¾1x¾2 . G0[(f ¾1x¾2)=y]
§; : ¡! ¾1x¾2 . 8y:G0 8R:
By induction hypothesis there is a derivation ¦0
1 of
§;f;h; : ¡! ¾1¾2 . G0[(f ¾1(h¾1)¾2)=y;(h¾1)=x]36
such that ht(¦0
1) · ht(¦1). We then apply the substitution [(¸¾1¸x¸¾2:f0 ¾1¾2)=f] to
remove the dependency of f on x. The derivation ¦0 is then constructed as follows.
¦0
1[(¸¾1¸x¸¾2:f0 ¾1¾2)=f]
§;h;f0 ; : ¡! ¾1¾2 . G0[(f0 ¾1¾2)=y;(h¾1)=x]
§;h; : ¡! ¾1¾2 . 8y:G0[(h¾1)=x]
8R
Note that substitution does not increase the height of the derivation ¦0
1, therefore
ht(¦0) = ht(¦0
1µ) + 1 · ht(¦).
Notice that we restrict the de¯nition D to a non co-inductive one. This is because
in a proof involving co-induction, there could be a replacement of a co-inductive predicate
with arbitrary invariants which may not be Horn goals.
The following proposition is an expected consequence of the preceeding lemma.
Proposition 3.28. Let D be a non co-inductive hc8r-de¯nition and let D0 be the non
co-inductive hc8r-de¯nition resulting from replacing some occurrences of 8 and r in in
the body of clauses of D with r and 8, respectively. Similarly, let G be an hc8r-goal and
let G0 be the hc8r-goal resulting from replacing some occurrences of 8 and r in G with
r and 8, respectively. If the sequent §; ¢ ¡! ¾ . G is cut-free provable using de¯nition
D then the sequent §; ¢ ¡! ¾ . G0 is cut-free provable using de¯nition D0.
Proof Let ¦ be a derivation of §; ¢ ¡! ¾ . G. We construct a derivation ¦0 of
§; ¢ ¡! ¾ . G0 by induction on the measure ht(¦). The non-trivial cases are when ¦
ends with the introduction rule for the connective being interchanged.
Suppose G = 8x:H, G0 = rx:H0 and ¦ ends with 8R.
¦1
§;h; : ¡! ¾ . H[(h¾)=x]
§; : ¡! ¾ . 8x:H 8R
By Lemma 3.27 there is a derivation ¦0
1 of §; : ¡! (¾;x).H such that ht(¦0
1) · ht(¦1).
We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis to ¦0
1 to get a derivation ¦2 of §; : ¡!
(¾;x) . H0. The derivation ¦0 is therefore
¦2
§; : ¡! (¾;x) . H0
§; : ¡! ¾ . rx:H0 rR
The case where G = rx:H, G0 = 8x:H0 and ¦ ends with rR is done analogously, since
Lemma 3.27 works on both directions.37
3.7 Proof search
In the search for a cut-free proof of a sequent, there can be more than one choice
of the applicable rules at a time. Some of these rules can always be applied without
a®ecting the cut-free provability of the sequent; we call these rules asynchronous rules,
and the other rules are called synchronous. The more general notion of synchrony and
asynchrony in proof search has been already studied in the literature (see e.g., [3]),
and these notions are usually tied to connectives rather than rules. Our attempt to
classify rules as synchronous and asynchronous for logical connectives is of more limited
scope. We do not attempt, for example, to devise a notion of uniform provability [36, 3],
although the following results will be used to establish certain uniform proof search in
limited settings.
Definition 3.29. A rule R is an asynchronous rule if for every sequent ¡ ¡! C such
that R is applicable to the sequent and such that there is a cut-free proof of the sequent,
there is a cut-free proof of the same sequent ending with R.
Proposition 3.30. The rules ^R, ^L¤, _L, ¾ R, >R, ?L, 9L, 8R, rL, rR, defL,
defR, eqL, eqR, ºL, ¹R, eqLcsu, defL= and defLcsu are asynchronous rules.
Proof We make use of the cut-elimination result for Linc (Corollary 4.21 in Chapter 4).
Suppose we have a cut-free derivation ¦ of the sequent ¡ ¡! C. For each case we
construct a cut-free derivation ¦0 ending with the respected rule. The cases with eqR,
>R, ?L are trivial. The rules defL= and defLcsu are derivable from defL, eqL, 9L and
eqLcsu, and hence their asynchrony follows from those rules. The cases with ºL and ¹R
are the same as defL and defR, but in these cases we use the fact that defL and defR
are derived rules for co-inductive and inductive de¯nitions (Proposition 2.5). The case
with eqLcsu is the same as eqL. It remains to check the following cases.
^R: Suppose C is B ^ D. We construct a derivation ¥ as follows.
¦
¡ ¡! B ^ D
B ¡! B init
B ^ D ¡! B ^L
¡ ¡! B
mc
¦
¡ ¡! B ^ D
D ¡! D init
B ^ D ¡! D ^L
¡ ¡! D
mc
¡ ¡! B ^ D ^R
By cut-elimination, there is a cut-free derivation ¦1 of ¡ ¡! B and a cut-free
derivation ¦2 of ¡ ¡! D. Therefore we construct the derivation ¦0 as follows.
¦1
¡ ¡! B
¦2
¡ ¡! D
¡ ¡! B ^ D ^R38
^L¤: Suppose ¡ is B ^ D;¡0. We construct the derivation ¦0 by cut-elimination on the
following derivation.
B ¡! B init
B;D ¡! B wL D ¡! D init
B;D ¡! D wL
B;D ¡! B ^ D ^R
¦
B ^ D;¡0 ¡! C
B;D;¡0 ¡! C
mc
B ^ D;¡0 ¡! C
^L¤
_L: Symmetric to the ^R-case.
¾ R: Suppose C is B ¾ D. The derivation ¦0 is obtained by cut-elimination on the
following derivation.
¦
¡ ¡! B ¾ D
B ¡! B init D ¡! D init
D;B ¡! D wL
B ¾ D;B ¡! D ¾ L
¡;B ¡! D
mc
¡ ¡! B ¾ D ¾ R
9L: Suppose ¡ is ¹ x.9y:By;¡0. Then ¦0 is obtained by cut-elimination on the derivation
§;h; ¹ x . B (h ¹ x) ¡! ¹ x . B (h ¹ x) init
§;h; ¹ x . B (h ¹ x) ¡! ¹ x . 9y:By 9R h:¦
§;h; ¹ x . 9y:By;¡0 ¡! C
§;h; ¹ x . B (h ¹ x);¡0 ¡! C
mc
§; ¹ x . 9y:By;¡0 ¡! C
9L
8R: Symmetric to the 9L case.
rL: Suppose ¡ is ¹ x.ry:By;¡0. Then ¦0 is obtained by cut-elimination on the following
derivation.
¹ xy . By ¡! ¹ xy . By init
¹ xy . By ¡! ¹ x . ry:By rR
¦
¹ x . ry:By;¡0 ¡! C
¹ xy . By;¡0 ¡! C
mc
¹ x . ry:By;¡0 ¡! C
rL
rR: Symmetric to the rL case.39
defL: Suppose ¡ is ¹ x . p¹ t;¡0, where the predicate p ¹ y is de¯ned by B ¹ y. We construct
¦0 by cut-elimination on the following derivation.
¹ x . B ¹ t ¡! ¹ x . B ¹ t
init
¹ x . B ¹ t ¡! ¹ x . p¹ t defR ¦
¹ x . p¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
¹ x . B ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
mc
¹ x . p¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
defL
defR: Symmetric to the defL case.
eqL: Suppose ¡ is ¹ x . s = t;¡. Then we take ¦0 as the derivation
½
¦½
§½; ¡0½ ¡! C½
¾
½
§; ¹ x . s = t;¡0 ¡! C
eqL
where ¦½ is obtained by cut-elimination on the derivation
¢; ¢ ¡! (¹ x . s = t)½
eqR
¦½
§½; (¹ x . s = t)½;¡0½ ¡! C½
§½; ¡0½ ¡! C½
mc40
Chapter 4
Cut Elimination for Linc
In this chapter we prove the cut-elimination theorem for Linc, from which the
consistency of the logic follows. The classic proof of cut-elimination for Gentzen's LK
and LJ is done by induction on the size of the cut formula, i.e., the number of logical
connectives in the formula. His cut-elimination proof is essentially a procedure for per-
muting cut-rule over other rules. During the permutation, a cut on a compound formula
is reduced to several cuts on formulas of smaller size, which by induction hypothesis can
be removed. For example, the derivation
¦1
¢ ¡! B1
¦2
¢ ¡! B2
¢ ¡! B1 ^ B2
^R
¦0
B1;¡ ¡! C
B1 ^ B2;¡ ¡! C ^L
¢;¡ ¡! C
mc
reduces to
¦1
¢ ¡! B1
¦0
B1;¡ ¡! C
¢;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
In the case of Linc, the use of de¯nitions and (co-)induction complicates the re-
duction of cut. The eqL rule uses substitutions in the premise, hence when permuting
up the cut rule over eqL we may need to apply the substitutions to some premise deriva-
tions above the cut. The way we handle this issue is similar to that of FO¸¢IN (see
Chapter 3, Section 3.1). The induction and co-induction cases however pose a di®erent
problem. Consider for example a cut involving the induction rules
¦1
¢ ¡! B pt
¢ ¡! pt
¹R
¦S
B S y ¡! S y
¦
S t;¡ ¡! C
pt;¡ ¡! C
¹L
¢;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
There are at least two problems in reducing this cut. First, any permutation of the cut
will necessarily involve a cut with S which can be of larger size than p, and hence simple
induction on the size of cut formula will not work. Second, the invariant S does not
appear in the conclusion of the left premise of the cut. The latter means that we need
to transform the left premise so that its end sequent will agree with the right premise.
Any such transformation will most likely be global, and hence simple induction on the
height of derivations will not work either, or at least will not be obvious.
Our proof of cut-elimination uses the technique of reducibility originally due to
Tait. The method was extended by Martin-LÄ of [27] to the setting of natural deduction,41
and to sequent calculus by McDowell and Miller for the logic FO¸¢IN. Our proof of
cut-elimination is based on the latter approach. The original idea of Martin-LÄ of was
to use derivations directly as a measure and to de¯ne a well-founded ordering on them.
The basis for the ordering relation is a set of reduction rules that are used to eliminate
the applications of cut rule. Two orderings are de¯ned on derivations: normalizability
and reducibility (called computability in [27]). The well-foundedness of normalizability
ordering implies that the process of applying the reduction rules to a derivation will
eventually terminate in a cut-free derivation of the same sequent. Reducibility ordering
is a superset of normalizability ordering and hence its well-foundedness implies the well-
foundedness of normalizability ordering. The main part of the proof is in showing that
all derivations in Linc are reducible, and hence normalizable.
We prove a stronger lemma from which cut-elimination follows as a corollary. In
a simpli¯ed form, this lemma basically says that given any derivation ¦ of
B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
and reducible derivations ¦1;:::;¦n of ¢ ¡! B1;:::;¢n ¡! Bn (n ¸ 0), the deriva-
tion ¥
¦1
¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦
B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
is reducible. The cut-elimination theorem is then just a particular instance of this lemma,
that is, the case where n = 0. The proof proceeds by induction on the height of ¦ with
subordinate inductions on n and on the (well-founded) reduction tree of ¦1;:::;¦n.
Most of the reduction rules are variants of Gentzen's reduction rules, except, of
course, for the cases involving induction and co-induction. We outline here the reduction
rules for the cut on ¹L=¹R and ºL=ºR pairs. In both cases we make use of the notion
of unfolding of derivations (Chapter 3, Section 3.4) to de¯ne the reduction rules. In the
¹L=¹R case above, the cut is reduced to
¹(¦1;¦S)
¢ ¡! B S t
¦S[t=y]
B S t ¡! S t
¢ ¡! S t
mc ¦
S t;¡ ¡! C
¢;¡ ¡! C
mc
We recall that the derivation ¹(¦1;¦S) is constructed inductively from ¦1 by replacing,
among others, the subderivation of the form
¦2
¢0 ¡! B pu
¢0 ¡! pu
¹R with
¹(¦2;¦S)
¢0 ¡! B S u
¦S[u=y]
B S u ¡! S u
¢0 ¡! S u
mc
where ¹(¦2;¦S) is constructed inductively from ¦2. There are possibly more cuts
produced in the unfolding process, but those are of smaller rank (i.e., the height of ¦S is
smaller than the height of the original derivation) and hence are reducible by the outer
induction hypothesis.42
The ºR=ºL case is more complicated. Suppose we have the derivation ¥
¦1
¢ ¡! S t
¦S
S y ¡! B S y
¢ ¡! pt ºR
¦
B pt;¡ ¡! C
pt;¡ ¡! C ºL
¢;¡ ¡! C
mc
The objective of the reduction rule is to reduce the height of the right premise of the
cut. Therefore, we need to do the unfolding on the left premise.
¦1
¢ ¡! S t
º(¦S;¦S)[t=y]
S t ¡! B pt
¢ ¡! B pt
mc ¦
B pt;¡ ¡! C
¢;¡ ¡! C
mc
In constructing the derivation º(¦S;¦S), subderivations of ¦S of the form
ª
¢ ¡! S u are replaced by
ª
¢ ¡! S u
¦S
S x ¡! B S x
¢ ¡! pu ºR :
This is the delicate point of the proof since there could be a potentially in¯nite unwinding
of derivations as we push up the cut. Notice that unlike in the inductive case, the
unfolding process uses only the derivations in the left premise of the cut, and hence the
outer induction hypothesis will not help in establishing the reducibility of the unfolded
derivation. We solve this problem by building into the reducibility ordering a closure
condition which will allow us to establish the reducibility of the unfolded derivation
¹(¦S;¦S), given the reducibility of ¦S.
4.1 Cut reduction
Here we de¯ne a reduction relation between derivations, which is an adaptation
of the reduction rules used in Gentzen's original Hauptsatz [18].
Definition 4.1. We de¯ne a reduction relation between derivations. The redex is al-
ways a derivation ¥ ending with the multicut rule
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦n
§; ¢n ¡! Bn
¦
§; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
We refer to the judgments B1;:::;Bn produced by the mc as cut judgments.
If n = 0, ¥ reduces to the premise derivation ¦.
For n > 0 we specify the reduction relation based on the last rule of the premise
derivations. If the rightmost premise derivation ¦ ends with a left rule acting on a
cut judgment Bi, then the last rule of ¦i and the last rule of ¦ together determine the
reduction rules that apply. We classify these rules according to the following criteria:
we call the rule an essential case when ¦i ends with a right rule; if it ends with a left43
rule, it is a left-commutative case; if ¦i ends with the init rule, then we have an axiom
case; a multicut case arises when it ends with the mc rule. When ¦ does not end with a
left rule acting on a cut judgment, then its last rule is alone su±cient to determine the
reduction rules that apply. If ¦ ends in a rule acting on a judgment other than a cut
judgment, then we call this a right-commutative case. A structural case results when ¦
ends with a contraction or weakening on a cut judgment. If ¦ ends with the init rule,
this is also an axiom case; similarly a multicut case arises if ¦ ends in the mc rule.
For simplicity of presentation, we always show i = 1.
Essential cases:
^R= ^ L: If ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1
¦00
1
¢1 ¡! B00
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1 ^ B00
1
^R
¦0
B0
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
B0
1 ^ B00
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
^L
;
then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1
¦2
¢2 ¡! B2 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦0
B0
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
The case for the other ^L rule is symmetric.
_R= _ L: If ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1 _ B00
1
_R
¦0
B0
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¦00
B00
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
B0
1 _ B00
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
_L
;
then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1
¦2
¢2 ¡! B2 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦0
B0
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
The case for the other _R rule is symmetric.
¾ R= ¾ L: Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
B0
1;¢1 ¡! B00
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1 ¾ B00
1
¾ R
¦0
B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! B0
1
¦00
B00
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
B0
1 ¾ B00
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¾ L
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Let ¥1 be
½
¦i
¢i ¡! Bi
¾
i2f2::ng
¦0
B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! B0
1
¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! B0
1
mc
¦0
1
B0
1;¢1 ¡! B00
1
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! B00
1
mc
:
Then ¥ reduces to
¥1
::: ¡! B00
1
½
¦i
¢i ¡! Bi
¾
i2f2::ng
¦00
B00
1;fBigi2f2::ng;¡ ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
cL
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C :
We use the double horizontal lines to indicate that the relevant inference rule (in this
case, cL) may need to be applied zero or more times.
8R=8L: If ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
§;h; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . B0
1[(h ¹ z)=x]
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . 8x:B0
1
8R
¦0
§; ¹ z . B0
1[t=x];B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ z . 8x:B0
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
8L
;
then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1[¸¹ z:t=h]
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . B0
1[t=x]
½
¦i
§; ¢i ¡! Bi
¾
i2f2::ng
¦0
::: ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
9R=9L: If ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . B0
1[t=x]
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . 9x:B0
1
9R
¦0
§;h; ¹ z . B0
1[(h ¹ z)=x];B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ z . 9x:B0
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
9L
;
then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . B0
1[t=x] :::
¦0[¸¹ z:t=h]
§; ¹ z . B0
1[t=x];B2;:::;¡ ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:45
rR=rL: If ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! ¹ zy . B0
1[y=x]
¢1 ¡! ¹ z . rx:B0
1
rR
¦0
¹ zy . B0
1[y=x];:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¹ z . rx:B0
1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
9L
;
then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! ¹ zy . B0
1[y=x] :::
¦0
¹ zy . B0
1[y=x];:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
¤=¹L: Suppose ¦ is the derivation
¦S
¹ x; DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¦0
§; ¹ z . S ¹ t;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ z . p¹ t;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¹L
where p ¹ x
¹
= B p ¹ x. Then ¥ reduces to
¹(¦1;¦S)
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t :::
¦0
§; ¹ z . S ¹ t;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
ºR=ºL: Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . p¹ t ºR
¦0
§; ¹ z . Dp¹ t;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ z . p¹ t;:::;¡ ¡! C ºL
where ¹ t = t1;:::;tm. Apply Lemma 3.16 to ¦S to get a derivation
¦0
S
h1;:::;hm ; ¹ z . S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . DS ¹ u
where ¹ u = (h1 ¹ z);:::;(hm ¹ z). Let ¥1 be the derivation
¦0
1
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
¦0
Sµ
§; ¹ z . S ¹ t ¡! ¹ z . DS ¹ t
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . DS ¹ t
mc46
where µ = [(¸¹ z:t1)=h1;:::;(¸¹ z:tm)=hm]. Then ¥ reduces to
º(¥1;¦S)
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . Dp¹ t
(
¦j
§; ¢j ¡! Bj
)
j2f2;:::;ng
¦0
§; ¹ z . Dp¹ t;:::;¡ ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
defR=defL: Let p ¹ x
4
= Dp ¹ x be a regular de¯nition. Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! ¹ z . Dp¹ t
¢1 ¡! ¹ z . p¹ t defR
¦0
¹ z . Dp¹ t;:::;¡ ¡! C
¹ z . p¹ t;:::;¡ ¡! C defL :
Then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! ¹ z . Dp¹ t :::
¦0
¹ z . Dp¹ t;:::;¡ ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
eqR=eqL: Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . s = t
eqR
½
¦½
§½; B2½;:::;Bn½;¡½ ¡! C½
¾
½
§; ¹ z . s = t;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
eqL
:
Then by the de¯nition of eqR rule, s and t are equal terms (modulo ¸-conversion),
and hence are uni¯able by the empty substitution. Note that in this case ¦² 2 f¦½g½.
Therefore ¥ reduces to
½
¦i
§; ¢i ¡! Bi
¾
i2f2::ng
¦²
§; B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
§; ¢1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C wL :
Left-commutative cases: In the following cases, we suppose that ¦ ends with a left rule,
other than fcL;wL;¹Lg, acting on B1.
²L= ± L: Suppose ¦1 is 8
> <
> :
¦i
1
§i ; ¢i
1 ¡! B1
9
> =
> ;
§; ¢1 ¡! B1
²L ;47
where ²L is any left rule except ¾ L, eqL, or ¹L. Note that in this case we have §i ¶ §
for each i. Then ¥ reduces to
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
¦i
1
§i ; ¢i
1 ¡! B1
8
<
:
¦0
j
§i ; ¢j ¡! Bj
9
=
;
j2f2::ng
¦0
§i ; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§i ; ¢i
1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
§; ¢1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C ²L :
The derivations ¦0
j and ¦0 are obtained from ¦j and ¦, respectively, by applying Lemma 3.11
(weakening of signature).
¾ L= ± L: Suppose ¦1 is
¦0
1
¢0
1 ¡! D0
1
¦00
1
D00
1;¢0
1 ¡! B1
D0
1 ¾ D00
1;¢0
1 ¡! B1
¾ L
:
Let ¥1 be
¦00
1
D00
1;¢0
1 ¡! B1
¦2
¢2 ¡! B2 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦
B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
D00
1;¢0
1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
Then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1
¢0
1 ¡! D0
1 wL
¢0
1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! D0
1
¥1
D00
1;¢0
1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
D0
1 ¾ D00
1;¢0
1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
¾ L
:
¹L= ± L: Suppose ¦1 is
¦S
¹ x; DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¦0
1
§; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¢0
1 ¡! B1
§; ¹ z . p¹ t;¢0
1 ¡! B1
¹L48
where p ¹ x
¹
= Dp ¹ x. Let ¥1 be
¦0
1
§; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¢0
1 ¡! B1 :::
¦n
§; ¢n ¡! Bn
¦
§; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¢0
1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
Then ¥ reduces to
¦S
¹ x; DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¥1
§; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¢0
1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
§; ¹ z . p¹ t;¢0
1;:::;¢n ¡! C
¹L
eqL= ± L: Suppose ¦1 is
8
<
:
¦½
1
§½; ¢0
1½ ¡! B1½
9
=
;
§; ¹ z . s = t;¢0
1 ¡! B1
eqL
;
then ¥ reduces to
8
> > > <
> > > :
¦½
1
§½; ¢0
1½ ¡! B1½
½
¦i½
§½; ¢i½ ¡! Bi½
¾
i2f2::ng
¦½
::: ¡! C½
§½; ¢0
1½;¢2½;:::;¢n½;¡½ ¡! C½
mc
9
> > > =
> > > ;
¹ z . s = t;¢0
1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
eqL
:
Right-commutative cases:
¡= ± L: Suppose ¦ is (
¦i
§i ; B1;:::;Bn;¡i ¡! C
)
§; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C ±L ;
where ±L is any left rule other than ¾ L, eqL, or ¹L (but including cL or wL) acting
on a judgment other than B1;:::;Bn. Note that §i ¶ § since in the case 9L a new
eigenvariable is introduced in the premise. The derivation ¥ reduces to
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
¦0
1
§i ; ¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦0
n
§i ; ¢n ¡! B0
n
¦i
§i ; B1;:::;Bn;¡i ¡! C
§i ; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡i ¡! C
mc
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C ±L ;
where ¦0
1;:::;¦0
n are obtained from applying Lemma 3.11 to ¦1;:::;¦n, respectively.49
¡= ¾ L: Suppose ¦ is
¦0
B1;:::;Bn;¡0 ¡! D0
¦00
B1;:::;Bn;D00;¡0 ¡! C
B1;:::;Bn;D0 ¾ D00;¡0 ¡! C
¾ L
:
Let ¥1 be
¦1
¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦0
B1;:::;Bn;¡0 ¡! D0
¢1;:::;¢n;¡0 ¡! D0 mc
and ¥2 be
¦1
¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦00
B1;:::;Bn;D00;¡0 ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;D00;¡0 ¡! C
mc
:
Then ¥ reduces to
¥1
¢1;:::;¢n;¡0 ¡! D0
¥2
¢1;:::;¢n;D00;¡0 ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;D0 ¾ D00;¡0 ¡! C
¾ L
:
¡=¹L: Suppose ¦ is
¦S
¹ x; DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¦0
§; B1;:::;Bn; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
§; B1;:::;Bn; ¹ z . p¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
¹L
;
where p ¹ x
¹
= Dp ¹ x. Let ¥1 be
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦n
§; ¢n ¡! Bn
¦0
§; B1;:::;Bn; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
mc
:
Then ¥ reduces to
¦S
¹ x; DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¥
§; ¢1;:::;¢n; ¹ z . S ¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
§; ¢1;:::;¢n; ¹ z . p¹ t;¡0 ¡! C
¹L
:
¡=eqL: If ¦ is ½
¦½
§½; B1½;:::;Bn½;¡0½ ¡! C½
¾
§; B1;:::;Bn; ¹ z . s = t;¡0 ¡! C
eqL
;50
then ¥ reduces to
8
> > <
> > :
½
¦i½
§½; ¢i½ ¡! Bi½
¾
i2f1::ng
¦½
§½; Bi½;:::;¡0½ ¡! C½
§½; ¢1½;:::;¢n½;¡0½ ¡! C½
mc
9
> > =
> > ;
§; ¢1;:::;¢n; ¹ z . s = t;¡0 ¡! C
eqL
:
¡= ± R: If ¦ is (
¦i
§i ; B1;:::;Bn;¡i ¡! Ci
)
§; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C ±R ;
where ±R is any right rule except ºR, then ¥ reduces to
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
¦0
1
§i ; ¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦0
n
§i ; ¢n ¡! Bn
¦i
§i ; B1;:::;Bn;¡i ¡! Ci
§i ; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡i ¡! Ci mc
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C ±R ;
where ¦0
1;:::;¦0
n are obtained from ¦1;:::;¦n by Lemma 3.11.
¡=ºR: Suppose ¦ is
¦0
§; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
§; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! ¹ z . p¹ t ºR ;
where p ¹ x
º = Dp ¹ x. Let ¥1 be
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! B1 ¢¢¢
¦n
§; ¢n ¡! Bn
¦0
§; B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
mc
:
Then ¥ reduces to
¥1
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
§; ¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! ¹ z . p¹ t ºR :
Multicut cases:
mc= ± L: If ¦ ends with a left rule, other than cL, wL and ¹L, acting on B1 and ¦1
ends with a multicut and reduces to ¦0
1, then ¥ reduces to
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! B1
¦2
¢2 ¡! B2 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦
B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:51
¡=mc: Suppose ¦ is
(
¦j
fBigi2Ij;¡j ¡! Dj
)
j2f1::mg
¦0
fDjgj2f1::mg;fBigi2I0;¡0 ¡! C
B1;:::;Bn;¡1;:::;¡m;¡0 ¡! C
mc
;
where I1;:::;Im;I0 partition the judgments fBigi2f1::ng among the premise derivations
¦1, ..., ¦m,¦0. For 1 · j · m let ¥j be
½
¦i
¢i ¡! Bi
¾
i2Ij
¦j
fBigi2Ij;¡j ¡! Dj
f¢igi2Ij;¡j ¡! Dj mc
:
Then ¥ reduces to
(
¥j
::: ¡! Dj
)
j2f1::mg
½
¦i
¢i ¡! Bi
¾
i2I0 ¦0
::: ¡! C
¢1;:::;¢n;¡1;:::¡m;¡0 ¡! C
mc
:
Structural case:
¡=cL: If ¦ is
¦0
B1;B1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
B1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C cL ;
then ¥ reduces to
¦1
¢1 ¡! B1
½
¦i
¢i ¡! Bi
¾
i2f1::ng
¦0
B1;B1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¢1;¢1;¢2;:::;¢n;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
cL
¢1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C :
¡=wL: If ¦ is
¦0
B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
B1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C wL ;
then ¥ reduces to
¦2
¢2 ¡! B2 :::
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦0
B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
wL
¢1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C :52
Axiom cases:
init= ± L: Suppose ¦ ends with a left-rule acting on B1 and ¦1 ends with the init rule.
Then it must be the case that ¢1 = fB1g and ¥ reduces to
¦2
¢2 ¡! B2 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
¦
B1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
B1;¢2;:::;¢n;¡ ¡! C
mc
:
¡=init: If ¦ ends with the init rule, then n = 1, ¡ is the empty multiset, and C must be
a cut formula, i.e., C = B1. Therefore ¥ reduces to ¦1.
An inspection of the rules of the logic and this de¯nition will reveal that every
derivation ending with a multicut has a reduct. Because we use a multiset as the left
side of the sequent, there may be ambiguity as to whether a formula occurring on the
left side of the rightmost premise to a multicut rule is in fact a cut formula, and if so,
which of the left premises corresponds to it. As a result, several of the reduction rules
may apply, and so a derivation may have multiple reducts.
The following lemmas show that the reduction relation is preserved by some of
the transformation of derivations de¯ned in previous chapter. Observe that the redexes
of a derivation are not a®ected by substitution or weakening of signatures, since both
transformations do not change the last rule of a derivation.
Lemma 4.2. Let ¦ be a derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C ending with a mc. Let §0 be a signature
di®erent from §. Then ¦ reduces to a derivation ¦0 if and only if §0:¦ reduces to §0:¦0.
Proof By induction on ht(¦) and inspection on the reduction rules. Induction hy-
pothesis is needed in the case mc= ± L. In the cases ¤=¹L and ºR=ºL we make use of
Lemma 3.23 and Lemma 3.24, respectively.
Lemma 4.3. Let ¦ be a derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C ending with a mc and let µ be a
substitution. Then ¦ reduces to a derivation ¦0 if and only if ¦µ reduces to ¦0µ.
Proof By induction on ht(¦), Lemma 3.21 and Lemma 3.22.
Lemma 4.4. Let p ¹ x
¹
= Dp ¹ x be an inductive de¯nition and let ¦S be a derivation of
¹ x; DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x for some invariant S. Let C p be a non-atomic judgment in which p
occurs strictly positively. Let ¦ and ¦0 be two derivations of the same sequent §; ¡ ¡!
C p, and ¦ ends with a mc rule. Then the derivation ¦ reduces to a derivation ¦0 if and
only the derivation ¹(¦;¦S) reduces to ¹(¦0;¦S).
Proof By case analysis on the reduction rules. The case analysis can be much simpli-
¯ed by the following observation. First, the reduction rules are driven only by outermost
connectives in the formulas in the sequent. Second, the unfolding of a derivation a®ects
only the right-handside of the sequents appearing in the derivation (or more speci¯cally,
only the branches containing major premises). By a quick inspection on the de¯nition of
reduction rules in De¯nition 4.1, we see that the only non-trivial case to consider is the
right-commutative case ¡=±R. Since C p is non-atomic (and assuming that it has at least53
one occurrence of p, otherwise it is trivial since ¦ = ¹(¦;¦S) in this case), the only cases
we need to verify is when its topmost logical connective is either ^, _, ¾, 8, 9, r. In
these cases, the unfolding does not change the topmost connective, therefore any reduc-
tion rule that applies to ¦ also applies to ¹(¦;¦S) and vice versa. Lemma 3.21, 3.22,
3.23 and 3.24 are used when substitutions are involved (right/left commutative cases
with eqL) and when global signature weakening are involved (right/left commutative
cases with 8 and 9).
Lemma 4.5. Let p ¹ x
º = Dp ¹ x be a co-inductive de¯nition and let ¦S be a derivation of
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x for some invariant S. Let C p be a non-atomic judgment in which p
occurs strictly positively. Let ¦ and ¦0 be two derivations of the sequent §; ¡ ¡! C S,
where ¦ ends with a mc rule. Then the derivation ¦ reduces to a derivation ¦0 if and
only the derivation º(¦;¦S) reduces to º(¦0;¦S).
Proof Analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.4.
4.2 Normalizability and reducibility
We now de¯ne two properties of derivations: normalizability and reducibility.
Each of these properties implies that the derivation can be reduced to a cut-free deriva-
tion of the same end-sequent.
4.2.1 Normalizability
Definition 4.6. We de¯ne the set of normalizable derivations to be the smallest set
that satis¯es the following conditions:
1. If a derivation ¦ ends with a multicut, then it is normalizable if every reduct of ¦
is normalizable.
2. If a derivation ends with any rule other than a multicut, then it is normalizable if
the premise derivations are normalizable.
These clauses assert that a given derivation is normalizable provided certain (perhaps
in¯nitely many) other derivations are normalizable. If we call these other derivations
the predecessors of the given derivation, then a derivation is normalizable if and only if
the tree of the derivation and its successive predecessors is well-founded. In this case,
the well-founded tree is called the normalization of the derivation.
The set of all normalizable derivations is denoted by @.
Since a normalization is well-founded, it has an associated induction principle:
for any property P of derivations, if for every derivation ¦ in the normalization, P holds
for every predecessor of ¦ implies that P holds for ¦, then P holds for every derivation
in the normalization.
Lemma 4.7. If there is a normalizable derivation of a sequent, then there is a cut-free
derivation of the sequent.54
Proof Let ¦ be a normalizable derivation of the sequent ¡ ¡! B. We show by
induction on the normalization of ¦ that there is a cut-free derivation of ¡ ¡! B.
1. If ¦ ends with a multicut, then any of its reducts is one of its predecessors and so
is normalizable. But the reduct is also a derivation of ¡ ¡! B, so by the induction
hypothesis this sequent has a cut-free derivation.
2. Suppose ¦ ends with a rule other than multicut. Since we are given that ¦ is
normalizable, by de¯nition the premise derivations are normalizable. These premise
derivations are the predecessors of ¦, so by the induction hypothesis there are cut-
free derivations of the premises. Thus there is a cut-free derivation of ¡ ¡! B.
The next two lemmas are also proved by induction on the normalization of the
given derivation.
Lemma 4.8. If ¦ is a normalizable derivation, then for any substitution µ, ¦µ is nor-
malizable.
Proof We prove this lemma by induction on the normalization of ¦.
1. If ¦ ends with a multicut, then ¦µ also ends with a multicut. By Lemma 4.3 every
reduct of ¦µ corresponds to a reduct of ¦, therefore by induction hypothesis every
reduct of ¦µ is normalizable, and hence ¦µ is normalizable.
2. Suppose ¦ ends with a rule other than multicut and has premise derivations f¦ig.
By De¯nition 3.1 each premise derivation in ¦µ is either ¦i or ¦iµ. Since ¦ is
normalizable, ¦i is normalizable, and so by the induction hypothesis ¦iµ is also
normalizable. Thus ¦µ is normalizable.
Lemma 4.9. If ¦ is a normalizable derivation, then for any signature § the derivation
§:¦ is normalizable.
Proof By induction on the normalization of ¦. The proof is analogous to the proof
of Lemma 4.8, but in the case where ¦ ends with mc we use Lemma 4.2 instead.
4.2.2 Generated Sets
In de¯ning the notion of reducibility in the following section, we will need to
construct a closed set in de¯ning the reducibility of derivations ending with co-induction
rules. The main closure condition is that related to the co-inductive invariants used in
the derivation. We call the least of such closed set the generated set. Its main use will
be in proving that reducibility is preserved under co-inductive unfolding of derivations.
Let L denote the set of all derivations and P(L) denote the power set of L.
Then the set P(L) together with order relation µ (set inclusion), greatest lower bound
operation \ and least upper bound operation [ de¯nes a complete lattice. The generated
set will be de¯ned as the least ¯xed point of a monotone function on this lattice. The
precise de¯nition follows.55
Definition 4.10. Let p ¹ x
º = B p ¹ x be a co-inductive de¯nition. Let R be a set of deriva-
tions such that for all ª 2 R, it holds that lvl(ª) < lvl(p). Let © be a derivation of
§; ¡ ¡! C such that lvl(C) · lvl(p) and let ¦S be a derivation of ¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x for
some invariant S, such that lvl(S) · lvl(p). We de¯ne a function WR;©;¦S : P(L) !
P(L) (abbreviated as W below) as follows, given an input set K.
1. © 2 W(K),
2. for every derivation ¥ 2 K and for every substitution µ the derivation ¥µ is in
W(K),
3. for every derivation ¥ 2 K of the sequent §0 ; ¡ ¡! D and for every signature §00
such that §00 and §0 are disjoint, the derivation §00:¥ is in W(K),
4. for every derivation ¥ of §0 ; ¢ ¡! D in K,
(a) if D = ¹ z . S ¹ u then
¥
§0 ; ¢ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¦0
S
§0 ; ¹ z . S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
§0 ; ¢ ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
mc ;
where ¦0
S is a raised instance of ¦S, is in W(K),
(b) otherwise,
i. if ¥ ends with ¾ R
¥0
¢;D1 ¡! D2
¢ ¡! D1 ¾ D2
¾ R
then ¥0 2 W(K) and for every substitution µ and signature §00 and for
every derivation ª of ¢0 ¡! D1µ in R, the derivation
ª
¡ ¡! D1µ
§00:¥0µ
D1µ;¢µ ¡! D2µ
¢0;¢µ ¡! D2µ
mc
is in W(K).
ii. if ¥ ends with mc, then every reduct of ¦ is in W(C),
iii. if ¥ ends with any other rule then its major premises are in W(C).
The (R;©;¦S)-generated set is de¯ned as the least ¯xed point of W.
From now on, when we write WR;©;¦S, it is understood that the derivations ©
and ¦S take the form as indicated in De¯nition 4.10, and that the underlying coinductive
de¯nition and invariant are assumed to be given.56
We de¯ne the ordinal powers of W as follows
W0 = W(;);
Wn+1 = W(Wn)
and W! =
S
fWk j k < !g.
Lemma 4.11. The function WR;©;¦S in De¯nition 4:10 is
1. monotone, i.e., for any sets K1 µ K2, WR;©;¦S(K1) µ WR;©;¦S(K2);
2. and continuous, i.e., for any chain
K1 µ K2 µ K3 µ ::::
we have
WR;©;¦S([fKi j i < !g) =
[
fWR;©;¦S(Ki) j i < !g:
Proof We abbreviate WR;©;¦S as simply W.
1. Let ª 2 W(K1). If ª = © then ª 2 W(K2). Otherwise, ª is obtained from a
derivation ª0 2 K1 by applying one of the operations (1) - (4) in De¯nition 4.10.
Since ª0 2 K2, we can apply the same operation to get ª in W(K2).
2. We show that [fW(Ki) j i < !g µ W([fKi j i < !g) and W([fKi j i < !g) µ
[fW(Ki) j i < !g.
(a) for every j < !,
Kj µ [fKi j i < !g ) (by monotonicity of W)
W(Kj) µ W([fKi j i < !g)
) [fW(Ki) j i < !g µ W([fKi j i < !g)
(b) Let ª be an element of W([fKi j i < !g). If ª = © then obviously ª 2
[fW(Ki) j i < !g. Otherwise, ª is obtained from an element ª0 in [fKi j
i < !g by some operation de¯ned in De¯nition 4.10. Since ª0 is also in some
Kk, we have ª 2 W(Kk) µ [fW(Ki) j i < !g.
It is a known fact that for every continous function W (see [4] for example),
the least ¯xed point of W is W!. Therefore, the (R;©;¦S)-generated set is exactly
W!
R;©;¦S
. This characterization will be useful in proving some properties of WR;©;¦S.
In particular, the fact that W!
R;©;¦S
is the least ¯xed point implies that we can use
ordinary induction to prove its properties.
The proof for the following lemma is immediate by induction on the construction
of generated sets, De¯nition 4.10 and De¯nition 3.2 (de¯nition of major premises).57
Lemma 4.12. Let W!
R;©;¦S
be a generated set with the underlying co-inductive de¯ni-
tion p ¹ x
º = B p ¹ x. Then for every ¥ 2 W!
R;©;¦S
, lvl(¥) · lvl(p).
Lemma 4.13. Let W1 = WR;©1;¦S and let W2 = WR;©2;¦S. If ©1 2 W!
2 then
W!
1 µ W!
2 .
Proof It is enough to show that for every i < !, Wi
1 µ W!
2 . The case where i = 0 is
trivial. Suppose Wi
1 µ W!
2 . We show that Wi+1
1 µ W!
2 . Note that the only di®erence
between W1 and W2 is in the operation (1) in De¯nition 4.10. Let ¥ 2 Wi+1
1 . If ¥ is ©1
then ¥ 2 W!
2 by inductive hypothesis. Otherwise, suppose ¥ is obtained from ¥0 2 Wi
1
by some operation (2) - (4) in De¯nition 4.10. Then we can perform the same operation
on W!
2 , that is, we have ¥ 2 W2(W!
2 ). But we know that W!
2 is a ¯xed point of W2,
and therefore ¥ 2 W!
2 .
4.2.3 Reducibility
The inductive de¯nition of reducibility is done by induction on the level of the
derivation: in the de¯nition of reducibility for derivations of level i we assume that
reducibility is already de¯ned for all levels j < i. (Recall from De¯nition 2.3 that the
level of a derivation is de¯ned to be the level of the consequent of its end-sequent.) In
the particular case involving co-induction, a generated set is constructed from reducible
derivations of level j < i. We shall denote the set of all reducible derivations with <.
The notation <i denotes the set of all reducible derivations of level i, while <<i (<·i)
denotes the set of reducible derivations of level smaller than i (respectively, smaller or
equal to i). In the following de¯nition, we refer to a derivation ¦ as an i-level derivation
if lvl(¦) = i.
Definition 4.14. For any i, we de¯ne the set of reducible i-level derivations to be the
smallest set of i-level derivations that satis¯es the following conditions:
1. If an i-level derivation ¦ ends with a multicut, then it is i-reducible if every reduct
of ¦ is i-reducible.
2. Suppose the i-level derivation ¦ ends with the implication right rule
¦0
B;¡ ¡! C
¡ ¡! B ¾ C ¾ R :
Let j be the level of B and let k be the level of C. Then the derivation is i-reducible if
the premise derivation ¦0 is k-reducible and, for every substitution µ, signature §0,
multiset ¢ of formulas, and j-reducible derivation ¦00 of ¢ ¡! Bµ, the derivation
¦00
¢ ¡! Bµ
§0:¦0µ
Bµ;¡µ ¡! Cµ
¢;¡µ ¡! Cµ
mc58
is k-reducible.
3. If the derivation ends with the ¾ L rule or the ¹L rule, then it is i-reducible if
the right premise derivation is i-reducible and the other premise derivations are
normalizable.
4. Suppose ¦ ends with ºR rule
¦0
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . p¹ t ºR
where p ¹ x
º = B p ¹ x. Let j be the level of ¦0 and let k be the level of ¦S. Then ¦
is i-reducible if ¦0 is j-reducible, ¦S is k-reducible, and for every derivation ª in
the (<<i;¦0;¦S)-generated set, ª is lvl(ª)-reducible.
5. If the derivation ends with any other rule, with the premise derivations f¦kgk2I for
some index set I, then it is i-reducible if every derivation ¦k is lvl(¦k)-reducible.
These clauses assert that a given derivation is reducible provided certain (perhaps
in¯nitely many) other derivations are reducible. If we call these other derivations the
predecessors of the given derivation, then a derivation is reducible only if the tree of the
derivation and its successive predecessors is well-founded. In this case, the well-founded
tree is called the reduction of the derivation.
In de¯ning reducibility for a derivation of (writing the signatures explicitly)
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . B ¾ C
ending with ¾ R we quantify over reducible derivations of
§µ [ §0 ; ¢ ¡! (¹ z . B)µ;
for some new signature §0. This is legitimate since we are de¯ning reducibility for a
derivation having level max(lvl(B)+1;lvl(C)), so the set of reducible derivations having
level lvl(B) is already de¯ned (substitution does not change the level).
For a derivation ending with ¾ L or ¹L, some premise derivations may have
consequents with a higher level than that of the consequent of the conclusion. As a result,
we cannot use the reducibility of those premise derivations to de¯ne the reducibility of
the derivation as a whole, since the reducibility of the premise derivations may not yet be
de¯ned. Thus we use the weaker notion of normalizability for those premise derivations.
In the ºR case, the reducibility of ¦ is de¯ned only if the generated set induced by
its premises contains only reducible derivations. Lemma 4.12 ensures that the derivations
in the generated set has lower or equal level as ¦. Also observe that the consequent of
the premise to the rule defL and defR cannot have a higher level than the consequent
of the conclusion because of the level restriction on de¯nitional clauses. Finally, as with
normalizations, reductions have associated induction principles.59
From now on, we shall refer to an i-reducible derivation, for some level i, as simply
reducible derivation.
Lemma 4.15. If a derivation is reducible, then it is normalizable.
Proof By induction on the reduction tree and De¯nition 4.6 (normalizability).
Lemma 4.16. If ¦ is a reducible derivation, then for any substitution µ, ¦µ is reducible.
Proof We prove this lemma by induction on the reduction of ¦.
1. If ¦ ends with a multicut, then ¦µ also ends with a multicut. By Lemma 4.3 every
reduct of ¦µ is an instance of a reduct of ¦. Hence by induction hypothesis all
reducts of ¦µ are reducible.
2. If ¦ ends with the implication right rule then ¦ and ¦µ are
¦0
§; B;¡ ¡! C
§; ¡ ¡! B ¾ C ¾ R
¦0µ
§µ; Bµ;¡µ ¡! Cµ
§µ; ¡µ ¡! (B ¾ C)µ
¾ R
:
¦µ is reducible if ¦0µ is reducible and, for every substitution µ0, signature §0,
multiset ¢, and reducible derivation ¦00, the derivation ¥
¦00
§µµ0 ; ¢ ¡! Bµµ0
§0:¦0µµ0
§µµ0 ; Bµµ0;¡µµ0 ¡! Cµµ0
§µµ0 ; ¢;¡µµ0 ¡! Cµµ0 mc
is also reducible. ¦0µ is reducible by the induction hypothesis, and ¥ is reducible
since it is a predecessor of ¦. Therefore ¦µ is reducible.
3. If ¦ ends with ¾ L or ¹L, then the right premise derivation is reducible and
the other premise derivations are normalizable. By De¯nition 3.1 each premise
derivation in ¦µ is obtained by applying µ to a premise derivation in ¦. By
the induction hypothesis the right premise derivation of ¦µ is reducible, and by
Lemma 4.8 the other premise derivations are normalizable. Thus ¦µ is reducible.
4. Suppose ¦ ends with ºR,
¦0
§; ¢ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
§; ¢ ¡! ¹ z . p¹ t ºR
where p ¹ x
º = Dp ¹ x. Let W be the (<<i;¦0;¦S)-generated set where i = lvl(p).
Then ¦0 and ¦S are reducible, and the generated set W contains only reducible
derivations. The derivation ¦µ is
¦0µ
§µ; ¢µ ¡! (¹ z . S ¹ t)µ
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
§µ; ¢µ ¡! (¹ z . p¹ t)µ ºR :60
The derivation ¦0µ is reducible by inductive hypothesis. It remains to show that
the (<<i;¦0µ;¦S)-generated set W0 contains only reducible derivations. From
De¯nition 4.10 we see that ¦0µ 2 W, and therefore by Lemma 4.13 W0 µ W and
hence all derivations in W0 are reducible.
5. Suppose ¦ ends with any other rule and has premise derivations f¦ig. By De¯ni-
tion 3.1 each premise derivation in ¦µ is either ¦i or ¦iµ. Since ¦ is reducible, ¦i
is reducible, and so by the induction hypothesis ¦iµ is also reducible. Thus ¦µ is
reducible.
Lemma 4.17. Let ¦ be a reducible derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C. Let §0 be a signature
di®erent from §. Then the derivation §0:¦ is reducible.
Proof By induction on the reduction of ¦. The proof is analogous to the proof of
Lemma 4.16. Note that in the case where ¦ ends with ºR, the weakening of global
signature is already included in the de¯nition of generated set (De¯nition 4.10 (3)).
4.2.4 Reducibility of unfolded derivations
The following lemmas state that reducibility is preserved by (co)inductive unfold-
ing, under certain assumptions.
Lemma 4.18. Inductive unfolding. Let p ¹ x
¹
= B p ¹ x be an inductive de¯nition. Let ¦S be
a reducible derivation of ¹ x; B S ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x. Let ¦ be a reducible derivation of §; ¡ ¡!
C p such that every occurrence of p in C p is strictly positive. Suppose the following
statements hold
1. for every reducible derivation ¥ of §0 ; ¢ ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u the derivation
¥
§0 ; ¢ ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
¦0
S
§0 ; ¹ z . B S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§0 ; ¢ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc
is reducible, where ¦0
S is a raised instance of ¦S and
2. for every D, the derivation Id of D ¡! D is reducible, and for every reducible
derivation ¥ of ¢ ¡! D the derivation
¥
¢ ¡! D
Id
D ¡! D
¢ ¡! D
mc
is reducible.
Then the derivation ¹(¦;¦S) of §; ¡ ¡! C S is reducible.
Proof By induction on the reduction of ¦. We show the non-trivial cases, assuming
that C S 6= C p.61
1. Suppose ¦ ends with init rule on ¹ z . p ¹ u. Then ¹(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¦S
¹ x; B p ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
Id
§; ¹ z . S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§; ¹ z . p ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¹L
:
The reducibility of ¹(¦;¦S) follows immediately from the assumptions.
2. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ R, that is, C p = C1 p ¾ C2 p.
¦0
¡;C1 p ¡! C2 p
¡ ¡! C1 p ¾ C2 p ¾ R :
By the restriction on C p, it must be the case that C S = C1 p ¾ C2 S since p is
vacuous in C1 p. By the de¯nition of reducibility, the derivation ¦0 is reducible and
for substitution µ, signature §0, multiset of formulas ¢, and reducible derivation
ª of ¢ ¡! (C1 p)µ, the derivation ¥
ª
¢ ¡! (C1 p)µ
§0:¦0µ
¡µ;(C1 p)µ ¡! (C2 p)µ
¢ ¡! (C2 p)µ
mc
is reducible. We want to show that the derivation ¹(¦;¦S)
¹(¦0;¦S)
¡;C1 p ¡! C2 S
¡ ¡! C1 p ¾ C2 S ¾ R
is reducible. This reduces to showing that ¹(¦0;¦S) is reducible and that
ª
¢ ¡! (C1 p)µ
§0:¹(¦0;¦S)µ
¡µ;(C1 p)µ ¡! (C2 S)µ
¢ ¡! (C2 S)µ
mc
is reducible. The ¯rst follows from induction hypothesis on ¦0. For the second
derivation, we know from Lemma 3.21 and Lemma 3.23 that
§0:¹(¦0;¦S)µ = §0:¹(¦0µ;¦S) = ¹(§0:¦0µ;¦S) = ¹(¥;¦S):
We can apply induction hypothesis on ¥, since it is a predecessor of ¦. Therefore,
the derivation ¹(¦;¦S) is reducible.
3. Suppose ¦ ends with ¹R rule on ¹ z . p ¹ u.
¦0
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . B p ¹ u
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u
¹R
:62
Then ¹(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¹(¦0;¦S)
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
¦0
S
§; ¹ z . B S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc
;
where ¦0
S is a raised instance of ¦S. The derivation ¹(¦0;¦S) is reducible by
inductive hypothesis. This, together with the assumptions of the lemma, implies
that ¹(¦;¦S) is reducible.
4. Suppose ¦ ends with mc.
¦1
¢1 ¡! D1 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Dm
¦0
D1;:::;Dm;¡0 ¡! C p
¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! C p
mc
:
Then ¹(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¦1
¢1 ¡! D1 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Dm
¹(¦0;¦S)
D1;:::;Dm;¡0 ¡! C S
¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! C S
mc
:
By the de¯nition of reducibility, every reduct of ¦ is reducible. We need to show
that every reduct of ¹(¦;¦S) is reducible.
From Lemma 4.4, we know that for the case where (C p) is not atomic every reduct
of ¹(¦;¦S) corresponds to some reduct of ¦. Therefore inductive hypothesis can
be applied to show the reducibility of each reduct of ¹(¦;¦S). If (C p) is atomic,
that is, suppose (C p) = ¹ z . p ¹ u , we have the following two cases.
Suppose ¦0 is the derivation
¦00
§; D1;:::;Dm;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B p ¹ u
§; D1;:::;Dm;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u
¹R
:
Let ¥1 be the derivation
(
¦j
§; ¢j ¡! Dj
)
j2f1;:::;mg
¦00
§; D1;:::;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B p ¹ u
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B p ¹ u
mc
then the derivation
¥1
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B p ¹ u
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u
¹R63
is a reduct of ¦ (by the reduction rule ¡=¹R), and therefore by the de¯nition of
reducibility both this reduct and ¥1 are reducible predecessors of ¦. Let ª be the
derivation
¹(¦00;¦S)
§; D1;:::;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
¦0
S
§; ¹ z . B S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§; D1;:::;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc
Then the derivation ¹(¦;¦S) is the following
(
¦j
§; ¢j ¡! Dj
)
j2f1;:::;mg
ª
§; D1;:::;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc
:
The only applicable reduction rule to ¹(¦;¦S) is ¡=mc, which gives us the reduct
¥
ª0
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
¦0
S
§; ¹ z . B S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc
;
where ª0 is the derivation
(
¦j
§; ¢j ¡! Dj
)
j2f1;:::;mg
¹(¦00;¦S)
§; D1;:::;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
§; ¢1;:::;¢m;¡0 ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
mc
Notice that ª0 is exactly ¹(¥1;¦S), and is reducible by inductive hypothesis.
Therefore the assumption on ¦S applies, and the reduct ¥ is reducible.
Otherwise, suppose ¦0 ends with init, then D1 = C p and ¦ is the derivation
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u §; ¹ z . p ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u init
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u
mc
:
The only reduct of ¦ is ¦1 since the only applicable reduction is ¡=init. On the
other hand, the derivation ¹(¦;¦S) is
¦1
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u
¦S
¹ x; B S ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
Id
§; ¹ z . S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§; ¹ z . p ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¹L
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc64
Its only reduct is (by ¤=¹L)
¹(¦1;¦S)
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
Id
§; ¹ z . S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
§; ¢1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc
:
The derivation ¹(¦1;¦S) is reducible by inductive hypothesis (¦1 is a predecessor
of ¦) and therefore assumption on Id applies, and the above reduct is reducible.
Lemma 4.19. Co-inductive unfolding. Let p ¹ x
º = B p ¹ x be a co-inductive de¯nition.
Let ¦S be a reducible derivation of ¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x for some invariant S such that
lvl(S) · lvl(p). Let C p be a judgment such that lvl(C p) · lvl(p), and let ¦ be a reducible
derivation of §; ¡ ¡! C S:
Suppose there is a (<<i;©;¦S)-generated set W, where i = lvl(p) and © is some
reducible derivation, such that all derivations in W are reducible and ¦ 2 W. Then the
derivation º(¦;¦S) of §; ¡ ¡! C p is reducible.
Proof By induction on the reduction of ¦ and case analysis on C. If C S = C p then
º(¦;¦S) = ¦, which is reducible by assumption. Otherwise, suppose C S 6= C p. We
have two cases to consider.
Suppose C p = ¹ z . p ¹ u. Then C S = ¹ z . S ¹ u and º(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¦
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¦S
¹ x; S ¹ x ¡! B S ¹ x
§; ¡ ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u ºR :
Let G be the (<<i;¦;¦S)-generated set. By the de¯nition of reducibility, the above
derivation is reducible if its premises are reducible and the derivations in G are reducible.
The reducibility of the premise derivations is immediate from the assumptions. Since
¦ 2 W, by Lemma 4.13 G µ W, and therefore the derivations in G are reducible.
Otherwise C p is non-atomic judgment and there are several subcases, depending
on the last rule in ¦.
1. Suppose ¦ ends with mc.
¦1
¢1 ¡! D1 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Dm
¦0
D1;:::;Dm;¡0 ¡! C S
¢1;:::;¢n;¡0 ¡! C S
mc
Then º(¦;¦S) is the derivation
¦1
¢1 ¡! D1 ¢¢¢
¦n
¢n ¡! Dm
º(¦0;¦S)
D1;:::;Dm;¡0 ¡! C p
¢1;:::;¢n;¡0 ¡! C p
mc
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The derivation º(¦;¦S) is reducible if every reduct of º(¦;¦S) is reducible. From
Lemma 4.5, it follows that every reduct of º(¦;¦S) is of the form º(¥;¦S) where
¥ is a reduct of ¦. Since all reducts of ¦ are in W by De¯nition 4.10, we can apply
the inductive hypothesis to show that º(¥;¦S) is reducible, and hence º(¦;¦S)
is also reducible.
2. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ R.
¦0
¡;C1 p ¡! C2 S
¡ ¡! C1 p ¾ C2 S ¾ R
Note that p is vacuous in C p, therefore C1 S = C1 p. The reducibility of ¦ implies
that ¦0 is reducible and for any reducible derivation ª (which is in <<i because
lvl(C1 p) < lvl(p) = i) and for any substitution µ and signature §0, the derivation
¥
ª
¢0 ¡! (C1 p)µ
§0:¦0µ
¡;(C1 p)µ ¡! (C2 S)µ
¢0;¡µ ¡! (C2 S)µ
mc
is reducible. By De¯nition 4.10, ¦0;¥ 2 W. The derivation º(¦;¦S) is
º(¦0;¦S)
¡;C1 p ¡! C2 p
¡ ¡! C1 p ¾ C2 p ¾ R :
To show that º(¦;¦S) is reducible, we need to show that º(¦0;¦S) is reducible,
and for every ¢0,µ,§0 and reducible derivation ª of ¢0 ¡! (C1 p)µ, the derivation
¥0
ª
¢0 ¡! (C1 p)µ
§0:º(¦0;¦S)µ
¡;(C1 p)µ ¡! (C2 p)µ
¢0;¡µ ¡! (C2 p)µ
mc
is reducible. From Lemma 3.24 and Lemma 3.22 we see that §0:º(¦0;¦S)µ = º(§0:
¦0µ;¦S). So ¥0 is exactly º(¥;¦S). Therefore we apply induction hypothesis to
¦0 and to ¥ to get the reducible derivations º(¦0;¦S) and ¥, respectively.
3. Suppose ¦ ends with ^R.
¦1
¡ ¡! C1 S
¦2
¡ ¡! C2 S
¡ ¡! C1 S ^ C2 S ^R
Since ¦ is reducible, both ¦1 and ¦2 are reducible predecessor of ¦, and both are
also in the set W by the de¯nition of generated set. Thus it follows from inductive66
hypothesis that the derivation º(¦;¦S)
º(¦1;¦S)
¡ ¡! C1 p
º(¦2;¦S)
¡ ¡! C2 p
¡ ¡! C1 p ^ C2 p ^R
is reducible. The cases where ¦ ends with _R, 9R, 8R or rR (and the corre-
sponding left-rules) are treated similarly since in these cases all premise derivations
are in the reduction of ¦.
4. Suppose ¦ ends with ¾ L.
¦1
¡0 ¡! D
¦2
¡0;E ¡! C S
¡0;D ¾ E ¡! C S
¾ L
:
By the de¯nition of reducibility, the derivation ¦2 is reducible and is the major
premise of ¦, and hence in W. The derivation ¦1 is normalizable. By inductive
hypothesis, º(¦2;¦S) is reducible. Therefore the derivation º(¦;¦S)
¦1
¡0 ¡! D
º(¦2;¦S)
¡0;E ¡! C p
¡0;D ¾ E ¡! C p
¾ L
is reducible. The case where ¦ ends with ¹L is treated similarly since in this case
unfolding is also done only in the major premise.
5. Suppose ¦ ends with a left rule ±L other than ¾ L and ¹L. In this case all premise
derivations are major premises and inductive hypothesis can be applied to show
the reducibility of º(¦;¦S).
4.3 Cut elimination
Lemma 4.20. For any derivation ¦ of B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C, reducible derivations
¦1
¢1 ¡! B1; ::: ;
¦n
¢n ¡! Bn
where n ¸ 0, for any substitutions ±1;:::;±n;° and signatures §1;:::;§n;§, such that
Bi±i = Bi°, for every i 2 f1;:::;ng, the derivation ¥
§1:¦1±1
¢1±1 ¡! B1±1 ¢¢¢
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
§:¦°
B1°;:::;Bn°;¡° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
is reducible.67
Proof The proof is by induction on ind(¦) with subordinate induction on ht(¦), on
n and on the reductions of ¦1;:::;¦n. The proof does not rely on the order of the
inductions on reductions. Thus when we need to distinguish one of the ¦i, we shall refer
to it as ¦1 without loss of generality. The derivation ¥ is reducible if all its reducts are
reducible.
If n = 0, then ¥ reduces to §:¦°, thus in this case we show that §:¦° is reducible.
Since reducibility is preserved by substitution and signature weakening (Lemma 4.16 and
Lemma 4.17) it is enough to show that ¦ is reducible. This is proved by a case analysis
of the last rule in ¦. For each case, the result follows easily from the outer induction
hypothesis and De¯nition 4.14. The ¾ R case requires that substitution for variables and
weakening of global signatures do not increase the measures of a derivation (Lemma 3.6
and Lemma 3.11). In the cases for ¾ L and ¹L we need the additional information
that reducibility implies normalizability (Lemma 4.15). The case for ºR requires special
attention. Let p ¹ x
º = Dp ¹ x be a co-inductive de¯nition. Suppose ¦ is the derivation
¦0
¡ ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ t
¦S
S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
¡ ¡! ¹ z . p¹ t ºR
for some invariant S. Let l = lvl(p). To show that ¦ is reducible we must show that
its premises are reducible and the (<<l;¦0;¦S)-generated set contains only reducible
derivations. Reducibility of premises of ¦ is immediate from inductive hypotheses. Since
ind(¦S) · ind(¦) and ht(¦S) < ht(¦) and substitution and weakening of signatures
does not increase these measures, by inductive hypothesis, for every reducible derivation
ª of ¢ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ u for some ¢, ¹ y and ¹ u, the derivation
ª
¢ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ u
¦0
S
¹ y . S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . B S ¹ u
¢ ¡! ¹ y . B S ¹ u
mc
(¤)
is reducible. Recall that ¦0
S is obtained from ¦
"^ ¿(¹ y)
S (see Lemma 3.16) by some substitu-
tion and hence ht(¦0
S) · ht(¦S) and ind(¦0
S) · ind(¦S). We will make use of this fact
to establish the reducibility of all derivations in the (<<l¦0;¦S)-generated set, which we
shall refer to here as G. This is done by induction of the construction of the generated
set (see De¯nition 4.10). For each natural number j, the state of the construction is
denoted by Wj, and G is the ordinal limit, i.e., W!. The base case follows immediately
from outer inductive hypothesis. For the inductive case, assume that all derivations in
Wj are reducible. To show that all derivations in Wj+1 are reducible, it is enough to
check that each case (1) - (4) in De¯nition 4.10 preserves reducibility. The cases (1),
(2) and (3) follow from outer inductive hypothesis (¦0 is reducible), Lemma 4.16, and
Lemma 4.17, respectively. For the case (4.a), since all derivations in Wj are reducible, it
follows from the fact (*) that the resulting derivations from applying (4.a) are reducible.
The remaining cases (4.b) follows from the de¯nition of major premises (De¯nition 3.2)
and the de¯nition of reducibility.68
For n > 0, we analyze all possible reductions and show for each case the reduct is
reducible. Some cases follow immediately from inductive hypothesis. We show here the
non-trivial cases.
¾ R= ¾ L: Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
¢1;B0
1 ¡! B00
1
¢1 ¡! B0
1 ¾ B00
1
¾ R
¦0
B2;:::;¡ ¡! B0
1
¦00
B00
1;B2;:::;¡ ¡! C
B0
1 ¾ B00
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¾ L
:
The derivation ¥1
§1:¦2±2
¢2±2 ¡! B2±2 :::
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
§:¦0°
B2°;:::;Bn°;¡° ¡! B0
1°
¢2±2;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! B0
1°
mc
is reducible by induction hypothesis since ind(¦0) · ind(¦) and ht(¦0) < ht(¦). Since
¦1 is reducible, by De¯nition 4.14 the derivation ¥2
¥1
¢2±2;:::;¡° ¡! B0
1°
§0:¦1±1
B0
1±1;¢1±1 ¡! B00
1±1
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! B00
1±1
mc
is a predecessor of ¦1 and therefore is reducible. The reduct of ¥ in this case is the
following derivation
¥2
::: ¡! B00
1±1
½
§i:¦i±i
¢i±i ¡! Bi±i
¾
i2f2::ng
§0:¦00°
B00
1°;:::;Bn°;¡° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡°;¢2±2;:::;¢n°;¡° ¡! C°
mc
cL
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
which is reducible by induction hypothesis and De¯nition 4.14 (reducibility).
8L=8R: Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! ¹ z . B0
1[(h ¹ z)=x]
¢1 ¡! ¹ z . 8x:B0
1
8R
¦0
¹ z . B0
1[t=x];B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
¹ z . 8x:B0
1;B2;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
8L
Since we identify derivations that di®er only in the choice of intermediate eigenvariables
that are not free in the end sequents, we can choose a variable h such that it is not free in
the domains and ranges of ±1 and ° and di®erent from §1 and §. We can safely assume
that the bound variables ¹ z and x are di®erent from free variables in ±1,°, §1 and §.69
This way we can push the substitution inside binders. The derivation ¥ is thus
§1:¦0
1±1
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . B0
1±1[(h ¹ z)=x]
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . 8x:B0
1±1
8R
:::
§0:¦0°
¹ z . B0
1°[t°=x];:::;¡° ¡! C°
¹ z . 8x:B0
1°;:::;¡° ¡! C°
8L
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
Let ±0
1 = ±1 ± [¸¹ z:t°=h]. The reduct of ¥ in this case is
§0:¦0
1±0
1
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . B0
1±1[t°=x] :::
¦0°
¹ z . B0
1°[t°=x];:::;¡° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
which is reducible by induction hypothesis.
eqR=eqL: Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
¢1 ¡! ¹ z . s = t
eqR
½
¦½
B2½;:::;Bn½;¡½ ¡! C½
¾
½
¹ z . s = t;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! C
eqL
Then ¥ is the derivation
¢1±1 ¡! (¹ z . s = t)±1
eqR
¢¢¢
(
§0:¦°±½0
B2°½0;:::;Bn°½0;¡½0 ¡! C°½0
)
½0
(¹ z . s = t)°;:::;Bn°;¡° ¡! C°
eqL
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
The eqR tells us that s and t are uni¯able via empty substitution (i.e., they are the same
normal terms). The reduct of ¥
¦2±2
¢2±2 ¡! B2±2 :::
§0:¦°
B2°;:::;¡° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
is therefore reducible by induction hypothesis.
¤=¹L: Suppose ¦ is the derivation
¦S
DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¦0
¹ z . S ¹ t;¡ ¡! C
¹ z . p¹ t;¡ ¡! C
¹L70
Let ¹ z . p ¹ u be the result of applying ±1 to ¹ z . p¹ t. Then ¥ is the derivation
§1:¦1±1
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u ¢¢¢
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
¦S
DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
§:¦0°
¹ z . S ¹ u;¡° ¡! C°
¹ z . p ¹ u;¡° ¡! C°
¹L
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
The derivation ¥ reduces to the derivation ¥0
§1:¹(¦1;¦S)±1
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u ¢¢¢
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
¦0°
¹ z . S ¹ u;¡° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
:
Notice that we have used the fact that
¹(§1:¦1±1;¦S) = §1:¹(¦1±1;¦S) = §1:¹(¦1;¦S)±1
in the derivation above, which follows from Lemma 3.21 and Lemma 3.23. Therefore, in
order to prove that ¥0 is reducible, it remains to show that the unfolding of ¦1 produces
a reducible derivation.
We observe the following facts. Let ¦0
S be a raised instance of ¦S, i.e., ¦0
S is a
derivation of some sequent ¹ y . DS ¹ w ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ w: By Lemma 3.18 we have ht(¦0
S) ·
ht(¦S) < ht(¦) and ind(¦0
S) · ind(¦S) < ind(¦). Therefore, by the outer induction
hypothesis, the result of cutting ¦0
S with any reducible derivation must produce another
reducible derivation. Precisely, given any reducible derivation ª of ¢ ¡! y .DS ¹ w, the
derivation
ª
¢ ¡! ¹ y . DS ¹ w
¦0
S
¹ y . DS ¹ w ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ w
¢ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ w
mc
is reducible. Additionally, from De¯nition 3.8, we clearly have ind(IdD) = 0 < ind(¦)
for any judgment D, and therefore at this stage, we have also established that for every
reducible derivation ª0 of ¢0 ¡! D0, the derivation
ª0
¢0 ¡! D0
IdD0
D0 ¡! D0
¢0 ¡! D0 mc
is reducible.
These facts give su±cient conditions for concluding the reducibility of ¹(¦1;¦S)
by applying Lemma 4.18. Therefore, applying the induction hypothesis to ¦0, we estab-
lish the reducibility of ¥0.71
ºR=ºL: Suppose ¦1 and ¦ are
¦0
1
¢1 ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t
¦S
S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
¢1 ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t ºR
¦0
¹ y . Dp¹ t;B2;:::;¡ ¡! C
¹ y . p¹ t;B2;:::;¡ ¡! C ºL
where p ¹ x
º = Dp ¹ x. Suppose (¹ y . p¹ t)±1 = (¹ y . p¹ t)° = ¹ z . p ¹ u. Then ¥ is the derivation
§1:¦0
1±1
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¦S
S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u ºR ¢¢¢
§:¦0°
¹ z . Dp ¹ u;:::;¡° ¡! C°
¹ z . p ¹ u;:::;¡° ¡! C° ºL
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
Let l = lvl(p) and let W be the (<<l;¦0
1;¦S)-generated set. Since ¦1 is reducible, by
De¯nition 4.14, the derivations in W are predecessors of ¦1 and are reducible. By the
de¯nition of generated set (De¯nition 4.10), W contains the derivation §1 :¦0
1±1 2 W
and the derivation ¥1
§1:¦0
1±1
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¦0
S
¹ z . S ¹ u ¡! ¹ z . DS ¹ u
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . DS ¹ u
mc
:
where ¦0
S is a raised instance of ¦S. Therefore by Lemma 4.19 the derivation º(¥1;¦S)
is reducible. The reduct of ¥ is the derivation
º(¥1;¦S)
¢1±1 ¡! ¹ z . Dp ¹ u ¢¢¢
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
§:¦0°
¹ z . Dp ¹ u;:::;Bn°;¡° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc:
Its reducibility follows from the reducibility of º(¥1;¦S) and outer induction hypothesis.
¾ L= ± L: Suppose ¦1 is
¦0
1
¢0
1 ¡! D0
1
¦00
1
D00
1;¢0
1 ¡! B1
D0
1 ¾ D00
1;¢0
1 ¡! B1
¾ L
Since ¦1 is reducible, it follows from De¯nition 4.14 that ¦0
1 is normalizable and ¦00
1 is
reducible. Let ¥1 be the derivation
§1:¦00
1±1
D00
1±1;¢0
1±1 ¡! B1±1
§2:¦2±2
¢2±2 ¡! B2±2 ¢¢¢
§:¦°
B1±1;:::;¡° ¡! C°
D00
1±1;¢0
1±1;¢2±2;:::;¡° ¡! C°
mc
:72
¥1 is reducible by induction hypothesis on the reduction of ¦1 (¦00
1 is a predecessor of
¦1). The reduct of ¥ in this case is the derivation
§1:¦0
1±1
¢0
1±1 ¡! D0
1±1
wL
¢0
1±1;¢2±2;:::;¡° ¡! D0
1±1
¥1
D00
1±1;¢0
1±1;¢2±2;:::;¡° ¡! C°
(D0
1 ¾ D00
1)±1;¢0
1±1;¢2±2;:::;¡° ¡! C°
¾ L
:
Since ¦0
1 is normalizable and substitution and signature weakening preserves normaliz-
ability, by De¯nition 4.6 the left premise of the reduct is normalizable, and hence the
reduct is reducible.
eqL= ± L: Suppose ¦1 is (
¦½
¢0
1½ ¡! B1½
)
½
¹ z . s = t;¢0
1 ¡! B1
eqL
Then ¥ is the derivation
8
<
:
§1:¦±1±½0
¢0
1±1½0 ¡! B1±1½0
9
=
;
½0
¢0
1±1 ¡! B1±1
eqL §2:¦2±2
¢2±2 ¡! B2±2 ¢¢¢
§:¦°
B1°;:::;¡° ¡! C°
(¹ z . s = t)±1;¢0
1±1;¢2±2;:::;¡° ¡! C°
mc
Notice that each premise derivation ¦±1±½0
of ¦1±1 is a also a premise derivation of ¦1,
and therefore it is a predecessor of ¦1. Let ¥½0
be the derivation
§1:¦
±1±½0
1
¢0
1±1½0 ¡! B1±1½0
(§2:¦2±2)½0
¢2±2½0 ¡! B2±2½0 ...
(§:¦°)½0
B1°½0;:::;¡°½0 ¡! C°½0
¢0
1±1½0;¢2±2½0;:::;¡°½0 ¡! C°½0 mc:
Observe that in the derivation §2 : ¦2±2, by the de¯nition of weakening of signature,
the variables in §2 are not free in the end sequent of ¦2µ2. Now since substitution
a®ects only the free variables in the end sequent, we can equally write the derivation
(§2:¦2±2)½0 as §0
2:¦2±2½0 where §0
2 is a signature containing variables in §0
2½0 but not
already in the free variables of the end sequent of ¦2±2½0. Having observed this, we can
now apply the induction hypothesis (on the reduction of ¦1) to establish the reducibility73
of ¥½0
. The reduct of ¥
(
¥½0
¢0
1±1½0;:::;¡°½0 ¡! C°½0
)
½0
(¹ z . s = t)±1;¢0
1±1;:::;¡° ¡! C°
eqL
is then reducible by De¯nition 4.14.
¹L= ± L: Suppose ¦1 is
¦S
DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¦0
1
¹ y . S ¹ t;¢0
1 ¡! B1
¹ y . p¹ t;¢0
1 ¡! B1
¹L
:
Since ¦1 is reducible, it follows from the de¯nition of reducibility that ¦0
1 is reducible
predecessor of ¦1 and ¦S is normalizable. Suppose ¹ z .p ¹ u = (¹ y .p¹ t)±1 = (¹ y .p¹ t)°. Let
¥1 be the derivation
§1:¦0
1±1
¹ z . S ¹ u;¢0
1±1 ¡! B1±1 ¢¢¢
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
§:¦°
B1°;:::;Bn°;¡° ¡! C°
¹ z . S ¹ u;¢0
1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
mc
:
¥1 is reducible by induction on the reduction of ¦1, therefore the reduct of ¥
¦S
DS ¹ x ¡! S ¹ x
¥1
¹ z . S ¹ u;¢0
1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
¹ z . p ¹ u;¢0
1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! C°
¹L
is reducible.
¡= ¾ L: Suppose ¦ is
¦0
B1;:::;Bn;¡0 ¡! D0
¦00
B1;:::;Bn;D00;¡0 ¡! C
B1;:::;Bn;D0 ¾ D00;¡0 ¡! C
¾ L
:
Let ¥1 be
§1:¦1±1
¢1±1 ¡! B1±1 ¢¢¢
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
§:¦0°
B1°;:::;Bn°;¡0° ¡! D0°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡0° ¡! D0°
mc74
and ¥2 be
§1:¦1±1
¢1±1 ¡! B1±1 ¢¢¢
§n:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
§:¦00°
B1°;:::;Bn°;D00°;¡0° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;D00°;¡0° ¡! C°
mc
:
Both ¥1 and ¥2 are reducible by induction hypothesis. Therefore the reduct of ¥
¥1
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡0° ¡! D0°
¥2
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;D00°;¡0° ¡! C°
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;(D0 ¾ D00)°;¡0° ¡! C°
¾ L
:
is reducible (recall that reducibility of ¥1 implies its normalizability by Lemma 4.8).
¡=ºR: Suppose ¦ is
¦0
B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! ¹ y . S ¹ t
¦S
S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
B1;:::;Bn;¡ ¡! ¹ y . p¹ t ºR ;
where p ¹ x
º = Dp ¹ x. Suppose ¹ z . p ¹ u = (¹ y . p¹ t)±1 = (¹ y . p¹ t)°. Let ¥1 be the derivation
§1:¦1±1
¢1±1 ¡! B1±1 ¢¢¢
§:¦n±n
¢n±n ¡! Bn±n
§:¦0°
B1°;:::;Bn°;¡° ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
mc
:
The derivations §:¦0°, ¦S, ¥1 and the derivation
ª
¢0 ¡! ¹ a . S ¹ w
¦0
S
¹ a . S ¹ w ¡! ¹ a . DS ¹ w
¢0 ¡! ¹ a . DS ¹ w
mc
;
where ª is any reducible derivation and ¦0
S is a raised instance of ¦S, are reducible
by induction hypothesis on the length of ¦. Again, we use the same arguments as in
the case where n = 0 to show that the (<<lvl(p);¥1;¦S)-generated set contains only
reducible derivations. Therefore by De¯nition 4.14, the reduct ¥
¥1
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! ¹ z . S ¹ u
¦S
S ¹ x ¡! DS ¹ x
¢1±1;:::;¢n±n;¡° ¡! ¹ z . p ¹ u ºR
is reducible.
mc= ± L: Suppose ¦1 ends with a mc. Then any reduct of §1 :¦1±1 corresponds to a
predecessor of ¦1 by Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.2. Therefore the reduct of ¥ is reducible
by induction on the reduction of ¦1.
¡=init: ¥ reduces to §1:¦1±1. Since ¦1 is reducible, by Lemma 4.16 and Lemma 4.17,
§1:¦1±1 is reducible and hence ¥ is reducible.75
Corollary 4.21. Given a ¯xed strati¯ed de¯nition, a sequent has a proof in Linc if
and only if it has a cut-free proof.
The consistency of Linc is an immediate consequence of cut-elimination. By
consistency we mean the following: given a ¯xed strati¯ed de¯nition and an arbitrary
formula C, it is not the case that both C and C ¾ ? are provable.
Corollary 4.22. The logic Linc is consistent.
Proof Suppose otherwise, that is, there is a formula C such that there is a proof ¦1
of C and another proof ¦2 for C ¾ ?. By cut-elimination, ¦2 must end with ¾ R, that
is, ¦2 is
¦0
2
C ¡! ?
¡! C ¾ ? ¾ R
Cutting ¦1 with ¦0
2 we get a derivation of ¢ ¡! ?, and applying the cut-elimination
procedure we get a cut-free derivation of ¢ ¡! ?. But there cannot be such derivation
since there is no right-introduction rule for ?, contradiction.
4.4 Conclusion
The proof of cut-elimination for Linc closely resembles that of FO¸¢IN. In par-
ticular, the notion of reducibility is de¯ned by induction on the level of the derivation
as in FO¸¢IN. We argue that the side condition on ºR is imposed by the use of this
framework of reducibility. More precisely, suppose we lift the side condition on ºR.
Then given a co-inductive de¯nition px
º = B px and a derivation ¦
¦0
¡ ¡! S t
¦S
S x ¡! B S x
¡ ¡! pt ºR
where lvl(S x) > lvl(p), the reducibility of ¦ cannot depend on the reducibility of its
premises. Therefore the only way to make the reducibility argument go through is by
directly de¯ning the co-inductive unfolding of ¦0 as the predecessor of ¦. But we see
there is a problem with this scheme of reducibility. Suppose we are given a co-inductive
de¯nition p
º = p. Let ¦ be the derivation
¦0
¡! p p ¡! p init
¡! p ºR
Let ¦1 be the derivation
¦0
¡! p p ¡! p init
¡! p mc76
Then ¦ is reducible if the result of unfolding ¦1 is reducible, that is, if the following
derivation ¦2
¦0
¡! p p ¡! p init
¡! p mc p ¡! p init
¡! p ºR
is reducible. Now, ¦2 is reducible if the following derivation ¦3 is reducible.
¦2
¡! p p ¡! p init
¡! p mc p ¡! p init
¡! p ºR
We can easily see that this leads to in¯nite descending chains and hence this notion of
reducibility is not well-founded. In our formulation of reducibility, this in¯nite descend
is avoided since the unfolded derivation ¦2 is not a predecessor of ¦. However, this does
not mean that the side condition on ºR cannot be removed. Doing so would probably
require a very di®erent proof technique than the one we currently use.77
Chapter 5
Reasoning about Logical Speci¯cations in Linc
In this chapter, we illustrate the use of Linc to encode logical speci¯cations and
to reason about them. Both ¯rst-order and higher-order encodings are shown. The
examples of ¯rst-order encoding are given in Section 5.1, Section 5.2 and Section 5.3.
In these examples the r quanti¯er plays no signi¯cant role, therefore we shall omit
writing explicitly the local signatures. Section 5.1 shows the examples of encoding natural
numbers in Linc. In particular, we show that the natural number induction rule in
FO¸¢IN is derivable in Linc. Section 5.2 presents some examples of lists, both ¯nite
and in¯nite, and show how we can derive the (co)-induction principle for lists and use
it to derive properties about functions on lists. Section 5.3 shows an encoding of CCS
[39] with ¯xed point operator. We illustrate the use of co-induction proof technique in
proving the similarity of processes in CCS.
The next two sections illustrate the encodings involving higher-order abstract
syntax. Section 5.4 shows an encoding of a simple object-logic, Horn logic with univer-
sal quanti¯cation. We show an example of reasoning about the provability of generic
judgments in the object-logic which makes an essential use of r in interpreting the
object-logic universal quanti¯cation. We also discuss in this section a limitation of r in
dealing with certain inductive proofs involving higher-order abstract syntax. Section 5.5
presents an encoding of the lazy ¸-calculus and the notion of applicative bisimulation [1].
Section 5.6 concludes this chapter and discusses some related work.
5.1 Natural numbers
We introduce a type nt to encode natural numbers. The type nt has the following
constructors:
z : nt s : nt ! nt
which denote the natural number zero and the successor function, respectively. The
membership predicate is encoded as the inductive predicate nat with the following
de¯nition clause
nat x
¹
= (x = z) _ 9y:(x = (s y)) ^ nat y:
Given this de¯nition, we can derive the natural number induction rule as in FO¸¢IN
(i.e., the natL, see [28]).
Proposition 5.1. The rule natL
¡! B z i; B i ¡! B (s i) B I;¡ ¡! C
nat I;¡ ¡! C natL78
is derivable in Linc.
Proof We show that there is a derivation from the given premises of natL to its
conclusion, using the rules in Linc.
¡! B z
j ; j = z ¡! B j eqLcsu
i; B i ¡! B (si)
j;k ; j = (sk);B k ¡! B j
eqLcsu
j;k; j = (sk) ^ B k ¡! B j ^L¤
j ; 9k:j = (sk) ^ B k ¡! B j 9L
j ; (j = z) _ 9k:j = (sk) ^ B k ¡! B j _L B I;¡ ¡! C
nat I;¡ ¡! C
¹L
Given the derivability of natL in Linc, all previous examples in FO¸¢IN can be
trivially carried over to Linc without much e®ort. For example, we can show that Linc
with the de¯nition nat above encodes the intuitionistic version of Peano's arithmetic, a
result which is shown for FO¸¢IN in [30]. We illustrate the use of this derived rule in
the following example.
Example 5.2. The sum function can be encoded using the predicate sum : nt ! nt !
nt ! o; de¯ned inductively as follows.
sum I J K
¹
= (I = z ^ J = K) _
9M9N:I = (sM) ^ K = (sN) ^ sum M J N:
Note that since sum is already an inductive de¯nition we can prove certain properties
about it directly by structural induction on its de¯nition, that is, if the predicate sum
appears on the assumptions on the properties to be proved. Some other properties must
still be proved with the assumption that the arguments of sum are natural numbers.
Consider for example proving the functionality and the totality of sum on its ¯rst two
arguments. The functionality property is stated formally as follows (we leave out the
type nt)
8I8J8Msum I J M ¾ 8N:sum I J N ¾ M = N
and the totality property is speci¯ed as
8I:nat I ¾ 8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K:
The former property is proved by induction on the predicate sum while the latter is by
induction on nat . In both cases, the induction invariants are simply the right hand-side
of the outermost implications, i.e., the corresponding invariants for the above cases are:
D1 = ¸I¸J¸M:8N:sum I J N ¾ M = N
D2 = ¸I8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K:
The informal proof for the functionality property is done by induction on the ¯rst ar-
gument of sum, followed by case analyses on the de¯nition of sum. The formal proofs79
¦z
¡! D z J J
¦s
D I J M ¡! D (sI) J (sM) D I J M ¡! D I J M init
sum I J M ¡! D I J M
sumL
¡! 8I8J8Msum I J M ¾ D I J M
8R;¾ R
where
D = ¸I¸J¸M:8N:sum I J N ¾ M = N;
¦z is
J = N ¡! J = N init
z = z ^ J = N ¡! J = N ^L
z = (sM) ¡! J = N
eqL
z = (sM) ^ N = (sN0) ^
sumM J N0 ¡! J = N
^L
9M9N0:
·
z = (sM) ^ N = (sN0) ^
sumM J N0
¸
¡! J = N
9L
(z = z ^ J = N) _
9M9N0:z = (sM) ^ N = (sN0) ^ sum M J N0 ¡! J = N
_L
sumz J N ¡! J = N defL
¡! sumz J N ¾ J = N ¾ R
¡! 8N:sumz J N ¾ J = N 8R
and ¦s is
¢¢¢;sI = z ¡! sM = N
eqL
¢¢¢;
sI = z^
J = N ¡! sM = N
^L
sumI J Q ¡! sumI J Q init ¡! sM = sM
eqR
M = Q ¡! sM = sQ
eqL
sumI J Q ¾ M = Q;sumI J Q ¡! sM = sQ ¾ L
DI J M;sumI J Q ¡! sM = sQ 8L
¢¢¢;
sI = sP^
N = (sQ)^
sum P J Q
¡! sM = N
^L¤;eqL
¢¢¢;9P9Q:
2
4
sI = sP^
N = (sQ)^
sum P J Q
3
5 ¡! sM = N
9L
D1 I J M;
·
sI = z ^ J = N _
9P9Q:sI = sP ^ N = sQ ^ sum P J Q
¸
¡! sM = N
_L
DI J M;sum(sI)J N ¡! (sM) = N
defL
DI J M ¡! 8N:sum (sI) J N ¾ sM = N
8R;¾ R
Fig. 5.1. A formal proof of the functionality of sum.80
¦z
¡! F z
¦s
F I ¡! F (sI) F I ¡! 8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K init
nat I ¡! 8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K natL
¡! nat I ¾ 8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K ¾ R
¡! 8I:nat I ¾ 8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K 8R
where F is ¸I:8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K, the derivations ¦z is
nat J ¡! z = z
eqR
nat J ¡! J = J
eqR
nat J ¡! z = z ^ J = J ^R
nat J ¡! (z = z ^ J = J) _ 9M9N:z = (sM) ^ J = (sN) ^ sum M J N
_
nat J ¡! sum z J J defR
nat J ¡! 9K:sum z J K 9R
¡! nat J ¾ 9K:sum z J K ¾ R
¡! 8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum z J K 8R
¦s is
nat J ¡! nat J init
¦0
s
sum I J K;nat J ¡! sum (sI) J (sK)
sum I J K;nat J ¡! 9K:sum (sI) J K
9R
9K:sum I J K;nat J ¡! 9K:sum (sI) J K
9L
nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K;nat J ¡! 9K:sum (sI) J K
¾ L
8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K;nat J ¡! 9K:sum (sI) J K
8L
8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K ¡! nat J ¾ 9K:sum (sI) J K
¾ R
8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum I J K ¡! 8J:nat J ¾ 9K:sum (sI) J K
8R
and ¦0
s is
¢¢¢ ¡! sI = sI
eqR
¢¢¢ ¡! sI = sI
eqR
¢¢¢ ¡! sI = sI ^ sK = sK ^R
sumI J K;nat J ¡! sumI J K init
sum I J K;nat J ¡! sI = sI ^ sK = sK ^ sum M J K ^R
sum I J K;nat J ¡! 9M9N:sI = sM ^ sK = sN ^ sum M J N 9R
sum I J K;nat J ¡!
(sI = z ^ J = sK) _
9M9N:sI = sM ^ sK = sN ^ sum M J N
_R
sum I J K;nat J ¡! sum (sI) J (sK)
defR
Fig. 5.2. A formal proof of the totality of sum.81
given in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 follow exactly this structure of informal proofs. In
Figure 5.1 we make use of a derived induction rule for sum:
¡! D z J J D I J K ¡! D (sI) J (sK) D R S T;¡ ¡! C
sumRS T;¡ ¡! C
sumL
where I;J;K are eigenvariables in their respected sequents. This rule can be derived in
Linc in the similar way as we derive natL.
5.2 Lists
Lists over some ¯xed type ® are encoded as the type lst, with the usual construc-
tors nil : lst for empty list and :: : ® ! lst ! lst. We consider some functions on lists
and their properties, for both ¯nite lists and in¯nite lists.
¡! z = z eqR
¡! x :: L = x :: L
eqR
L1 = L2 ¡! x :: L1 = x :: L2
eqL
csu
¢¢¢;L1 = L2 ¡! L1 = L2
init
list L1;list L2;eqx L1 L2 ¡! L1 = L2
eqxL
¡! > >R
¡! eqxnilnil defR
=
eqxL
0
1 L
0
2 ¡! eqxL
0
1 L
0
2
init
eqx(x :: L
0
1)(x :: L
0
2) ¡! eqxL
0
1 L
0
2
defL
csu
eqxLL;list L ¡! eqxLL init
list L;list L ¡! eqx L L
listL
list L1;list L2;L1 = L2 ¡! eqx L1 L2
eqL
csu
Fig. 5.3. Freeness property of lists.
5.2.1 Finite lists
Finite lists over ® are generated by the constructors nil and ::, from the elements
of the type ®. The membership predicate is de¯ned as follows.
list L
¹
= L = nil _ 9x9L0:L = x :: L0 ^ list L082
Its corresponding induction rule is
¡! D nil D L ¡! D (x :: L) D l;¡ ¡! C
list l;¡ ¡! C
listL
List is an example of free inductive data type (just as natural number is), that is, two
lists are (extensionally) equal if and only if they are syntactically equal. More precisely,
we can de¯ne the equality predicate for lists as follows.
eqx L1 L2
¹
= (L1 = nil ^ L2 = nil)_
(9x9L0
19L0
2:L1 = (x :: L0
1) ^ L2 = (x :: L0
2) ^ eqx L0
1 L0
2):
We can equally write this de¯nition as a patterned de¯nition as follows
eqx nil nil
¹
= >; eqx (X :: L0
1) (X :: L0
2)
¹
= eqx L0
1 L0
2:
This patterned de¯nition is used when we apply defLcsu.
The freeness property above can be stated formally as
8L18L2:list L1 ¾ list L2 ¾ (eqx L1 L2 ´ (L1 = L2)):
Its two subproofs are shown in Figure 5.3. In one of the subproofs, we make use of a
derived induction rule for eq, that is,
¡! D nil nil DL1 L2 ¡! D(x :: L1)(x :: L2) Dll0;¡ ¡! C
eqx l l0;¡ ¡! C
eqxL
This rule can be shown to be derivable in Linc, following the same scheme for deriving
natL and sum as seen previously. The induction invariant in the ¯rst proof in the ¯gure
is ¸L1¸L2:L1 = L2, while in the second it is ¸L:eqx L L.
We next consider the append function on ¯nite lists and prove one of its properties,
i.e., associativity.
Example 5.3. Associativity of app. The append function can be encoded as the fol-
lowing de¯nition clauses.
appL1 L2 L3
¹
= (L1 = nil ^ L2 = L3) _
9x;L0
1;L0
3:L1 = (x::L0
1) ^ L3 = (x::L0
3) ^ appL0
1 L2 L0
3:
We can alternatively see this as coding the patterned de¯nition clause
appnilLL
¹
= >; app(X :: L1)L2 (X :: L3)
¹
= appL1 L2 L3:
The associated induction principle for app is as follows.
¡! D nil L L D L1 L2 L3 ¡! D (x :: L1) L2 (X :: L3) D l1 l2 l3;¡ ¡! C
appl1 l2 l3;¡ ¡! C
appL83
The associativity of app is stated formally as follows.
8L18L28L128L38L4:(appL1 L2 L12 ^ appL12 L3 L4) ¾
8L23:appL2 L3 L23 ¾ appL1 L23 L4:
(5.1)
Proving this formula requires us to prove ¯rst that the de¯nition of append is functional,
that is,
8L18L28L38L4:appL1 L2 L3 ^ appL1 L2 L4 ¾ L3 = L4:
This is done by induction on appL1 L2 L3. The invariant in this case is
I = ¸L1¸L2¸L3:8R:appL1 L2 R ¾ R = L3:
It is a simple case analysis to check that this is the right invariant:
¦1
¡! I nilLL
¦2
I L0
1 L2 L0
3 ¡! I (X :: L0
1)L2 (X :: L0
3)
¦3
I L1 L2 L3;::: ¡! L3 = L4
appL1 L2 L3;appL1 L2 L4 ¡! L3 = L4
appL
¡! appL1 L2 L3 ^ appL1 L2 L4 ¾ L3 = L4
¾ R;^L¤
¡! 8L18L28L38L4:appL1 L2 L3 ^ appL1 L2 L4 ¾ L3 = L4
8R
where ¦1;¦2 and ¦3 are the following derivation.
¡! nil = nil
eqR
appnilnilL ¡! L = nil defLcsu
¡! 8L:appnilnilL ¾ L = nil
8R;¾ R
appL0
1 L2 L0 ¡! appL0
1 L2 L0 init
appL0
1 L2 L00 ¡! X :: L00 = X :: L00 init
appL0
1 L2 L0;L0 = L0
3 ¡! X :: L0 = X :: L0
3
eqLcsu
appL0
1 L2 L0 ¾ L0 = L0
3;appL0
1 L2 L0 ¡! X :: L0 = X :: L0
3
¾ L
8R:appL0
1 L2 R ¾ R = L0
3;appL0
1 L2 L0 ¡! X :: L0 = X :: L0
3
8L
I L0
1 L2 L0
3;appX :: L0
1 L2 L ¡! L = X :: L0
3
defLcsu
I L0
1 L2 L0
3 ¡! 8L:appX :: L0
1 L2 X :: L0
3 ¾ L = X :: L0
3
8R;¾ R
appL1 L2 L4 ¡! appL1 L2 L4
init L3 = L4;appL1 L2 L4 ¡! L3 = L4
init
appL1 L2 L4 ¾ L4 = L3;appL1 L2 L4 ¡! L3 = L4
¾ L
8R:appL1 L2 R ¾ R = L3;appL1 L2 L4 ¡! L3 = L4
8L84
We are now ready to prove the associativity of append. The problem of associa-
tivity is reduced to proving the following sequent
appL1 L2 L12; appL12 L3 L4; appL2 L3 L23 ¡! appL1 L23 L4: (5.2)
We then proceed by induction on the list L1, that is, we apply the appL rule to the
hypothesis appL1 L2 L12 using the invariant
S = ¸L1¸L2¸L12:8L38L4:appL12 L3 L4 ¾ 8L23:appL2 L3 L23 ¾ appL1 L23 L4:
Applying the ¹L rule, followed by _L, to sequent (5.2) reduces the sequent to the
following sub-goals
(i) ¡! S nilL2 L3,
(ii) S L0
1 L2 L0
3 ¡! S (X :: L1)L2 (X :: L3),
(ii) S L1 L2 L12; appL12 L3 L4; appL2 L3 L23 ¡! appL1 L23 L4,
The proof for the ¯rst sequent is straightforward. The proof for the second sequent is
done by a series of case analysis. The third sequent reduces to
appL12 L3 L4;appL12 L3 L23 ¡! appnilL23 L4:
This follows from the functionality of append (which identi¯es L4 and L23) and defR.
5.2.2 In¯nite lists
Unlike ¯nite lists, in¯nite lists are not characterized by the ¯nite constructions
from its constructors. Instead, it is characterized by the destructor operations (also called
observation) on lists, i.e., taking the head and the tail of the list. In a list of the form
x :: L, the element x is the head and L is the tail of the list. This leads to a di®erent
notion of equivalence of lists, that is, two lists are equivalent if they are observationally
equivalent. This notion of equivalence is typically de¯ned via bisimulation (a more
general notion, involving transition systems, will be given in Section 5.3). In the case
of lists, the observables are the empty list nil and the constructor ::. The equivalence
relation for the (possibly) in¯nite lists is de¯ned as follows.
eqiL1 L2
º = (L1 = nil ¾ L2 = nil) ^ (L2 = nil ¾ L1 = nil)^
(8X8L0
1:L1 = X :: L0
1 ¾ 9L0
2:L2 = X :: L0
2 ^ eqi L0
1 L0
2)
(8X8L0
2:L2 = X :: L0
2 ¾ 9L0
1:L1 = X :: L0
1 ^ eqi L0
2 L0
1)
It can be veri¯ed that the relation de¯ned by eqi obeys the usual equality laws, i.e.,
re°exive, symmetric and transitive.
One interesting property concerning equality of in¯nite lists is that it can be
de¯ned via ¯nite approximation. That is, two in¯nite lists are equal (in the above sense)
if and only if every ¯nite pre¯x of one list is (syntactically) equal to the pre¯x of the85
same length of the other list. This is also known as the take lemma [5]. We show the
proof of the take lemma in the following example.
Example 5.4. The take lemma. Let us de¯ne the tk predicate as follows.
tkz Lnil
4
= >:
tkN nilnil
4
= >:
tk(sN)(X :: L)(X :: R)
4
= tkN LR:
Given a natural number n and a list L, the tk predicate \outputs" a list R such that R
is the ¯rst n elements of L. The de¯nition consisting of eqi and tk can be strati¯ed by
assigning eqi with a level higher than the level of tk.
Let eqfL1 L2 denotes the formula 8N:nat N ¾ 8L:tkN L1 L ´ tkN L2 L: The
take lemma can be stated formally as eqiL1 L2 ´ eqfL1 L2: We ¯rst prove the forward
direction, that is,
eqiL1 L2 ¾ 8N:nat N ¾ 8L:tkN L1 L ´ tkN L2 L:
Proving this formula reduces to proving the sequent
eqiL1 L2;nat N ¡! 8L:tkN L1 L ´ tkN L2 L:
This is done by induction on N with the invariant
I = ¸N:8L18L2:eqiL1 L2 ¾ 8L:tkN L1 L ´ tkN L2 L:
The proof for the base case is as follows.
eqiL1 L2 ¡! > >R
eqiL1 L2 ¡! tkz L2 nil defR= eqinilL2 ¡! > >R
eqinilL2 ¡! tkz L2 nil defR=
eqiL1 L2;tkz L1 L ¡! tkz L2 L defLcsu
The inductive cases are given by the sequents
I N;eqiL1 L2;tk(sN)L1 L ¡! tk(sN)L2 L
and
I N;eqiL1 L2;tk(sN)L2 L ¡! tk(sN)L1 L:
We show the proof for the ¯rst sequent, since the proof for the latter can be obtained
from the ¯rst by substitution (exchanging L1 and L2) and the symmetry of eqi. The
proof starts with case analyses (defLcsu) on tk, followed by eqi. The detail of the formal
proof is rather involved, but it is basically some mechanical checking of cases. We look
at the particular case where both L1 and L2 are instantiated to non-nil terms, i.e.,
L1 = X :: L0
1 and L2 = X :: L0
2 for some X, L0
1 and L0
2. This subproof is given in the86
following.
:::;eqiL0
1 L0
2 ¡! eqiL0
1 L0
2
init ¦
8L:tkN L0
1 L ´ tkN L0
2 L;¢¢¢ ¡! tkN L0
2 L0
eqiL0
1 L0
2 ¾ 8L:tkN L1 L ´ tkN L2 L;eqiL0
1 L0
2;tkN L0
1 L0 ¡! tkN L0
2 L0 ¾ R
I N;eqiL0
1 L0
2;tkN L0
1 L0 ¡! tkN L0
2 L0 8L
Here the subproof ¦ is
¢¢¢;tkN L0
1 L0 ¡! tkN L0
1 L0 init
¢¢¢;tkN L0
2 L0 ¡! tkN L0
2 L0 init
tkN L0
1 L0 ¾ tkN L0
2 L;¢¢¢ ¡! tkN L0
2 L0 ¾ L
tkN L0
1 L0 ´ tkN L0
2 L;¢¢¢ ¡! tkN L0
2 L0 ^L
8L:tkN L0
1 L ´ tkN L0
2 L;¢¢¢ ¡! tkN L0
2 L0 8L:
The other direction, i.e., eqfL1 L2 ¾ eqiL1 L2 is proved by co-induction. The
invariant in this case is ¸L1¸L2:eqfL1 L2: Applying ºR, followed by applications of
asynchronous rules, give us the following premises
1. eqfnilL2 ¡! L2 = nil
2. eqfL1 nil ¡! L1 = nil
3. eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! 9L0
2:L2 = (X :: L0
2) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2:
4. eqfL1 (X :: L0
1) ¡! 9L0
1:L1 = (X :: L0
1) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2:
5. eqfL1 L2 ¡! eqfL1 L2:
We show the proof for the ¯rst and the third sequents. The second and the fourth are
symmetric to the ¯rst and the third. The proof for the ¯rst sequent is given in the
following.
¡! > >R
¡! nat (sz) defR=
¡! > >R
¡! tk(sz)nilnil defR= ¡! nil = nil
eqR
tk(sz)L2 nil ¡! L2 = nil defLcsu
tk(sz)nilnil ¾ tk(sz)L2 nil ¡! L2 = nil
¾ L
tk(sz)nilnil ´ tk(sz)L2 nil ¡! L2 = nil
^L
8L:tk(sz)nilL ´ tk(sz)L2 L ¡! L2 = nil
8L
nat (sz) ¾ 8L:tk(sz)nilL ´ tk(sz)L2 L ¡! L2 = nil
¾ L
8N:nat N ¾ 8L:tkN nilL ´ tkN L2 L ¡! L2 = nil 8L
In the proof of the third sequent, we make use of the following lemma
eqf(X :: L)(X :: R) ¾ eqfLR;87
which essentially says that the set denoted by eqf is downward-closed. The proof of this
lemma is given below. We refer to this proof as ¥.
¥1
¢¢¢ ¡! tkM LL0 ¾ tkM RL0
¥2
¢¢¢ ¡! tkM RL0 ¾ tkM LL0
eqf(X :: L)(X :: R);nat M ¡! tkM LL0 ´ tkM RL0 ^R
eqf(X :: L)(X :: R) ¡! eqfLR
8R;¾ R
The proof ¥1 is symmetric to ¥2, therefore we show here only ¥1, which is the following
derivation.
nat M ¡! nat (sM)
defR=;init
¥3
tk(sM)(X :: L)(X :: L0) ¾
tk(sM)(X :: R)(X :: L0);
nat M;tkM LL0 ¡! tkM RL0
tk(sM)(X :: L)(X :: L0) ´
tk(sM)(X :: R)(X :: L0);
nat M;tkM LL0 ¡! tkM RL0
8P:[ tk(sM)(X :: L)P ´
tk(sM)(X :: R)P];
nat M;tkM LL0 ¡! tkM RL0
8L
nat (sM) ¾
8P:tk(sM)(X :: L)P ´ tk(sM)(X :: R)P ;nat M;tkM LL0 ¡! tkM RL0
¾ L
eqf(X :: L)(X :: R);nat M;tkM LL0 ¡! tkM RL0 8L
eqf(X :: L)(X :: R);nat M ¡! tkM LL0 ¾ tkM RL0 ¾ R
where ¥3 is the derivation
tkM LL0 ¡! tk(sM)(X :: L)(X :: L0)
tkM RL0;¢¢¢ ¡! tkM RL0 init
tk(sM)(X :: R)(X :: L0);
nat M;tkM LL0 ¡! tkM RL0
defLcsu
tk(sM)(X :: L)(X :: L0) ¾ tk(sM)(X :: R)(X :: L0);
nat M;tkM LL0 ¡! tkM RL0
¾ L
The complete proof of sequent (3) is given in Figure 5.4.
Example 5.5. Co-recursive append. The co-recursive append requires case analysis on
all arguments.
coapp L1 L2 L3
º = (L1 = nil ^ L2 = nil ^ L3 = nil) _
(L1 = nil ^ 9x9L0
29L0
3:(L2 = (x::L0
2) ^ L3 = (x::L0
3)
^ coapp nil L0
2 L0
3) _
(9x9L0
19L0
3:L1 = (x::L0
1) ^ L3 = (x::L0
3)
^ coapp L0
1 L2 L0
3):88
¡! > >R
¡! nat (sz) defR=
¦
tk(sz)(X :: L0
1)(X :: nil) ´
tk(sz)L2 (X :: nil); eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! ¢¢¢
8L:tk(sz)(X :: L0
1)L ´
tk(sz)L2 L; eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! ¢¢¢
8L
nat (sz) ¾
8L:tk(sz)(X :: L0
1)L ´
tk(sz)L2 L; eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! ¢¢¢
¾ L
eqf(X :: L0
1)L2;eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! 9L0
2:L2 = (X :: L0
2) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2
8L
eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! 9L0
2:L2 = (X :: L0
2) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2
cL
¦ :
¡! > >R
¡! tk(sz)(X :: L0
1)(X :: nil)
defR=
¦1
tk(sz)L2 (X :: nil);
eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! ¢¢¢
tk(sz)(X :: L0
1)(X :: nil) ¾
tk(sz)L2 (X :: nil);
eqf(X :: L0
1)L2
¡! 9L0
2:L2 = (X :: L0
2) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2
¾ L
tk(sz)(X :: L0
1)(X :: nil) ´
tk(sz)L2 (X :: nil);
eqf(X :: L0
1)L2
¡! 9L0
2:L2 = (X :: L0
2) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2
^L
¦1 :
¢¢¢ ¡! X :: L3 = X :: L3
eqR ¥
eqf(X :: L0
1)(X :: L3) ¡! eqfL0
1 L3
eqf(X :: L0
1)(X :: L3) ¡! (X :: L3) = (X :: L3) ^ eqfL0
1 L3
^R
eqf(X :: L0
1)(X :: L3) ¡! 9L0
2:(X :: L3) = (X :: L0
2) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2
9R
tk(sz)L2 (X :: nil);
eqf(X :: L0
1)L2 ¡! 9L0
2:L2 = (X :: L0
2) ^ eqfL0
1 L0
2
defLcsu
Fig. 5.4. A proof of the take lemma.89
The corresponding associativity property is stated analogously to the inductive one and
as in the inductive case, the main statement reduces to proving the sequent
coapp l1 l2 l12; coapp l12 l3 l4; coapp l2 l3 l23 ¡! coapp l1 l23 l4:
We apply the ºR rule to coapp l1 l23 l4, using the simulation
I = ¸l1¸l2¸l12:9l239l39l4:coapp l12 l3 l4 ^ coapp l2 l3 l23 ^ coapp l1 l23 l4:
Subsequent steps of the proof involve mainly case analysis on coapp l12 l3 l4. As in the
inductive case, we have to prove the sub-cases when l12 is nil. However, unlike in the
former case, case analyses on the arguments of coapp su±ces.
5.3 Abstract transition systems
We consider a subset of the calculus of communicating systems (CCS) [39] with
a ¯xed point operator ¹. The process expressions of CCS are generated by the following
grammar.
P ::= 0 j X j ®:P j PjQ j P + Q j ¹X:P
® ::= x j ¹ x j ¿:
Processes can make transitions and perform actions. The process 0 is the inert process
which does not make any transition. The `.' (dot) operator is the action pre¯x. The
process ®:P can perform an action ® and changes its state into process P. Actions come
in pairs, that is, for every action a, there is a complement action ¹ a. There is a special
action, ¿, which denotes silent transition and which does not have any complementary
action. An action is identi¯ed with its double-complement, i.e., a = ¹ ¹ a. The + is the
choice operator and j is the parallel composition. The variable X above denotes a process
variable. We consider only closed process expressions, that is, all occurrences of process
variables are bound by the ¹ operator. The ¹ operator is the ¯xed point operator.
The operational meaning of these operators is given by the operational semantics in
Figure 5.5.
A:P
A
¡ ¡ ! P
P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0
P j Q
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 j Q
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0
P j Q
A
¡ ¡ ! P j Q0
P[¹X:P=X]
A
¡ ¡ ! Q
¹X:P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q
P
A
¡ ¡ ! R
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
P
¹ A
¡ ¡ ! R Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! R j S
Fig. 5.5. One-step transition for CCS90
The process expressions can be translated into higher-order abstract syntax in
the following way. We introduce the types p and a to denote processes and actions. The
operators above can then be given the following types:
¿ : a; ¹: a ! a; : : a ! p ! p;
j : p ! p ! p; + : p ! p ! p; ¹ : (p ! p) ! p:
The one-step transition judgment is encoded as the predicate :
:
¡ ¡ ! : : p ! a ! p. The
one-step transition semantics for CCS in Figure 5.5 is translated to the de¯nition clauses
in Figure 5.6.
A:P
A
¡ ¡ ! P
¹
= >:
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¹
= P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0:
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ¹
= Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0:
PjQ
A
¡ ¡ ! P0jQ
¹
= P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0:
PjQ
A
¡ ¡ ! PjQ0 ¹
= Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0:
¹X:P X
A
¡ ¡ ! Q
¹
= P (¹X:P X)
A
¡ ¡ ! Q:
PjQ
¿
¡ ¡ ! P0jQ0 ¹
= 9A9B:comp A B ^ P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ^ Q
B
¡ ¡ ! Q0
comp A ¹ A
¹
= >:
comp ¹ A A
¹
= >:
Fig. 5.6. Encoding of one-step transition of CCS in Linc.
Given this encoding, we can easily see that to infer a one-step transition, we only
need to use right-introduction rules. In the following example we consider proving a
negative statement about the transition system, in which the left-rules (in particular the
induction rule) are used.
Example 5.6. The process ¹X:X clearly does not make any transition since it has no
action-pre¯x. This is stated formally as the formula
8A8Q:¹X:X
A
¡ ¡ ! Q ¾ ?:91
Finding a proof for this formula reduces to ¯nding a proof for the sequent
¹X:X
A
¡ ¡ ! Q ¡! ?:
Clearly, applying the defLcsu rule will not lead us to a proof, since it will result in the
same sequent in the premise. We need to use induction. The informal proof is done by
induction on the structure of the one-step derivation. In each case, pattern matching
on the clause su±ces to show that ¹X:X does not make any transition. This is proved
formally by using the invariant S = ¸P¸A¸Q:P = ¹X:X ¾ ?.
¦
B (¹X:X)AQ ¡! ?
B P AQ;P = ¹X:X ¡! ?
eqL
B P AQ ¡! P = ¹X:X ¾ ? ¾ R
¡! ¹X:X = ¹X:X
eqR
? ¡! ? ?L
¹X:X = ¹X:X ¾ ? ¡! ? ¾ L
¹X:X
A
¡ ¡ ! Q ¡! ?
¹L
The formula B P AQ denotes the body of the de¯nition clause corresponding to the
patterned de¯nition in Figure 5.6. The premise derivation ¦ is constructed by a series of
case analyses on the de¯nition of one-step transition. Most cases fail to pattern-match,
and the only case that successfully pattern-match yields the following sequent (using the
sixth clause in Figure 5.6)
¹X:X = ¹X:X ¾ ? ¡! ?
which is trivially provable.
5.3.1 Bisimulation
An important notion in reasoning about processes is that of bisimulation. That is,
given two processes P and Q, any transition of P can be simulated by a transition of Q
such that their continuations continue to simulate each other. If we de¯ne the behavior
of a process as the actions it is capable of performing (at current state or some \future"
state), then bisimulation gives us a way to say when two processes are behaviorally
equivalent. The original motivation of studying bisimulation [39] is precisely this, that
it will provide us with an equational theory of behaviors. We consider here encoding
simulation (which is, roughly speaking, one-half of bisimulation) and bisimulation. Both
are encoded as coinductive de¯nitions given in Figure 5.7. In the following we show a
simple example of checking simulation between processes. In Chapter 6 we shall consider
more comprehensive examples of bisimulation in ¼-calculus, an extension of CCS.
Example 5.7. Consider proving the simulation sim ( ¹x:a:x) (¹x:(a:x j a:x)). This is
proved using the following simulation predicate
S := ¸P¸Q:(P = ¹x:a:x) ^ 9Q0:Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0:92
sim P Q
4
= 8A8P0:P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¾ 9Q0:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ^ sim P 0 Q0
bisim P Q
4
= [8A8P0:P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¾ 9Q0:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ^ bisim P 0 Q0]^
[8A8Q0:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ¾ 9P0:P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ^ bisim Q 0 P0]
Fig. 5.7. Simulation and bisimulation for CCS
Intuitively, it is enough to characterize ¹x:(a:x j a:x) by saying that it preserves the
capability of making an a-transition whenever it makes an a-transition. The proof is as
follows. Let R = ¹x:a:x and T = ¹x:(a:x j a:x).
¦1
¡! R = ¹x:a:x ^ 9Q0:T
a
¡ ¡ ! T j Q0
¦2
P = ¹x:a:x ^ 9Q0:(Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0) ¡! B S P Q
¡! sim R T ºR
where B S P Q is the formula
8A8P0:P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¾ 9Q1:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q1 ^ [P0 = ¹x:a:x ^ 9Q2:Q1
a
¡ ¡ ! Q1 j Q2]
The ¯rst premise is provable by instantiating Q0 with a:T. The second premise
derivation reduces to the following derivation, after some simpli¯cation steps.
(Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0) ¡! (Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0) ^ [¹x:a:x = ¹x:a:x ^ 9Q2:((Q j Q0)
a
¡ ¡ ! (Q j Q0) j Q2)]
(Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0) ¡! 9Q1:(Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q1) ^ [¹x:a:x = ¹x:a:x ^ 9Q2:(Q1
a
¡ ¡ ! Q1 j Q2)]
9R
We show here the subderivation for the third conjunct, the others are trivially provable.
(Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0) ¡! (Q
a
¡ ¡ ! (Q j Q0))
init
(Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0) ¡! ((Q j Q0)
a
¡ ¡ ! (Q j Q0) j Q0)
defR
(Q
a
¡ ¡ ! Q j Q0) ¡! 9Q2:((Q j Q0)
a
¡ ¡ ! (Q j Q0) j Q2)
9R
5.4 Object logic
In this section we consider an encoding of a simple object-logic, that is, Horn logic
with universal quanti¯cation. The static structure of the object-level quanti¯cation is
encoded via abstraction at the meta-level, similar to our previous encoding of the ¹-
operator. However, in the previous encoding we essentially deal only with closed terms,93
pv ^ >
4
= >
pv (G & G0)
4
= pv G ^ pv G0
pv (^ 8G)
4
= rx:pv (Gx)
pv (^ 9G)
4
= 9x:pv (Gx)
pv A
4
= atom A ^ 9D:prog D ^ bc(D;A)
bc(A;A)
4
= atom A
bc(G ¾ D;A)
4
= bc(D;A) ^ pv G
bc(^ 8D;A)
4
= 9t: bc(D t;A)
Fig. 5.8. Interpreter for an object-level logic.
and hence there is no need to interpret object-level variables at the meta-level. With
object-logic universal quanti¯cation the issue is di®erent, since the universally quanti¯ed
goal can be replaced by another goal with (object-level) eigenvariables. We illustrate an
example in which we use r to interpret the object-logic eigenvariables and show that
the use of r captures the intensional aspect of object-logic eigenvariables, that is, to act
as fresh constant in (object-logic) proof construction.
The provability of the object-logic is encoded using two predicates: one for encod-
ing the ¯rst-order provability and the other for backchaining. The completeness of this
proof system follows from the completeness of uniform provability for intuitionistic logic.
We introduce the type obj to denote object-logic formulas. The object-logic connectives
are encoded as the constants
^ > : obj; & : obj ! obj ! obj; ): obj ! obj ! obj
^ 8 : (i ! obj) ! obj; ^ 9 : (i ! obj) ! obj
which denote, respectively, object-level true, conjunction, implication, universal quanti-
¯er and existential quanti¯er. The object-level implication is only used in the program
clause and never in the goal. The type i ranges over ¯rst-order object-level terms. The
predicate pv ¢ of type obj ! o is used to indicate ¯rst-order provability and bc(¢;¢) of
type obj ! obj ! o is used to indicate backchaining. The de¯nition clauses in Figure 5.8
encodes provability for a ¯rst-order logic programming language that is restricted to hc8
and is parametrized by the predicates atom (describing object-level atomic formulas)
and prog (describing object-level logic programs clauses). We illustrate in the following
example reasoning about provability of this object-logic in Linc.
Example 5.8. We recall the motivating example given in [28, 38]. Consider the problem
of proving the formula
8u8v[q hu;t1i hv;t2i hv;t3i];94
where q is a three place predicate, h¢;¢i is used to form pairs, t1 and t2 are some ¯rst-
order terms, and the only assumptions for the predicate q are the (universal closure of
the) three atomic formulas: q X X Y , q X Y X and q Y X X. Clearly, this query
succeeds only if terms t2 and t3 are equal. Notice that while the object-level logic here
is hc8 (since our motivating example is concerned with the provability of a universally
quanti¯ed formula), the meta-level de¯nition is hcr.
The query that captures our intended example is the following formula
8x;y;z[pv (^ 8u^ 8v[q hu;xi hv;yi hv;zi]) ¾ y = z]
along with the de¯nition consisting of the clauses in Figure 5.8 and the following object-
logic program clauses.
prog (^ 8x^ 8y:q x x y)
4
= >:
prog (^ 8x^ 8y:q x y x)
4
= >:
prog (^ 8x^ 8y:q y x x)
4
= >:
atom (q X Y Z)
4
= >:
Attempting a proof of this formula leads to the following sequent (after applying
some right rules and a pair of defLcsu and rL rules):
X;Y;Z ; (s;r) . pv (q hs;Xi hr;Y i hr;Zi) ¡! .Y = Z:
A series of defLcsu rules will now need to be applied in order to work through the
encoding of the object-level interpreter. In the end, three separate uni¯cation problems
will be attempted, one for each of the three ways to prove the predicate q. In particular,
the defLcsu rule will attempt to unify the term ¸s¸r:(q hs;Xi hr;Y i hr;Zi) with each
of the following three terms:
¸s¸r:(q (X0 s r) (X0 s r) (Y 0 s r))
¸s¸r:(q (X0 s r) (Y 0 s r) (X0 s r))
¸s¸r:(q (Y 0 s r) (X0 s r) (X0 s r))
The ¯rst two uni¯cation problems fail and hence the corresponding occurrences of
defLcsu succeed. The third of these uni¯cation problems is solvable, however, with
X0 instantiated to ¸s¸r:hr;Zi, Y 0 instantiated to ¸s¸r:hs;Zi, Y instantiated to Z
(or vice versa), and X uninstantiated. As a result, this third premise is the sequent
¢; ¢ ¡! Y = Y , which is provable using eqR.
The more common approach to encoding object-logic provability into a meta-
logic uses the meta-level universal quanti¯er instead of the r for the clause encoding the
provability of object-level universal quanti¯cation: that is, the clause
pv (^ 8x:G x)
4
= 8x[pv (G x)]:95
is used instead. In this case, attempting a proof of this formula reduces to an attempt
to prove the sequent
X;Y;Z ; .pv (q hs1;Xi hs2;Y i hr;Zi) ¡! .Y = Z;
and were s1 and s2 are two terms. To complete the proof, these two terms must be chosen
to be di®erent. While this sequent can be proved, doing so requires the assumption that
there are two such distinct terms (the domain is non-empty and not a singleton). Our
encoding using r allows this (meta-level) proof to be completed in a more natural way
without this assumption.
The extensional nature of ^ 8, that is, pv ^ 8x:P x implies pv P t for arbitrary term
t, can be proved indirectly in Linc as a consequence of the meta-properties of Linc.
Proposition 5.9. If pv ^ 8x:P x is provable then 8t:pv P t is provable.
Proof Proving the goal pv ^ 8x:P x reduces to proving the subgoal rx:pv P x. Note
that since the de¯nition for pv is hcr, by Proposition 3.28, in proving hcr goals, r can
be interchanged with 8 without a®ecting provability. Therefore if we have a proof of
rx:pv P x then we also have a proof of 8x:pv P x.
However, we cannot directly prove the implication
pv ^ 8x:P x ¾ 8x:pv P x (5.3)
in Linc, even with induction. To see why, consider the following proof attempt with
induction.
¢¢¢ x . S (P x) ¡! 8x:pv P x
x . pv P x ¡! 8x:pv P x
¹L
rx:pv P x ¡! 8x:pv P x rL
pv ^ 8x:P x ¡! 8x:pv P x
defLcsu
¡! pv ^ 8x:P x ¾ 8x:pv P x
¾ R
Note that the ¯rst three rules used in the above derivation are all asynchronous rules,
therefore any proof of the formula (5.3) can be transformed to a proof which ends in
those rules. However such a proof cannot exist since on the left we have an extra local
signature guarding the formula S (P x) which does not match the local signature of the
right-hand side of the sequent, regardless of what invariant S we choose. This example
illustrates the fact that our current formulation of induction and co-induction do not
interact much with r.
5.5 The lazy ¸-calculus
We consider an untyped version of the pure ¸-calculus with lazy evaluation [1],
following the usual HOAS style, i.e., object-level ¸-operator and application are encoded
as constants lam : (tm ! tm) ! tm and @ : tm ! tm ! tm, where tm is the syntactic
category of object-level ¸-terms. The evaluation relation is encoded as the following96
inductive de¯nition
lamM +lamM
¹
= >:
M @N +T
¹
= M +(lamP) ^ (P N)+T:
Notice that object-level substitution is realized via ¯-reduction in the meta-logic.
Applicative simulation
We show some simple properties about applicative simulation of ¸-expressions in
this language. Simulation is encoded as the (strati¯ed) co-inductive de¯nition
sim R S
º = 8T:R+lamT ¾ 9U:S +lamU ^ 8P:sim (T P) (U P):
Consider the re°exivity property of simulation, i.e., 8s:sim s s: This is proved co-
inductively by using the simulation ¸x¸y:[x = y]. After applying 8R and ºR, it remains
to prove the sequents ¡! [s = s], and
x = y ¡! 8x1:x+lamx1 ¾ (9x2:y +lamx2 ^ 8x3:(x1 x3) = (x2 x3)) :
The ¯rst sequent is provable by an application of eqR rule. The second sequent is proved
as follows.
z +lamx1 ¡! z +lamx1
init
z +lamx1 ¡! (x1 x3) = (x1 x3)
eqR
z +lamx1 ¡! 8x3:(x1 x3) = (x1 x3)
8R
z +lamx1 ¡! (z +lamx1 ^ 8x3:(x1 x3) = (x1 x3))
^R
z +lamx1 ¡! (9x2:z +lamx2 ^ 8x3:(x1 x3) = (x2 x3))
9R
x = y;x+lamx1 ¡! (9x2:y +lamx2 ^ 8x3:(x1 x3) = (x2 x3))
eqL
x = y ¡! x+lamx1 ¾ (9x2:y +lamx2 ^ 8x3:(x1 x3) = (x2 x3))
¾ R
x = y ¡! 8x1:x+lamx1 ¾ (9x2:y +lamx2 ^ 8x3:(x1 x3) = (x2 x3))
8R
The transitivity property is expressed as the formula
8r8s8t:sim r s ^ sim s t ¾ sim r t:
Its proof involves co-induction on sim r t with the following simulation
S := ¸u¸v:9w:sim u w ^ sim w v;
followed by case analyses (i.e., defL and eqL rules) on sim r s and sim s t. The rest of
the proof is basically a series of manipulation of logical connectives.
¦
S uv ¡! B S uv
sim r s;sim s t ¡! sim r s init sim r s;sim s t ¡! sim s t init
sim r s;sim s t ¡! sim r s ^ sim s t ^R
sim r s;sim s t ¡! 9w:sim r w ^ sim w t 9R
sim r s;sim s t ¡! sim r t ºR
¡! 8r8s8t:sim r s ^ sim s t ¾ sim r t
8R;¾ R97
B S uv is the formula
8x:u+lamx ¾ 9y:v +lamy ^ 8z:S (xz)(y z):
The derivation ¦ is given in Figure 5.9.
Divergence
The existence of a divergent term can be proved formally in Linc, using the
following encoding of divergence.
divrg T
º = (9T19T2:T = (T1@T2) ^ divrg T1) _
(9T19T2:T = (T1@T2) ^ 9E:T1 +lamE ^ divrg (E T2)):
Let ­ be the term (lamx:(x@x))@(lamx:(x@x)). We show that divrg ­ holds. The
proof is straightforward by co-induction using the simulation S := ¸s:s = ­. Applying
the ºR produces the sequents ¡! ­ = ­ and T = ­ ¡! S1 _ S2 where
S1 := 9T19T2:T = (T1@T2) ^ (S T1); and
S2 := 9T19T2:T = (T1@T2) ^ 9E:T1 +lamE ^ S (E T2):
Clearly, only the second disjunct is provable, i.e., by instantiating T1 and T2 with the
same term lamx:(x@x), and E with the function ¸x:(x@x).
5.6 Conclusion and related work
We have seen several examples of reasoning about logical speci¯cations in Linc.
Both ¯rst-order and higher-order encodings are shown. We have shown that the natural
number induction in FO¸¢IN can be derived in Linc. This implies that applications
and examples that were previously done in FO¸¢IN, e.g., [28, 31, 57], can be carried
out in Linc without any essential modi¯cation. For example, the encoding of CCS in
Section 5.3 has been studied in [31]. However, in their encoding simulation and bisim-
ulation are encoded indirectly via natural number induction because FO¸¢IN does not
support co-induction. In our example, simulation and bisimulation are encoded directly
as co-inductive de¯nitions. Part of Section 5.5 has appeared in [42] and Section 5.4 has
appeared in [38]. We note that the current formulation of (co)-induction does not allow
certain proofs which require reference to local signatures, as we have seen in the object-
logic encoding. This limitation implies that certain forms of induction over higher-order
abstract syntax do not bene¯t from the presence of r. The subject-reduction theorem
for functional languages, for example, does not admit simple formalization in Linc, al-
though it can still be done via the encoding style as in [12, 28]. We shall see in Chapter 6,
there are still interesting uses of r in reasoning with (co-)induction.98
¡! lamx+lamx defR
¦1
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
(lamm)+(lamm) ¾
9p:v +lamp ^ 8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡! ¢¢¢
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
8r:(lamm)+(lamr) ¾
9p:v +lamp ^ 8n:sim (rn) (pn) ¡! ¢¢¢
8L
8n:sim (xn) (mn);sim (lamm) v ¡! ¢¢¢
defL
w+lamm;8n:sim (xn) (mn);sim w v ¡! ¢¢¢ defLcsu
9m:w+lamm ^ 8n:sim (xn) (mn);sim w v ¡! ¢¢¢
9L;^L
lamx+lamx ¾ 9m:w+lamm ^ 8n:sim (xn) (mn);sim w v ¡! ¢¢¢
¾ L
8r:lamx+lamr ¾ 9m:w+lamm ^ 8n:sim (rn) (mn);sim w v ¡! ¢¢¢
8L
sim (lamx) w;sim w v ¡! 9y:v +lamy ^ 8z:S (xz)(y z)
defL
S (lamx)v ¡! 9y:v +lamy ^ 8z:S (xz)(y z)
9L;^L
S uv;u+lamx ¡! 9y:v +lamy ^ 8z:S (xz)(y z) defLcsu
S uv ¡! 8x:u+lamx ¾ 9y:v +lamy ^ 8z:S (xz)(y z)
8R;¾ R
¦1 :
¡! (lamm)+(lamm)
defR
¢¢¢ ¡! lamp+lamp defR
¦2
¢¢¢ ¡! 8z:S (xz)(pz)
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡!
lamp+lamp^
8z:S (xz)(pz)
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡!
9y:lamp+lamy^
8z:S (xz)(y z)
9R
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
v +lamp;
8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡!
9y:v +lamy^
8z:S (xz)(y z)
defLcsu
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
v +lamp ^ 8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡!
9y:v +lamy^
8z:S (xz)(y z)
^L
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
9p:v +lamp ^ 8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡!
9y:v +lamy^
8z:S (xz)(y z)
9L
8n:sim (xn) (mn);
(lamm)+(lamm) ¾
9p:v +lamp ^ 8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡! 9y:v +lamy ^ 8z:S (xz)(y z)
¾ L
¦2 :
¢¢¢ ¡! sim (xz) (mz)
init
¢¢¢ ¡! sim (mz) (pz)
init
sim (xz) (mz);sim (mz) (pz) ¡! sim (xz) (mz) ^ sim (mz) (pz)
^R
8n:sim (xn) (mn);8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡! sim (xz) (mz) ^ sim (mz) (pz)
8L
8n:sim (xn) (mn);8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡! 9q:sim (xz) q ^ sim q (pz)
9R
8n:sim (xn) (mn);8n:sim (mn) (pn) ¡! 8z:9q:sim (xz) q ^ sim q (pz)
8R
Fig. 5.9. A proof of transitivity of applicative simulation.99
Chapter 6
Encoding ¼-calculus
In this chapter we consider an encoding of the operational semantics of the ¼-
calculus [40]. Central to the calculus is the notion of names which represent communi-
cation links between processes. The dynamics of names in ¼-calculus, i.e., the creation
of new names and the changes in the scoping of names as the process evolves, construe
a notion of mobility in which the movement of processes is interpreted as the changing
of communication links. The notion of new name generation is not unique to ¼-calculus.
It also appears in the area of, for example, security protocol, where the creation of fresh
value (nonces) is common in the speci¯cation of the protocols. A common approach
to encoding fresh names generation in logic is via the use of eigenvariable (or universal
quanti¯er). This approach is taken in the encoding of ¼-calculus in [34], nonces in se-
curity protocols [6], references to locations in imperative programming languages [8, 35]
and constructors hidden within abstract data types [32]. In these works, the main in-
terest is in encoding computation, while we are also interested in doing reasoning about
computation. This approach does not scale easily to suit our purpose because of the
following reason. Suppose we would like to verify that a certain computation, F, follows
from some other computation Gxy under the assumption that x and y are di®erent fresh
names. In other words, we would like to say that if Gxy holds genericly (with respect
to x and y) then F is true. This type of statement often occurs in checking bisimu-
lation where the closure with respect to one-step transitions is a requirement. Using
the 8 encoding above we would have to prove the sequent 8x8y:Gxy ¡! F. However,
the assumption that x and y are distinct are not enforced in this sequent, since there
might be a proof in which x and y are identi¯ed. Thus we do not capture faithfully the
intended assumption on genericity of x and y, at least not without additional non-logical
encoding. Our solution to this problem is to use r, instead of 8, to encode fresh names
generation. Using this new encoding, the above sequent becomes rxry:Gxy ¡! F,
which can be proved only by instantiating x and y to di®erent names.
We are mainly interested in reasoning about the bisimilarity and equivalence
of processes. We ¯rst consider an encoding of the ¯nite ¼-calculus (all execution of
processes always terminate) and study the bisimulation relations and congruence in this
subcalculus. The full ¼-calculus which includes non-terminating processes is studied
later in the chapter. In Section 6.1 we introduce the syntax of ¼-calculus, for the ¯nite
case, and its encoding into higher-order abstract syntax. The encoding of the operational
semantics of one-step transitions is given in Section 6.2 in which the adequacy of the
encoding is also shown. Section 6.3 studies the encoding of a variant of bisimulation, the
strong late bisimulation. This notion of bisimulation gives rise to the strong congruence
relation, which is the subject of Section 6.4. In Section 6.5 we consider the ¼-calculus
with replications, which allows us to express some non-terminating processes. Here we100
see that co-induction proof method is needed to prove the bisimilarity of processes. We
show an example on how the informal co-inductive proof can be carried over to formal
proofs in Linc. The correctness of the encoding of bisimulation and congruence for the
full ¼-calculus is also shown. Section 6.6 concludes this chapter with some conjectures
and related work.
6.1 Finite late ¼-calculus
In this section, we consider the ¯nite late ¼-calculus as de¯ned in [40], that is,
the fragment of ¼-calculus without recursion (or replication). The main emphasis in this
section is thus on the treatment of names in logic. The syntax of processes is de¯ned as
follows
P ::= 0 j ¹ xy:P j x(y):P j ¿:P j (x)P j [x = y]P j PjQ j P + Q:
We use the notation P, Q, R, S and T to denote processes. Names are denoted by
a;b;c;d;x;y;z. The occurrence of y in the process x(y):P and (y)P is a binding occur-
rence, with P as its scope. The set of free names in P is denoted by fn(P), the set of
bound names is denoted by bn(P). We write n(P) for the set fn(P) [ bn(P).
The one-step transition in ¼-calculus is denoted by P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q, where P and Q are
processes and ® is an action. The kinds of actions are the silent action ¿, the free output
action ¹ xy, the bound input action x(y) and the bound output action ¹ x(y). The name y
in x(y) and ¹ x(y) is a binding occurrence. Just like we did with processes, we use fn(®),
bn(®) and n(®) to denote free names, bound names, and names in ®. An action without
binding occurrences of names is a free action, otherwise it is a bound action.
We encode the syntax of process expressions using higher-order syntax as follows.
We shall require three primitive syntactic categories: n for names, p for processes, and
a for actions, and the constructors corresponding to the operators in ¼-calculus. We
assume an in¯nite set of constants of type n. Other constants and their types are given
in Table 6.1. We abbreviate º¸x:P as simply ºx:P. Notice that when ¿ is written as a
pre¯x, it has type p ! p, and when it is written as an action, it has type a.
The one-step judgment of ¼-calculus is given the type o0 in Linc. We distinguish
two di®erent kinds of one-step transitions: those with free actions and those with bound
actions. The former is encoded using the constant ¢
¢
¡ ¡ ! ¢ of type p ! a ! p ! o0,
and the latter using the constant ¢
¢
¡ ¡ * ¢ of type p ! (n ! a) ! (n ! p) ! o0. We
need an additionaly constant ¦ : nt ! o0 ! o to coerce the type o0 into o. The type
nt denotes natural numbers, which we use here to distinguish the two kinds of one-step
transitions. Formally speaking, the free one-step transition P
¹ xz
¡ ¡ ! Q is translated to
¦ 0 (P
¹ xz
¡ ¡ ! Q) and the bound transition P
x(y)
¡ ¡ ! Q is translated to ¦ 1 (P
"x
¡ ¡ * ¸y:Q).
However, to simplify the presentation, when writing down these translations we shall
leave the ¦ and the indices 0 and 1 implicit. The precise translation between ¼-calculus
syntax and HOAS is given in the following de¯nition.101
¼-calculus syntax HOAS
Names n
Actions a
Processes p
¹ xy " xy ": n ! n ! a
¿ ¿ ¿ : a
x(y) ¸y # xy #: n ! n ! a
¹ x(y) ¸y " xy
0 0 0 : proc
¿:P ¿ P ¿ : p ! p
¹ xy:P out x y P out : n ! n ! p ! p
x(y):P in x ¸y:P y in : n ! (n ! p) ! p
P + Q P + Q + : p ! p ! p
PjQ PjQ j : p ! p ! p
[x = y]P match x y P match : n ! n ! p ! p
(x)P º¸x:P x º : (n ! p) ! p
Table 6.1. Signatures for ¼-calculus102
Definition 6.1. We de¯ne a translation function h:i from process expressions to ¯´-
long normal terms of type p as follows.
h0i = 0 h¿:Pi = ¿ hPi
h¹ xy:Pi = out x y hPi hx(y):Pi = in x ¸y:hPi
hP + Qi = hPi + hQi hPjQi = hPijhQi
h[x = y]Pi = match x y hPi h(x)Pi = º¸x:hPi
The one-step transition judgments is translated to atomic formulas as follows (we over-
load the symbol h:i).
hP
¹ xy
¡ ¡ ! Qi = hPi
"xy
¡ ¡ ! hQi hP
¿
¡ ¡ ! Qi = hPi
¿
¡ ¡ ! hQi
hP
x(y)
¡ ¡ ! Qi = hPi
¸y#xy
¡ ¡ * ¸y:hQi hP
¹ x(y)
¡ ¡ ! Qi = hPi
¸y"xy
¡ ¡ * ¸y:hQi
Lemma 6.2. The function h:i is a bijection.
Proof By induction on the structure of process expressions and the structure of normal
¸-terms.
Given the above bijection, we shall omit writing explicitly the function symbol h:i
when referring to p-term obtained via the translation.
6.2 One-step transitions
The operational semantics of one-step transition is given in Figure 6.1 [40]. There
are symmetric counterparts of the rules SUM, PAR, CLOSE and COM which are not
shown in the ¯gure but can be easily derived. Figure 6.2 (taken from [37]) contains
the inference rules specifying the transitions in Figure 6.1 using higher-order abstract
syntax. The variables in these rules denote schema variables: these schema variables
have primitive types such as a, n, and p as well as functional types such as n ! a and
n ! p. Notice that for clarity we have ´-expanded some terms in Figure 6.1. These
inference rules can trivially be written as de¯nition clauses. These clauses are presented
in Figure 6.3. Here, schema variables are universally quanti¯ed (implicitly) at the top-
level of such clauses.
Notice that the complicated side conditions in the original speci¯cation of ¼-
calculus are no longer present, as they are now treated directly and declaratively by the
meta-logic. For example, the side condition that x 6= y in the open rule is implicit, since
x is outside the scope of y and therefore cannot be instantiated with y. The restriction
operator is interpreted at the meta-level as the r quanti¯er. The use of r, instead of 8,
allows to prove negative statements about the transitions, as illustrated in Example 6.3.
To simplify the presentation, we mix the syntax of ¼-calculus and HOAS and use the
usual abbreviations in writing process expressions: when a name z is used as a pre¯x,
it denotes the pre¯x z(w) where w is vacuous in its scope; when a name ¹ z is used as
a pre¯x it denotes the output pre¯x ¹ za for some ¯xed constant a. We also abbreviate
(y)¹ xy:P as ¹ x(y):P and the process term 0 is omitted if it appears as the continuation103
¿:P
¿
¡ ¡ ! P
TAU¡ACT
¹ xy:P
¹ xy
¡ ¡ ! P
OUTPUT¡ACT
x(z):P
x(w)
¡ ¡ ! P[w=z]
INPUT¡ACT;w 62 fn((z)P) P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0
[x = x]P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0
MATCH
P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0
P + Q
®
¡ ¡ ! P0
SUM
P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0
P j Q
®
¡ ¡ ! P0 j Q
PAR;bn(®) \ fn(Q) = ;
P
¹ xy
¡ ¡ ! P0 Q
x(z)
¡ ¡ ! Q0
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! P0 j Q0[y=z]
COM
P
¹ x(w)
¡ ¡ ! P0 Q
x(w)
¡ ¡ ! Q0
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! (w)(P0 j Q0)
CLOSE
P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0
(y)P
®
¡ ¡ ! (y)P0
RES;y 62 n(®)
P
¹ xy
¡ ¡ ! P0
(y)P
¹ x(w)
¡ ¡ ! P0[w=y]
OPEN;y 6= x;w 62 fn((y)P0)
Fig. 6.1. The operational semantics of the late ¼-calculus.104
¿ P
¿
¡ ¡ ! P
¿
P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q
match x x P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q
match
P
X
¡ ¡ * Q
match x x P
X
¡ ¡ * Q
match
P
A
¡ ¡ ! R
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
sum
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
sum
P
X
¡ ¡ * R
P + Q
X
¡ ¡ * R
sum
Q
X
¡ ¡ * R
P + Q
X
¡ ¡ * R
sum
P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0
P j Q
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 j Q
par
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0
P j Q
A
¡ ¡ ! P j Q0
par
P
X
¡ ¡ * ¸yMy
P j Q
X
¡ ¡ * ¸n(Mn j Q)
par
Q
X
¡ ¡ * ¸yNy
P j Q
X
¡ ¡ * ¸n(P j Nn)
par
rn(Pn
A
¡ ¡ ! P0n)
ºn:Pn
A
¡ ¡ ! ºn:P0n
res
rn(Pn
X
¡ ¡ * ¸m P0nm)
ºn:Pn
X
¡ ¡ * ¸m ºn:(P0nm)
res
ry(My
"xy
¡ ¡ ! M0y)
ºy:My
¸y"xy
¡ ¡ * ¸yM0y
open
out x y P
"xy
¡ ¡ ! P
out
in x M
#x
¡ ¡ * M
in
P
¸y#xy
¡ ¡ * ¸y My Q
¸y"xy
¡ ¡ * ¸y Ny
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! ºn:(Mn j Nn)
close
P
¸y"xy
¡ ¡ * ¸yMy Q
¸y#xy
¡ ¡ * ¸yNy
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! ºn:(Mn j Nn)
close
P
¸y#xy
¡ ¡ * ¸yMy Q
"xy
¡ ¡ ! Q0
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! (My) j Q0
com
P
"xy
¡ ¡ ! P0 Q
¸y#xy
¡ ¡ * ¸yNy
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! P0 j (Ny)
com
Fig. 6.2. The HOAS representation of the late ¼-calculus.105
¿ P
¿
¡ ¡ ! P
4
= >: in X M
#X
¡ ¡ * M
4
= >: out x y P
"xy
¡ ¡ ! P0 4
= >:
match x x P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q
4
= P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q: match x x P
A
¡ ¡ * Q
4
= P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q:
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
4
= P
A
¡ ¡ ! R: P + Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R
4
= Q
A
¡ ¡ ! R:
P + Q
A
¡ ¡ * R
4
= P
A
¡ ¡ * R: P + Q
A
¡ ¡ * R
4
= Q
A
¡ ¡ * R:
P j Q
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 j Q
4
= P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0: P j Q
A
¡ ¡ ! P j Q0 4
= Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0
P j Q
A
¡ ¡ * ¸n(M n j Q)
4
= P
A
¡ ¡ * M: P j Q
A
¡ ¡ * ¸n(P j N n)
4
= Q
A
¡ ¡ * N:
ºn:Pn
A
¡ ¡ ! ºn:Qn
4
= rn(Pn
A
¡ ¡ ! Qn): ºn:Pn
A
¡ ¡ ! ºn:Qn
4
= rn(Pn
A
¡ ¡ ! Qn):
ºy:Py
"X
¡ ¡ * ºy:Qy
4
= ry(Py
"Xy
¡ ¡ ! Qy):
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! ºy:My j Ny
4
= 9X:P
#X
¡ ¡ * M ^ Q
"X
¡ ¡ * T
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! ºy:My j Ny
4
= 9X:P
"X
¡ ¡ * M ^ Q
#X
¡ ¡ * T
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! MY j Q0 4
= 9X:P
#X
¡ ¡ * M ^ Q
"XY
¡ ¡ ! Q0
P j Q
¿
¡ ¡ ! P0 j NY
4
= 9X:P
"XY
¡ ¡ * P0 ^ Q
#X
¡ ¡ ! N
Fig. 6.3. De¯nition clauses for one-step transition of ¼-calculus106
of a pre¯x. We assume that the operators j and + associates the right, e.g., we write
P + Q + R to denote P + (Q + R).
Example 6.3. In this example we illustrate how the scoping constraints in the ¼-
calculus is handled at the meta-level. Consider the process (y)[x = y]¹ xz:0. This process
cannot make any transition since the bound variable y denotes a name di®erent from x.
We would therefore expect that the following is provable.
8x8z8Q8®:[((y)[x = y](¹ xz:0)
®
¡ ¡ ! Q) ¾ ?]
This type of statement naturally occurs when one is asking whether two processes are
bisimilar (see Section 6.3), where it is necessary to know what transitions a process can
make and what it cannot.
fx;z;Q;®g; w . ([x = w](¹ xz:0)
®
¡ ¡ ! Q) ¡! ?
defLcsu
fx;z;Q;®g; : . ry:([x = y](¹ xz:0)
®
¡ ¡ ! Q) ¡! ?
rL
fx;z;Q;®g; : . ((y)[x = y](¹ xz:0)
®
¡ ¡ ! Q) ¡! ?
defLcsu
fx;z;Q;®g; ¡! : . ((y)[x = y](¹ xz:0)
®
¡ ¡ ! Q) ¾ ?
¾ R
Fig. 6.4. The proof of a negation.
To appreciate better the role of r, let us look at a di®erent encoding of one-
step transition using 8. That is, suppose we replace r with 8 in the inference rules in
Figure 6.2. Attempting to prove the above formula given this de¯nition would reduce to
attempting a proof of the sequent
fx;z;Q;®g; 8y:([x = y](¹ xz:0)
®
¡ ¡ ! Q) ¡! ?:
Since cut-elimination holds (Corollary 4.21), the only applicable rule is 8L, followed by
defLcsu. For the sequent to be provable, x and y would have to be instantiated with
di®erent terms so that the defLcsu rule will produce the empty premise. However, we
see that there are at least two instantiations of variables that identify them: namely, the
substitution fw=y, w=x, ¹ wz=®, 0=Qg gives us
fzg; ([w = w]( ¹ wz:0)
¹ wz
¡ ¡ ! 0) ¡! ?107
and the substitution fx=y, ¹ xz=®, 0=Qg gives us
fzg; ([x = x](¹ xz:0)
¹ xz
¡ ¡ ! 0) ¡! ?:
In the ¯rst case, the scoping of variables at the object-level is lost at the meta-level, while
in the second case, the newness assumption on y is violated. However, these two aspects
are captured precisely by r, as it is shown in the derivation in Figure 6.4. The success
of the topmost instance of defLcsu depends on the failure of the uni¯cation problem
¸w:x = ¸w:w: Notice that the scoping of object variables is maintained at the meta-
level by the separation of (global) eigenvariables and (locally bound) generic variables.
The \newness" of w is internalized as ¸-abstraction and hence it is not subject to any
instantiation.
We now prove the adequacy of the encoding of one-step transition. We denote the
set of de¯nition clauses in Figure 6.3 with D¼. We use the term ¼-derivation to refer to
a derivation in the operational semantics of one-step transition of ¼-calculus. The term
(logic) derivation is reserved for the derivation in the logic Linc. We shall often use the
term proof and logic derivation interchangeably.
Proposition 6.4. Let P and Q be processes and ® an action. The transition P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q is
derivable in ¼-calculus if and only if the sequent :; : ¡! hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi is provable in Linc
with de¯nition D¼.
Proof
): If P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q then :; : ¡! hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi is provable. The proof is by induction on
the ¼-derivation of P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q. Most cases follow immediately from induction hypothesis.
The non-trivial cases are the RES- and OPEN-rules which require the creation of fresh
names. Suppose the transition is inferred by the RES rule
¦
P0 ®
¡ ¡ ! Q0
(y)P0 ®
¡ ¡ ! (y)Q0
RES;y 62 n(®);
then by induction hypothesis there is a derivation ¥ of the sequent :; : ¡! .hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi.
By Lemma 3.13 there is a derivation ¥0 of :; : ¡! y . hP0 ®
¡ ¡ ! Q0i. Hence we can
construct the following derivation
¥0
:; : ¡! y . hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi
:; : ¡! .ry:hP0 ®
¡ ¡ ! Q0i
rR
:; : ¡! h(y)P0 ®
¡ ¡ ! (y)Q0i
defR=
): If :; : ¡! hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi is provable then P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q. In this case, we need to prove a
stronger statement: If :; : ¡! ¹ a.hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi is provable then for all renaming substitution108
µ such that dom(µ) µ ¹ a, the one-step transition (P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q)µ is derivable in ¼-calculus.
The reason for the need for renaming is because we consider judgments as equal modulo
®-conversion, or renaming of locally bound names.
Let ¥ of be a derivation of the judgment :; : ¡! ¹ a . hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi. The proof is
by induction on ht(¥). Again, the non-trivial cases are when there is a creation of new
names. We look at the case with RES rule. Suppose ¦ is
¥0
:; : ¡! ¹ ay . hP0 ®
¡ ¡ ! Q0i
:; : ¡! ¹ a . ry:hP0 ®
¡ ¡ ! Q0i
rR
:; : ¡! ¹ a . h(y)P0 ®
¡ ¡ ! (y)Q0i
defR
Then by induction hypothesis for all renaming substitution ½ such that dom(½) µ ¹ ay,
(P0 ®
¡ ¡ ! Q0)½ is derivable in ¼-calculus. This includes a renaming which maps y to a
fresh name not occuring in P, ® and Q. Therefore we have the following derivation in
¼-calculus
¦0
P0 ®
¡ ¡ ! Q0
(y)P0 ®
¡ ¡ ! (y)Q0
RES;y 62 n(®)
where ¦0 is obtained from induction hypothesis.
6.3 Strong bisimilarity
There are many variants of bisimulation studied in the literature related to ¼-
calculus; we will not attempt to cover all of them here. We consider here only strong
bisimulation, that is, bisimulation in which all actions, observable or not, are considered.
More precisely, we consider encoding strong late bisimulation. The notion of strong
bisimulation for late ¼-calculus is de¯ned as follows.
Definition 6.5. [40] A binary relation S on processes is a strong late simulation if it
satis¯es the following requirements:
1. if P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0 and ® is a free action, then for some Q0, Q
®
¡ ¡ ! Q0 and P0SQ0,
2. if P
x(y)
¡ ¡ ! P0 and y 62 n(P;Q), then for some Q0, Q
x(y)
¡ ¡ ! Q0 and for all w,
P0[w=y] S Q0[w=y];
and
3. if P
¹ x(y)
¡ ¡ ! P0 and y 62 n(P;Q) then for some Q0, Q
¹ x(y)
¡ ¡ ! Q0 and P0 S Q0.109
The relation S is a strong late bisimulation if both S and its inverse are late simulations.
The relation
: », strong late bisimilarity, on processes is de¯ned by P
: » Q if and only if
there exists a late bisimulation S such that PSQ.
bisim P Q
4
= 8A8P0 [(P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0) ¾ 9Q0:(Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0) ^ bisim P0 Q0] ^
8A8Q0 [(Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0) ¾ 9P0:(P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0) ^ bisim Q0 P0] ^
8X8P0 [(P
#X
¡ ¡ * P0) ¾ 9Q0:(Q
#X
¡ ¡ * Q0) ^ 8w:bisim (P0w) (Q0w)] ^
8X8Q0 [(Q
#X
¡ ¡ * Q0) ¾ 9P0:(P
#X
¡ ¡ * P0) ^ 8w:bisim (Q0w) (P0w)] ^
8X8P0 [(P
"X
¡ ¡ * P0) ¾ 9Q0:(Q
"X
¡ ¡ * Q0) ^ rw:bisim (P0w) (Q0w)] ^
8X8Q0 [(Q
"X
¡ ¡ * Q0) ¾ 9P0:(P
"X
¡ ¡ * P0) ^ rw:bisim (Q0w) (P0w)]
Fig. 6.5. Lazy encoding of strong late bisimulation
We ¯rst attempt to do a straightforward encoding of strong bisimulation de¯ned
above, that is, by replacing the English words \if ... then ...", \and", \for all", etc., with
logical connectives. Let us call this encoding the lazy encoding of strong bisimulation
(the use of the term \lazy" will be clear later). This encoding is shown in Figure 6.5,
and has also appeared in [38]. We denote by D¼;
: » the de¯nition D¼ augmented with
the bisim clause.
Notice that the di®erence between bound output and bound input is captured by
the use of r and 8 quanti¯ers. We illustrate this in the following example.
Example 6.6. Consider the following processes expressions.
P = x(y):(yj¹ z); Q = x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿); R = ¹ x(y):(yj¹ z); T = ¹ x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y):
The process P is bisimilar to Q and the process R to T. Note that we need the match
pre¯x in Q since P is capable of performing the silent transition in the case where the
input value y is z. We don't need the match pre¯x in T since y in this case can only be
instantiated with a fresh name di®erent from z. We would therefore expect the following
sequents to be provable.
¢; ¢ ¡! bisim x(y):(yj¹ z) x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
¢; ¢ ¡! bisim ¹ x(y):(yj¹ z) ¹ x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y)110
(a:1) ¢; ¢ ¡! x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
#x
¡ ¡ ! ¸y(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
^ 8w:bisim (wj¹ z) (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
(a:2) ¢; ¢ ¡! x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
#x
¡ ¡ ! ¸y(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
(a:3) w; ¢ ¡! bisim (wj¹ z) (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
(a:4) w;R;A; (wj¹ z)
A
¡ ¡ ! R ¡! 9T:(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
A
¡ ¡ ! T ^ bisim R T
(a:5) w;T;A; (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
A
¡ ¡ ! T ¡! 9R:(wj¹ z)
A
¡ ¡ ! R ^ bisim T R
(a:6) w;U;X ; (wj¹ z)
#X
¡ ¡ * U ¡! 9V:(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
#X
¡ ¡ * V ^ 8n:bisim Un V n
(a:7) w;V;X ; (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
#X
¡ ¡ * V ¡! 9U:(wj¹ z)
#X
¡ ¡ * U ^ 8n:bisim V n Un
(a:8) w;U;X ; (wj¹ z)
"X
¡ ¡ * U ¡! 9V:(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
"X
¡ ¡ * V ^ rn:bisim Un V n
(a:9) w;V;X ; (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
"X
¡ ¡ * V ¡! 9U:(wj¹ z)
"X
¡ ¡ * U ^ rn:bisim V n Un
(a:10) w; ¢ ¡! 9T:(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
"za
¡ ¡ ! T ^ bisim (wj0) T
(a:11) w;X0;Y;R0;M ; w
#X0
¡ ¡ * M; ¹ z
"X0Y
¡ ¡ ! R0 ¡! 9T:
"
(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w + [w = z]¿)
¿
¡ ¡ ! T
^ bisim (M0Y jR0) T
#
(a:12) ¢; ¢ ¡! 9T:(z:¹ z + ¹ z:z + [z = z]¿)
¿
¡ ¡ ! T ^ bisim (0j0) T
(a:13) w; ¢ ¡! 9R:(wj¹ z)
"za
¡ ¡ ! R ^ bisim w R
(a:14) w;T;A; [w = z]¿
A
¡ ¡ ! T ¡! 9R:(wj¹ z)
A
¡ ¡ ! R ^ bisim T R
(a:15) ¢; ¢ ¡! 9R:(zj¹ z)
¿
¡ ¡ ! R ^ bisim 0 R
Fig. 6.6. Example of bisim with bound input111
(iii:1) R;A; w . (wj¹ z)
Aw
¡ ¡ ! Rw ¡! w . 9T:(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w
Aw
¡ ¡ ! T ^ bisim Rw T
(iii:2) T;A; w . (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
Aw
¡ ¡ ! Tw ¡! w . 9R:(wj¹ z)
Aw
¡ ¡ ! R ^ bisim Tw R
(iii:3) M;X ; w . (wj¹ z)
#(Xw)
¡ ¡ * Mw ¡! w . 9N
"
(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
#(Xw)
¡ ¡ * N
^ 8n:bisim Mwn Nn
#
(iii:4) N;X ; w . (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
#(Xw)
¡ ¡ * Nw ¡! w . 9M
"
(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
#(Xw)
¡ ¡ * M
^ 8n:bisim Nwn Mn
#
(iii:5) M;X ; w . (wj¹ z)
"(Xw)
¡ ¡ * Mw ¡! w . 9N
"
(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
"(Xw)
¡ ¡ * N
^ rn:bisim Mwn Nn
#
(iii:6) N;X ; w . (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
"(Xw)
¡ ¡ * Nw ¡! w . 9M
"
(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
"(Xw)
¡ ¡ * M
^ rn:bisim Nwn Mn
#
(iii:7) M;X;R0;Y ;
2
4 w . w
#X
¡ ¡ * Mw;
w . ¹ z
"XY
¡ ¡ ! R0w
3
5 ¡! w . 9T:
"
(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
¿
¡ ¡ ! T
^ bisim (MwY jR0w) T
#
(iii:8) R0;Y ; w . ¹ z
"wY
¡ ¡ ! R0w ¡! w . 9T:(w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
¿
¡ ¡ ! T ^ bisim (0jR0w) T
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Since we have cut-elimination, we need only consider cut-free proofs in proving these
sequents. Therefore to prove the ¯rst sequent, we ¯rst apply defR followed by 8R and
^R, resulting in the following six sequents.
(1) P0;A; x(y):(yj¹ z)
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¡! 9Q0:x(y):(y:¹ z+ ¹ z:y+[y = z]¿)
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ^ bisim P0 Q0
(2) Q0;A; x(y):(y:¹ z+ ¹ z:y+[y = z]¿)
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ¡! 9P0:x(y):(yj¹ z)
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ^ bisim Q0 P0
(3) M;X ; x(y):(yj¹ z)
#X
¡ ¡ * M ¡! 9N:
0
@ x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
#X
¡ ¡ * N ^
8w:bisim Mw Nw
1
A.
(4) N;X ; x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
#X
¡ ¡ * N ¡! 9M:
0
@ x(y):(yj¹ z)
#X
¡ ¡ * M ^
8w:bisim Nw Mw
1
A.
(5) M;X ; x(y):(yj¹ z)
"X
¡ ¡ * M ¡! 9N:
0
@ x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
"X
¡ ¡ * N ^
rw:bisim Mw Nw
1
A.
(6) N;X ; x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
"X
¡ ¡ * N ¡! 9N:
0
@ x(y):(yj¹ z)
"X
¡ ¡ * M ^
rw:bisim Nw Mw
1
A.
Next, we apply the defLcsu to each sequent. Since the outermost constructor of the
process P is the input pre¯x, the only matching de¯nition clause is
in X0 M0 #X0
¡ ¡ * M0 4
= >:
The uni¯cation succeeds only on sequents (3) and (4) with the respective (most general)
uni¯ers
[¸y(yj¹ z)=M;x=X] and [¸y(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)=N;x=X]:
It fails on the other sequents, and hence the proofs for those sequents succeed. The
corresponding premises of sequents (3) and (4) are the sequents
(a) ¢; ¢ ¡! 9N:x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿)
#x
¡ ¡ * N ^ 8w:bisim (wj¹ z) Nw and
(b) ¢; ¢ ¡! 9M:x(y):(yj¹ z)
#x
¡ ¡ * M ^ 8w:bisim (¹ z + ¹ z:y + [y = z]¿) Mw:
We proceed by applying 9R to both sequents. It is obvious that for the sequent (a) we
should instantiate N with ¸y(y:¹ z+ ¹ z:y+[y = z]¿) and for the sequent (b) we instantiate
M with ¸y(yj¹ z). We show here an outline of the proof for the continuation of (a). The
proof for (b) is completely symmetric.
A list of premises of (a) is listed in Figure 6.6. Here the sequent (a:1) is the
immediate premise of (a), after applying 9R. The proof branches to sequent (a:2)
and (a:3). The sequent (a:2) is provable by one step application of defR=. We apply
defLcsu to (a:3) (followed by instances ^R, 8R and ¾ R) to get the six premises (a:4)113
- (a:9). We highlight the proof for the sequent (a:4) and (a:5) since they illustrate the
important role of eigenvariables in encoding bound input. We see from the de¯nition
clauses in Figure 6.2 that applying defLcsu repeatedly to sequent (a:4) leaves us with
two premises: (a:10) and (a:11). In the case of (a:10), we infer that (wj¹ z) has made a
free output " za (a is a constant). This sequent is provable by instantiating T with w. In
(a:11), we would like to infer the ¿ transition from (wj¹ z). This reduces to inferring that
w makes an input transition to some process and ¹ z makes an output transition on the
same channel, which is represented here as X0. We continue applying defLcsu to (a:11).
We see that in order for the w
#X0
¡ ¡ * M to succeed, X0 must be instantiated to w and M
to ¸y:0. We are then left with the remaining one-step transition: ¹ z
"wa
¡ ¡ ! R0. Again, for
this transition to succeed w needs to be instantiated with z, which is what happens when
we apply the defLcsu. Note that w is an eigenvariable so it can be instantiated when
applying defLcsu. The resulting sequent is (a:12) which can be veri¯ed to be provable.
In the symmetric case with (a:5), the subcase where w gets instantiated is given in the
sequent (a:14). Here the uni¯cation of w and z is driven by the match pre¯x [w = z]¿.
The result of applying defLcsu to (a:14) is the sequent (a:15), where w is instantiated
with z, A with ¿ and T with 0. The resulting sequent can be shown provable.
The sequent ¢; ¢ ¡! bisim ¹ x(y):(yj¹ z) ¹ x(y):(y:¹ z+¹ z:y) is proved in similar fashion,
that is, the proof starts with an instance of defR=, followed by asynchronous rules (see
Chapter 3, Section 3.7), and defLcsu. We get the corresponding six premises as in
(1) ¡ (6). In particular, the cases involving bound output are now
(50) M;X ; ¹ x(y):(yj¹ z)
"X
¡ ¡ * M ¡! 9N:¹ x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y)
"X
¡ ¡ * N ^ rw:bisim Mw Nw
(60) N;X ; ¹ x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y)
"X
¡ ¡ * N ¡! 9M:¹ x(y):(yj¹ z)
"X
¡ ¡ * M ^ rw:bisim Nw Mw
We apply defLcsu followed by 9R and ^R. In the premises of defLcsu, the eigenvariable
M and X in (50) get instantiated to ¸y(yj¹ z) and x, while in (60), N and X get instantiated
to ¸y(y:¹ z+ ¹ z:y). In the instances of 9R, we instantiate N in (50) with the term ¸y(y:¹ z+
¹ z:y) and M in (60) with ¸y(yj¹ z). We thus arrive at the following premise sequents
(i) ¢; ¢ ¡! ¹ x(y):(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y)
"x
¡ ¡ * ¸y(y:¹ z + ¹ z:y)
(ii) ¢; ¢ ¡! rw:bisim (wj¹ z) (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w)
(iii) ¢; ¢ ¡! ¹ x(y):(yj¹ z)
"x
¡ ¡ * ¸y(yj¹ z)
(iv) ¢; ¢ ¡! rw:bisim (w:¹ z + ¹ z:w) (wj¹ z)
Sequents (i) and (ii) are provable by two applications of defR=. We look at the proof of
sequent (iii) (the proof of (iv) is basically the same as (iii)). By unfolding the de¯nition
of bisim we get the six premises (iii:1) - (iii:6) in Figure 6.7, which are analogous to the
sequents (a:4) - (a:9) in Figure 6.6. Notice that the variable w now has local scope. For
the sequent (iii:1) to be provable, it is necessary that the process (wj¹ z) does not make
a ¿ transition. This reduces to showing that the sequent (iii:7), which is obtained from
(iii:1) by defLcsu, is provable. We ¯rst apply defLcsu to the judgment w . w
#Xw
¡ ¡ * Mw.114
This will unify the variable X with ¸w:w and M with ¸w:0. The resulting sequent is
(iii:8). We then apply defLcsu to w . ¹ z
"wY
¡ ¡ ! R0w. The applicable de¯nition clause is
the out-rule (see Figure 6.2). For the defLcsu to succeed we need to identify z and w.
But since w has local scope its corresponding uni¯cation problem is ¸w:w = ¸w:z (recall
that local variables are interpreted as ¸-abstraction in applying eqL and defLcsu), which
has no solution. Therefore the proof for sequent (iii:8) succeeds. Notice the di®erence
with the sequent (a:11) in which the corresponding uni¯cation problem is w = z, which
is solvable since w in that case is an eigenvariable which is subject to instantiation.
We now show that the bisim clause does encode bisimulation.
Theorem 6.7. Let P and Q be two processes. If the sequent
:; : ¡! ¹ u . bisim P Q;
where free names in P and Q are either in ¹ u or global constants, is provable in Linc with
the de¯nition D¼;
: » then P
: » Q.
Proof We show that the set
S = f(R;T) j :; : ¡! ¹ w . bisim R Tg
where free names in R and T are either in ¹ w or global constants, is a strong late bisim-
ulation. Given the cut-elimination theorem, we know that the proof of ¹ w . bisim R T
must end with an instance of defR. By unfolding the de¯nition clause of bisim and
applying the introduction rules for the asynchronous logical connectives, we arrive at six
sequents in the premise. We show here three of them, the other three are symmetric (by
interchanging R and T):
(1) A;R0 ; ¹ w . R
A ¹ w
¡ ¡ ! R0 ¹ w ¡! ¹ w . 9T0:T
A ¹ w
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ bisim (R0 ¹ w) T0
(2) X;M ; ¹ w . R
#(X ¹ w)
¡ ¡ * M ¹ w ¡! ¹ w . 9N:T
#(X ¹ w)
¡ ¡ * N ^ 8n:bisim (M ¹ wn) (N n)
(3) X;M ; ¹ w . R
"(X ¹ w)
¡ ¡ * M ¹ w ¡! ¹ w . 9N:T
"(X ¹ w)
¡ ¡ * N ^ rn:bisim (M ¹ wn) (N n)
Let ¦1;¦2;¦3 be the proofs of the sequents (1), (2) and (3), respectively. We need to
show that for every transition that R can perform, T can make the same transition and
their continuations are in S. We distinguish three cases, depending whether ® is a free
action, a bound input or a bound output. These cases correspond to the sequents (1),
(2) and (3) above.
For case (1), suppose we have a transition R
®
¡ ¡ ! R1, then by Proposition 6.4
we have derivation of :; : ¡! R
®
¡ ¡ ! R1, where the free names ¹ w are treated as global
constants. By Lemma 3.13 we can weaken the scope of ¹ w so that we have a derivation115
¦ of :; : ¡! ¹ w . R
®
¡ ¡ ! R1. We instantiate the derivation ¦1 with the substitution
µ = [¸ ¹ w:R1=R0;¸ ¹ w:®=A] and then cut this derivation with ¦ to obtain the derivation ¥
¦
:; : ¡! ¹ w . R
®
¡ ¡ ! R1
¦1µ
:; ¹ w . R
®
¡ ¡ ! R1 ¡! ¹ w . 9T0:T
®
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ bisim R1 T0
:; : ¡! ¹ w . 9T0:T
®
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ bisim R1 T0
mc
By cut-elimination, there is a cut-free proof of the sequent
:; : ¡! ¹ w . 9T0:T
®
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ bisim R1 T0:
The two last rules of this proof must be instances of 9R and ^R. Hence there must exist
a process term T1 such that
:; : ¡! ¹ w . T
®
¡ ¡ ! T1 and :; : ¡! ¹ w . bisim R1 T1
are provable. By Proposition 6.4 there is a transition T
®
¡ ¡ ! T1, and from the de¯nition
of S, clearly (R1;T1) 2 S.
In case (2), we are given a transition R
#x
¡ ¡ * ¸y:My, and we need to show that
there is an abstraction N (of type n ! p) such that ¹ w . T
#x
¡ ¡ * ¸y:Ny is provable and
that for every name a, (Ma;Na) 2 S. By similar arguments as in case (1), we show that
there is indeed a term N such that
:; : ¡! ¹ w . T
#x
¡ ¡ * N
and
:; : ¡! ¹ w . 8y:bisim (My) (Ny)
are provable. In the second sequent, we can instantiate y with any constant of type name
(either global or local). That is, ¹ w .bisim (M a) (Na) is provable for every a, and hence
(Ma;Na) 2 S. Case (3) is similar to case (2), the only di®erence is that in this case we
need only to show that (Ma;Na) 2 S for a fresh name a not in the free names of (R;T).
Applying the same arguments as above, we arrive at the (cut-free) derivation
¥0
; ¡! ¹ wa . bisim (Ma) (Na)
; ¡! ¹ w . ry:bisim (My) (Ny) rR:
Hence (Ma;Na) 2 S. We have thus shown that S is indeed a bisimulation set, and
therefore the soundness of our encoding.
The converse of Theorem 6.7 is not true, that is, there are some processes that
are bisimilar but their encoding is not provable in Linc with D¼;
: ». A counterexample
is given below.116
Example 6.8. Consider the processes
P = y(z):(x + x:z); Q = y(z):(x + x:z + x:[z = a]z):
We show that P
: » Q but bisim P Q is not provable. Let
R = f(P;Q)g
S
f(x + x:w;x + x:w + x:[w = a]w) j for some name w g S
f(0;[w = a]w) j for some name w 6= a g
S
f(a;[a = a]a);(0;0)g
and let S be the symmetric closure of R, i.e., S = f(R;T);(T;R) j (R;T) 2 Rg. We show
that S is a bisimulation set by case analysis on all possible pairs in S. The interesting
case is to check that the continuations of (x + x:w;x + x:w + x:[w = a]w) are in S.
Let R = x + x:w and T = x + x:w + [w = a]w. There are two possible transitions
from R: either R
x
¡ ¡ ! 0 or R
x
¡ ¡ ! w. In the ¯rst case, we choose for T the transition
T
x
¡ ¡ ! 0 (i.e., by selecting the ¯rst summand x). In the second case, we choose for T
the transition T
x
¡ ¡ ! w. In both cases the continuation pairs are in S.
Conversely, there are three possible transitions from T: T
x
¡ ¡ ! 0, T
x
¡ ¡ ! w and
T
x
¡ ¡ ! [w = a]w. For the ¯rst two cases, we choose for R the transition R
x
¡ ¡ ! 0 and
R
x
¡ ¡ ! w, respectively. For the third case, if w = a, we choose the transition R
x
¡ ¡ ! w,
otherwise take the transition R
x
¡ ¡ ! 0. In all cases it is obvious that the continuations
are in S.
Let us now attempt to prove the sequent ¢; ¢ ¡! bisim P Q, where all the
free names in (P;Q) are encoded as constants. It can be checked that, using only
asynchronous rules, the proof of this sequent reduces to a proof of the sequent
; ¡! 8w:bisim (x + x:w) (x + x:w + [w = a]w): (6.1)
Now we apply 8R, defR and the necessary introduction rules for the logical connectives
in bisim . We get six sequents as the premise, corresponding to free action, bound input
and bound output transitions. Among the premises is the sequent
X;R0 ; (x + x:w + x:[w = a]w)
#X
¡ ¡ * R0 ¡! 9T0:x + x:w
#X
¡ ¡ * T0 ^ 8n:bisim R0n T0n:
Applying defLcsu on this sequent gives us three premises. The interesting one is the
sequent
X;R0 ; x:[w = a]w
#X
¡ ¡ * R0 ¡! 9T0:x + x:w
#X
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ 8n:bisim R0n T0n:
Another application of defLcsu gives us
w; ¢ ¡! 9T0:x + x:w
#x
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ 8n:bisim [w = a]w T0n: (6.2)
Notice that w is not instantiated since it plays no active role in inferring the transition
from (x+x:w). Now we claim that there is no proof for this sequent. Suppose otherwise,117
then we must choose a T0 to proceed with the proof. There are only two choices, either
we instantiate T0 with ¸n:w or ¸n:0. The ¯rst choice leads to the premise w; ¢ ¡!
bisim [w = a]w x while the second leads to w; ¢ ¡! bisim [w = a]w 0. We ¯rst apply
defR and other logical rules to the atom bisim [w = a]w x to get the following premise
(among other ones)
w;X0;R00 ; x
#X0
¡ ¡ * R00 ¡! 9T00:[w = a]
#X0
¡ ¡ * T00 ^ 8n:bisim (R00n) (T00n)
Applying defLcsu once we get
w; ¡! 9T00:[w = a]w
#x
¡ ¡ * T00 ^ 8n:bisim 0 (T00n)
where X0 is instantiated with x and R00 with ¸n:0. Now notice that w is again not
instantiated. This means that there is no way we can prove [w = a]
#x
¡ ¡ * T00 for any T00,
since w and a are di®erent (recall that eigenvariables are not instantiated when applying
any right-introduction rules).
The sequent w; ¢ ¡! bisim ([w = a]w) 0 is not provable either since its proof
would reduce to a proof of
w;Y;U ; [w = a]w
#Y
¡ ¡ * U ¡! 9V:0
#Y
¡ ¡ * V ^ 8n:bisim (Un) (V n)
which in turns would reduce to (by an application of defLcsu)
¢; ¢ ¡! 9V:0
#a
¡ ¡ * V ^ 8n:bisim 0 (V n):
In the latter sequent above, w gets instantiated to a. Clearly this sequent is not provable
since the process 0 cannot perform any action.
A complete encoding of late bisimulation
What seems to be the problem in Example 6.8 is that we need to do case analyses
on the possible name w can take in the sequent (6.2) before we instantiate T0. More
generally, our use of eigenvariable in encoding bound input forces lazy instantiation of
the variable, i.e., only at the point when it is needed, e.g., in inferring the one-step
transition (on the left-hand side of the sequent). We come to a simple solution to this
problem by forcing an explicit enumeration of all names in the case involving bound
input. For this to work, we need to maintain a list of free names of the processes being
checked for their bisimilarity. More speci¯cally, the bisimulation relation is encoded as
the following predicate
lbisim : nlist ! p ! p ! o:
where the type nlist denotes the list of names, with the usual constructors: nil for empty
list and :: : n ! nlist ! nlist for constructing a list from a name and another list. The
relation P
: » Q is now encoded as lbisim L P Q where L is a list of names containing free118
names in P and Q. The de¯nition clause for lbisim is given in Figure 6.8. The predicate
lname X L is used to enumerate all possible instantiation of X with the names in L.
Notice that now the lbisim clause for input-pre¯x case has explicit assumptions about
the possible name w can take, either it is in the list of free names in L, or it is a new
name not in L, P or Q, which in this case is given by the quanti¯er r. Whenever we
introduce a new name via r, the name has to be added to the list L. We refer to the
de¯nition clause given in Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.3 as D¼;
: »l
.
Theorem 6.9. Let P and Q be two processes. If the sequent
:; : ¡! ¹ u . lbisim L¹ u P Q;
where L is a ground term and the free names in P and Q are in the list L ¹ u, is provable
in Linc with the de¯nition D¼;
: »l
then P
: » Q.
Proof The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 6.7, that is, we show that
the set
S = f(R;T) j :; : ¡! ¹ w . lbisim L ¹ w R Tg
where L is a ground term and the free names of R and T are included in L, is a bisimulation
set. The non-trivial case is when R makes an input transition. In this case the proof of
¹ w . lbisim L ¹ w R T reduces to
X;M ; ¹ w . R
#(X ¹ w)
¡ ¡ * M ¹ w ¡! ¹ w . 9N:
2
6
4
T
#(X ¹ w)
¡ ¡ * N
^ 8n:lname w L ¹ w ¾ lbisim L ¹ w (M ¹ wn) (N n)
^ rn:lbisim (n :: L) M ¹ w Nn
3
7
5
Suppose we are given a transition ¹ w .R
#®
¡ ¡ * R0 then by cut and cut-elimination there is
some term T0 and name ® such that the following sequents are provable.
(1) ¢; ¢ ¡! ¹ w . T
#®
¡ ¡ * T0
(2) h; ¹ w . lname h ¹ w L ¹ w ¡! ¹ w . lbisim L ¹ w R0(h ¹ w) T0(h ¹ w)
(3) ¢; ¢ ¡! ¹ wn . lbisim (n :: L ¹ w) R0n T0n
Since defL, eqL and _L are asynchronous rules, we can rearrange the proof of (2) so
that those left-rules are applied before any other rules. The rearranged proof is of the
shape
¦a1
¢; ¢ ¡! ¹ w . lbisim L ¹ w R0a1 T0a1 ¢¢¢
¦an
¢; ¢ ¡! ¹ w . lbisim L ¹ w R0an T0an
h; ¹ w . lname h ¹ w L ¹ w ¡! ¹ w . lbisim L ¹ w R0(h ¹ w) T0(h ¹ w)
where a1;:::;an are the names in L ¹ w. We need to show that the continuation pairs
(R0a;T0a) 2 S for every a. If a 2 fa1;:::;ang then (R0a;T0a) 2 S by the proof ¦a.119
lbisim L P Q
4
= 8A8P0 [(P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0) ¾ 9Q0:(Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0) ^ lbisim L P0 Q0] ^
8A8Q0 [(Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0) ¾ 9P0:(P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0) ^ lbisim L Q0 P0] ^
8X8P0
2
6 6
4
(P
#X
¡ ¡ * P0) ¾ 9Q0:(Q
#X
¡ ¡ * Q0)
^8w:lname x L ¾ lbisim L (P0w) (Q0w)
^rw:lbisim (w :: L) (P0w) (Q0w)
3
7 7
5 ^
8X8Q0
2
6
6
4
(Q
#X
¡ ¡ * Q0) ¾ 9P0:(P
#X
¡ ¡ * P0)
^ 8w:lname x L ¾ lbisim (Q0w) (P0w)
^rw:lbisim (w :: L) (P0w) (Q0w)
3
7
7
5 ^
8X8P0
2
6
4 (P
"X
¡ ¡ * P0) ¾ 9Q0:(Q
"X
¡ ¡ * Q0)
^ rw:lbisim (w :: L) (P0w) (Q0w)
3
7
5 ^
8X8Q0
2
6
4 (Q
"X
¡ ¡ * Q0) ¾ 9P0:(P
"X
¡ ¡ * P0)
^ rw:lbisim (w :: L) (Q0w) (P0w)
3
7
5
lname X (Y :: L)
4
= (X = Y ) _ lname X L
Fig. 6.8. A complete encoding of strong late bisimulation120
Otherwise, a is a fresh name not in L ¹ w,R, and T. In this case, (R0a;T0a) 2 S follows from
the proof of the sequent (3).
We now prove the converse of Theorem 6.9. For this we need a few more de¯nitions
and lemmas. The following de¯nition makes use of multiset. We use v to denote multiset
ordering. We write P < Q if the multiset P is strictly smaller than Q, i.e., P v Q and
S 6= Q.
Definition 6.10. We de¯ne the measures pr and # on normal p-terms as follows.
² if P is either ¿ P0, out x y P0 then pr(P) = 1 + pr(P0), and #(P) = 1 + #(P0),
² if P is in x P then pr(P) = 1 + pr(P y) and #(P) = 1 + #(P y), for some y not
free in P,
² if P is match x y P0 then pr(P) = pr(P0) and #(P) = 1 + #(P0),
² if P is º P0, then pr(P) = pr(P0y) and #(P) = 1+#(P0y) for some y not free in
P,
² if P is P1 +P2 or P1 jP2 then pr(P) = pr(P1)+pr(P2) and #(P) = 1+#(P1)+
#(P2),
² otherwise pr(P) = 0 and #(P) = 0.
The measure pr counts the number of pre¯xes in the term and # counts the number of
constructors (except 0). We extend these measures to apply to one-step transition:
pr(P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q) = pr(P
A0
¡ ¡ * Q
0) = pr(P); #(P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q) = #(P
A0
¡ ¡ * Q
0) = #(P):
Given a formula B, the measure M(B) is the multiset
f#(P) j P
A
¡ ¡ ! Q or P
A
¡ ¡ * Q is a subformula occurrence in Bg;
where each occurrence of P in B is counted only once. The measure M is extended to
judgments and sequents as follows.
M(¹ x . B) = M(B); M(¡) =
[
fM(J) j J 2 ¡g:
Lemma 6.11. If a process P makes a transition to Q then pr(P) > pr(Q).
Proof By induction on the ¼-derivation of P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q.
Definition 6.12. An occurrence of a one-step-transition predicate P
X
¡ ¡ ! Q (likewise,
P
X
¡ ¡ * Q) in a judgment ¹ w . C is a ground-head occurrence if the free variables in P
are either in ¹ w or it is bound by a r quanti¯er in C. Let C be a judgment in which
the only occurrences of predicate symbols are the one-step-transition predicates. If every121
occurrence of the one-step predicate in C is ground-head then we say that C is a ground-
head judgment. A sequent ¡ ¡! C is a ground head sequent if all judgments in ¡ are
ground head judgments.
Lemma 6.13. Let A be a ground head judgment. Then for any substitution µ, Aµ is a
ground head judgment and M(A) = M(Aµ).
Lemma 6.14. Let A be a ground head judgment. For any raised de¯nition clause H
4
= B
in D¼;
: »l
, if Aµ = Hµ then M(Bµ) < M(A)
Proof By case analyses on the de¯nition clauses in Figure 6.3 and Lemma 6.13.
In the following we shall need a notion of partial derivation. A partial derivation
is constructed inductively as derivations, but we do not require that every leaf to be
closed, i.e., some leaves may be instances of rules with one or more premises. We call a
branch in a partial derivation an open branch if its leaf is an instance of a rule with one
or more premise, otherwise it is closed. Obviously, a derivation is a partial derivation in
which all branches are closed. We then de¯ne a partial proof strategy for constructing
partial derivations for the particular case of lbisim .
Definition 6.15. The lbisim-(partial) proof strategy for a given sequent is de¯ned as
follows.
Step 1 Given a sequent ¡ ¡! C, apply the introduction rules 9L, rL and ^L until
neither of them is applicable. Let ¡0 ¡! C be the resulting sequent.
Step 2 Apply defLcsu to some atomic judgment in ¡0, if there is any, otherwise the
strategy terminates. For every premise sequent ¡00 ¡! C0, repeat Step 1.
This strategy is non-terminating in general, however, we see that in a speci¯c case it is
terminating, although the resulting partial derivation may not be a valid derivation.
Lemma 6.16. Let S be either the ground head sequent
P
0;A; ¹ x . P
A¹ x
¡ ¡ ! P
0¹ x ¡! C or M;X ; ¹ x . P
X¹ x
¡ ¡ * M¹ x ¡! C;
where ¹ x are of type n. Then the following statements hold.
(a) The application of lbisim strategy on S terminates.
(b) Let ¦ be the resulting partial derivation after applying the lbisim-strategy. Suppose
there is an open branch ª in ¦. Let µ = µ1 ± ::: ± µn where µi is the substitution
applied to the premise of of the i-th instance of defLcsu in ª. Then P0µ and Aµ
(likewise, Mµ and Xµ) are closed terms and either one of the sequents
¢; ¢ ¡! (¹ x . P
A¹ x
¡ ¡ ! P0¹ x)µ
¢; ¢ ¡! (¹ x . P
X¹ x
¡ ¡ * M¹ x)µ
is provable.122
Proof As a consequence of Lemma 6.13 and Lemma 6.14, we observe the following
invariant in the lbisim-strategy: given a ground head sequent ¡ ¡! C, the resulting
sequents from applying lbisim-strategy are all ground head sequents. Let size(¡) be the
number of logical connectives in ¡. To show the termination of the lbisim-strategy we
assign the measure
hM(¡);size(¡)i
to a given ground-head sequent ¡ ¡! C and show that each step of the strategy produces
sequents of smaller measure. Step 1 removes logical connectives and does not introduce
any new occurrence of one-step predicate, therefore it clearly reduces size(¡) while M(¡)
remains unchanged. Step 2 reduces M(¡) by Lemma 6.13 and Lemma 6.14. Since we
start with a ¯xed ground head sequent, applying this strategy eventually terminates.
The proof of (b) is by induction on the length of ª. We can write each sequent
appearing in the branch ª below the i + 1-th application of defLcsu as
¡µ1 ± ¢¢¢ ± µi ¡! Cµ1 ± ¢¢¢µi:
Let us denote the substitution µ1 ± ::: ± µi with µi. We claim that for any sequent
¡µi ¡! Cµi in ª and any judgment Aµi 2 ¡µi, Aµ is a ground judgment (i.e., no
occurrence of eigenvariables) and there is a derivation ¥ of the sequent ¢ ¡! Aµ: In the
base case, we have an instance of defLcsu (we show here only the premise that is in ª)
>;>;:::;> ¡! Cµn¡1 ± µn
Aµn¡1;>;:::;> ¡! Cµn¡1 defLcsu
where Aµn¡1µn = Aµ = Hµn for some raised de¯nition clause H
4
= ¹ w.>. By inspection
on the de¯nition clauses of D¼;
: »l
we see that this instance of defLcsu must have used
either one of the de¯nition clauses
¿ M
¿
¡ ¡ ! P
4
= >; in X M
#X
¡ ¡ * M
4
= >; or out x y P
"xy
¡ ¡ ! P
0 4
= >
or their raised versions. Since Aµn¡1 is a ground-head judgment, applying defLcsu to it
using the above clauses will fully instantiate the variables in A with ground terms, and
therefore Aµ is a ground judgment. We then take ¥ to be the derivation
¡! > >R
¡! Aµ defR= :
For the inductive cases we have either defLcsu, ^L¤, rL, or 9L. We assume
that the free variables in µi and ¡µi are di®erent from the new eigenvariables introduced
above the sequent ¡µi ¡! Cµi and di®erent from the bound variables in the sequent.123
1. Suppose defLcsu is applied to ¡µi
ª0
Bµi+1;¡0µi ± µi+1 ¡! Cµi ± µi+1
Aµi;¡0µi ¡! Cµi defLcsu
for some raised de¯nition clause H
4
= B such that Hµi+1 = Aµi ± µi+1. Since we
can choose the variables in H to be di®erent from the free variables in µi and in
the sequent, we have Bµi+1 = Bµi ± µi+1. By induction hypothesis we know that
Bµ is a ground term and there is a derivation of ¥0 of ¢ ¡! Bµ. We see that in
most de¯nition clauses for the one-step transition, the variables that appear in the
head of the clause also appear in the body. In these cases, clearly Hµ is a ground
judgment and hence Aµ is also a ground jugdment. The exceptions are with the
par- and sum-rules, e.g.,
R + T
Y
¡ ¡ ! R
0 4
= R
Y
¡ ¡ ! R
0:
But since Aµi is a ground-head judgment, unifying Aµi with the above clause will
instantiate R and T with ground terms, while the variable R0µ is a ground term
following from the induction hypothesis. Therefore Aµ is also a ground judgment.
We construct the derivation ¥ as follows
¥0
¢ ¡! Bµ
¢ ¡! Aµ defR=:
The above instance of defR= is valid since we have Aµi ± µi+1 = Hµi ± µi+1 and
hence Aµ = Hµi+1 ± ::: ± µn.
2. Suppose ^L¤ is applied to ¡µi
ª0
B1µi;B2µi;¡0µi ¡! Cµi
B1µi ^ B2µi;¡0µi ¡! Cµi ^L¤
Then we construct ¥ as follows
¥1
¢ ¡! B1µ
¥2
¢ ¡! B2µ
¢ ¡! B1µ ^ B2µ ^R124
where ¥1 and ¥2 are obtained from induction hypothesis. The judgments B1µ and
B2µ are both ground judgments by induction hypothesis, so obviously B1µ ^ B2µ
is also a ground jugdment.
3. Suppose 9L is applied to ¡µi
ª0
¹ u . Bµi (h¹ u);¡0µi ¡! Cµi
¹ u . 9y:Bµi y;¡0µi ¡! Cµi 9L
By induction hypothesis we get a derivation ¥0 of ¢ ¡! ¹ u.(B (h¹ u))µ where (B (h¹ u))
is a ground judgment. The terms (¸¹ u:B)µ and hµ are ground terms, so obviously
¹ u . 9y:Bµy is a ground judgment. We therefore construct ¥ as follows
¥0
¢ ¡! ¹ u . (B (h¹ u))µ
¢ ¡! ¹ u . 9y:Bµy 9R
4. Suppose rL is applied to ¡µi
ª0
¹ uy . (By)µi;¡0µi ¡! Cµi
u . ry:(By)µi;¡0µi ¡! Cµi rL
By induction hypothesis we have a derivation ¥0 of ¢ ¡! ¹ uy . (By)µ, where ¹ uy .
(By)µ is a ground judgment. Obviously, ¹ uy .ry:(By)µ is a ground judgment. We
therefore take ¥ to be the derivation
¥0
¢ ¡! ¹ uy . (By)µ
¢ ¡! ¹ u . ry:(By)µ rR
We note that the use r to encode restriction makes it possible to dualize an
open branch of the partial derivation to obtain a valid derivation. If we had used 8,
which is not an asynchronous connective on the left, we would not be able to dualize
the proof, since on the left-side we would have been required to instantiate it with some
name (could be already occurring in the sequent), while on the right we would have been
forced to use a fresh eigenvariable.
Theorem 6.17. If P
: » Q then for any ¯nite list L such that L contains the free names
of P and Q, the sequent
¢; ¢ ¡! lbisim L P Q
is provable in Linc with the de¯nition D¼;
: »l
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Proof The proof is by induction on the measure #(P) + #(Q). We attempt to prove
lbisim L P Q by applying defR followed by instances of ^R,8R and ¾ R. We get
six premises. We show here the construction of the derivations for three of them, the
derivations for the other three can be constructed analogously.
(a) P0;A; P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¡! 9Q0:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ^ lbisim L P0 Q0
(b) M;X ; P
#X
¡ ¡ * M ¡! 9N: Q
#X
¡ ¡ * N ^ 8w:lname w L ¾ lbisim L Mw Nw
^ rw:lbisim (w :: L) Mw Nw
(c) M;X ; P
"X
¡ ¡ * M ¡! 9N:Q
"X
¡ ¡ * N ^ rw:lbisim (w :: L) Mw Nw
We apply the lbisim-strategy to the above sequents. Let ¦a, ¦b and ¦c be the partial
derivations for (a), (b) and (c), respectively. In all cases, if there are no open branches
then we are done. Otherwise, suppose there is an open branch ªa in ¦a. The leaf of ªa
has the judgment
¢; ¢ ¡! 9Q
0:Q
Aµ
¡ ¡ ! Q
0 ^ lbisim L P
0µ Q
0 (6.3)
in the premise, where µ is the composition of all substitutions appearing in ªa. Since
(a) is a ground-head sequent, by Lemma 6.16 there is a derivation of ¢; ¢ ¡! P
Aµ
¡ ¡ ! P0µ:
That is, P makes an Aµ-transition to P0µ. Hence, by the de¯nition of bisimulation, there
is a transition from Q
Aµ
¡ ¡ ! R such that P0µ
: » R, for some process R. By Proposition 6.4
there is a proof ¥ of Q
Aµ
¡ ¡ ! R. From Lemma 6.11 we know that pr(P0µ) + pr(R) <
pr(P) + pr(Q), and therefore we can apply the induction hypothesis to get a derivation
¦0 of lbisim L P0µ R. We thus complete the proof for sequent (6.3) as follows.
¥
¡! Q
Aµ
¡ ¡ ! R
¦0
¡! lbisim L P0µ R
¡! Q
Aµ
¡ ¡ ! R ^ lbisim L P0µ R
^R
¡! 9Q0:Q
Aµ
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ^ lbisim L P0µ Q0
9R
The sequent (b) is proved in a similar fashion. In this case, however, we are given a
derivation of lbisim L0 Ma Na for any name a and any ¯nite list of names L0, and we
need to construct a derivation for each of the sequents
w; lname w L ¡! lbisim L Mw Nw and ¢; ¢ ¡! w . lbisim (w :: L) Mw Nw:
The ¯rst is proved by unwinding the predicate lname w L by applying defL, _L and
eqL. This will result in the premises
¡! lbisim L Ma1 Na1;¢¢¢;¡! lbisim L Mak Nak126
where a1;:::;ak are the names in L. These premises are provable from induction hy-
pothesis. The derivation for the sequent ¡! w . lbisim (w :: L) Mw Nw is obtained
from induction hypothesis, i.e., a derivation of ¡! lbisim (c :: L) Mc Nc for some name
(constant) c not in L, and then applying Lemma 3.13 to weaken the scope of c to local
context. The proof for (c) is similar to this case.
6.4 Strong congruence and distinction
It is a well-known fact that the late bisimulation relation is not a congruence since
it is not preserved by input pre¯x. For a simple example, consider the processes P = (xj¹ y)
and Q = (x:¹ y + ¹ y:x). P and Q are bisimilar but x(y):P 6
: » x(y):Q since in the latter case
we need to show that for every name a, P[a=y]
: » Q[a=y]. In particular, a could be x, and
hence P can make a ¿-transition which cannot be simulated by Q. Part of the reason
why the congruence property fails for
: » is that ¼-calculus makes no syntactic distinction
between instantiable names and non-instantiable names. In Linc this distinction is made
by the use of eigenvariables to encode the former and constants (or variables in local
context) to encode the latter. In ¼-calculus, this lack of syntactic distinction is remedied
by considering a variant of bisimulation relation which is closed under all substitutions of
names. The resulting relation is shown in [40] to be a congruence. The precise de¯nition
follows.
Definition 6.18. [40] The processes P and Q are strong late congruent, written P » Q,
if Pµ
: » Qµ for every (name) substitution µ.
In the above de¯nition, strictly speaking we do not need to consider all substitu-
tions. It is enough to consider substitutions the domain of which is included in the set of
free variables of P and Q. To encode strong congruence in Linc we therefore interpret the
quanti¯cation over \all substitutions" as simply universal quanti¯cation over free names
in P and Q. This is true for both bisim and lbisim. The soundness of this encoding
follows straightforwardly from the property of universal quanti¯er and Theorem 6.7 and
Theorem 6.9.
Theorem 6.19. Let P and Q be two processes and let ¹ y be the free names in P and Q. If
8¹ y:bisim P Q is provable in Linc with the de¯nition D¼;
: » then P » Q.
Theorem 6.20. Let P and Q be two processes and let ¹ y be the free names in P and Q.
Let L be a list of names containing only those in ¹ y. If 8¹ y:lbisim L P Q is provable in
Linc with the de¯nition D¼;
: »l
then P » Q.
The notion of bisimulation can be further re¯ned by explicitly specifying the
distinction among names, e.g., certain names remain distinct after substitutions. This
notion is formally de¯ned as follows.
Definition 6.21. [40] A distinction is a ¯nite symmetric and irre°exive relation on
names. A substitution µ respects a distinction D if (x;y) 2 D implies xµ 6= yµ.127
Definition 6.22. [40] Let D be a distinction. Then P and Q are strong D-bisimilar,
written P »D Q if Pµ
: » Qµ for each µ that respects D.
It is enough to consider distinctions which mention only the free variables in P
and Q when checking P »D Q. That is, we have P »D Q if and only if P »D0
Q where
D0 = D \ (fn(P;Q) £ fn(P;Q)). A class of distinctions that often arises in practice is of
the form (N £ N) ¡ I where N is a ¯nite set of names and I is the identity relation on
names. Let us call such a distinction as complete distinction. We abbreviate a complete
distinction (N £ N) ¡ I as simply N. It is obvious that any substitution µ that respects
N and whose domain is a subset of N is a renaming substitution. This suggests that we
can encode »N by quantifying the names in N with r and the rest free variables with
8. The precise statements are given in the following two theorems. The proofs of the
theorems make use of the following result (which can be proved analogously to the proofs
of Theorem 6.7 and Theorem 6.9):
² If r¹ y:bisim P Q is provable then Pµ
: » Qµ for every renaming substitution µ such
that dom(µ) µ f¹ yg.
² If r¹ y:lbisim L P Q is provable then Pµ
: » Qµ for every renaming substitution µ such
that dom(µ) µ f¹ yg.
Theorem 6.23. Let N = fx1;:::;xng be a complete distinction. Let P and Q be two pro-
cesses and let ¹ y be a list of free names in P and Q but not in N. If rx1 :::rxn8¹ y:bisim P Q
is provable with the de¯nition D¼;
: » then P »N Q.
Theorem 6.24. Let N = fx1;:::;xng be a complete distinction. Let P and Q be two
processes and L be a ¯nite list of names containing the free names in P and Q, and let
¹ y be a list of free names in P and Q but not in N. If rx1 :::rxn8¹ y:lbisim L P Q is
provable with the de¯nition D¼;
: »l
then P »N Q.
P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0
!P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0 j !P
!act;bn(® \ fn(P) = ;)
P
¹ xy
¡ ¡ ! P0 P
x(z)
¡ ¡ * P00
!P
¿
¡ ¡ ! (P0 j P00[y=z]) j !P
!comm
P
¹ x(z)
¡ ¡ * P0 P
x(z)
¡ ¡ * P00
P
¿
¡ ¡ ! (z)(P0 j P00) j !P
!close
Fig. 6.9. The late transition rules for ¼-calculus with replication128
P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0
!P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 j !P
!act
P
X
¡ ¡ * M
!P
X
¡ ¡ * ¸y(My j !P)
!act
P
"xy
¡ ¡ ! P0 P
#x
¡ ¡ * M
!P
¿
¡ ¡ ! (P0 j My)
!comm
P
"x
¡ ¡ * M P
#x
¡ ¡ * N
P
¿
¡ ¡ ! ºz:(Mz j Nz) j !P
!close
Fig. 6.10. The late transition rules for ¼-calculus with replication (HOAS)
6.5 ¼-calculus with replication
We now consider an extension to the ¯nite ¼-calculus which will allow us to
represent non-terminating processes. There are at least two ways of encoding non-
terminating processes in ¼-calculus, e.g., via recursive de¯nitions or replications [47].
We consider here the latter approach since it leads to a simpler presentation of the
operational semantics. To the syntax of ¯nite ¼-calculus we add the process expression
!P. The processes !P can be understood as the in¯nite parallel composition of P, i.e.,
PjPj¢¢¢jPj¢¢¢. Thus it is possible to have a process which retains a copy of itself
after making a transition, e.g., !P
®
¡ ¡ ! P0j!P. The operational semantics for one-step
transitions of the ¼-calculus with replication (in HOAS) is given in Figure 6.2 plus the
additional rules in Figure 6.10. We use the same symbol to encode replication in HOAS,
i.e., ! : p ! p. The original speci¯cation, taken from [47], is given in Figure 6.9
Let us denote the de¯nition clauses for ¼-calculus with replication with D!¼. The
de¯nition D!¼;
: » denotes the de¯nition D!¼ augmented with the bisim clause, and D!¼;
: »l
denotes D!¼ augmented with lbisim clause. Note that the bisim and lbisim clauses have
now to be marked as co-inductive de¯nitions in order for the co-induction rules to be
applicable.
Example 6.25. Let P =!(z)(¹ za j z(y):¹ xy) and Q =!¿:¹ xa. The only action P can make is
the silent action ¿ since the channel z is restricted internally within the process. It is
easy to see that P
¿
¡ ¡ ! ¹ xa j P. That is, the continuation of P is capable of outputting a
free name a or making a silent transition. Obviously Q can make the same ¿ action and
results in a bisimilar continuation. Let us try to prove bisim P Q. The proof strategy as
in the ¯nite case (i.e., unfolding the bisim clause via defR and applying the necessary
introduction rules for logical connectives) will not work here. It is easy to check that
applying this strategy, after the ¯rst defR on bisim (but before the second defR on
bisim) we arrive at the sequent bisim ((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j P) (¹ xa j Q): Since P and Q still occur
in the continuation pair, it is obvious that this strategy is non terminating. We need to
use the co-induction proof rules instead.129
The informal proof as it is done in ¼-calculus starts by ¯nding a bisimulation set S
such that (P;Q) 2 S. Let Ri, for any natural number i, be either (z)(0 j ¹ xa) or (z)(0 j 0),
and Ti be either ¹ xa or 0. and let S0 = f(R1 j ¢¢¢ j Rn j P;T1 j ¢¢¢ j Tn j Q) j n ¸ 0g.
De¯ne S to be the symmetric closure of S0. It can be veri¯ed that S is a bisimulation set
by showing the set is closed with respect to one-step transitions. To prove this formally
in Linc we need someway to represent the set S. We code the set S as the following
inductive de¯nition.
inv P Q
¹
= >: inv Q P
¹
= >:
inv ((z)(0 j 0) j M) (0 j N)
¹
= inv M N:
inv (0 j N) ((z)(0 j 0) j M)
¹
= inv N M:
inv ((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j M) (¹ xa j N)
¹
= inv M N:
inv (¹ xa j N) ((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j M)
¹
= inv N M:
Note that the resulting de¯nition from adding inv to D!¼;
: » can be strati¯ed by assigning
a level to inv such that lvl(inv) < lvl(bisim). The set of pairs encoded by inv can be
shown to be symmetric, i.e., the formula 8R8T:inv R T ¾ inv T R is provable inductively
(using the same formula as the induction invariant).
We then apply the ºR rule to bisim P Q, using the predicate inv as the invariant.
This application of ºR yields the following two premises: ¡! inv P Q and
R;T ; inv R T ¡! B RT
where B RT is the formula
8A8P0 [(R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0) ¾ 9Q0:(T
A
¡ ¡ ! T0) ^ inv R0 T0] ^
8A8T0 [(T
A
¡ ¡ ! T0) ¾ 9R0:(R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0) ^ inv T0 R0] ^
8X8R0 [(P
#X
¡ ¡ * R0) ¾ 9T0:(T
#X
¡ ¡ * T0) ^ 8w:inv (R0w) (T0w)] ^
8X8T0 [(T
#X
¡ ¡ * T0) ¾ 9R0:(R
#X
¡ ¡ * R0) ^ 8w:inv (R0w) (R0w)] ^
8X8R0 [(R
"X
¡ ¡ * R0) ¾ 9T0:(T
"X
¡ ¡ * T0) ^ rw:inv (R0w) (T0w)] ^
8X8T0 [(T
"X
¡ ¡ * T0) ¾ 9R0:(R
"X
¡ ¡ * R0) ^ rw:inv (T0w) (R0w)]
The sequent reads, intuitively, that the set de¯ned by inv is symmetric and is closed
under one-step transitions. This is proved by induction on inv. Formally, this is done
by applying ¹L to inv R T, using the invariant
¸R¸T:inv R T ¾ B RT:
The sequents corresponding to the base cases of the induction are
inv P Q ¡! B PQ and inv Q P ¡! B QP130
and the inductive cases are given by
inv R T ¾ B RT ¡! inv ((z)(0 j 0) j R) (0 j T) ¾ B ((z)(0 j 0) j R) (0 j T);
inv R T ¾ B RT ¡! inv ((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R) (¹ xa j T) ¾ B ((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R) (¹ xa j T)
and their symmetric variants. The proof involves quite a number of cases. We show
here one particular case, the other cases can be proved pretty much in the same way.
We consider a case for free input, where we have the sequent (after applying some right-
introduction rules)
R;T;R
0;A;
8
> > <
> > :
inv R T ¾ B RT;
inv ((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R) (¹ xa j T);
((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R)
A
¡ ¡ ! R0
9
> > =
> > ;
¡! 9T
0:(¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! T
0 ^ inv R
0 T
0
(6.4)
to prove. Its symmetric case can be proved by using cut, since the predicate inv is
symmetric. The sequent (6.4) can be simpli¯ed by applying defLcsu to the inv predicate,
followed by an instance of ¾ L. The resulting sequent is
8
<
:
B RT; inv R T
((z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R)
A
¡ ¡ ! R0
9
=
; ¡! 9T
0:(¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! T
0 ^ inv R
0 T
0 (6.5)
There are three ways in which the one-step transition in the left-hand side of the
sequent (6.4) can be inferred (via defLcsu), i.e., either A is ¹ xa and R0 is ((z)(0 j 0) j R),
or R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00 and R0 is (z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R00), or A is ¿ and R
#X
¡ ¡ * M, R0 is ((z)(0 j 0)jMa)
for some X and M. These three cases correspond to the following sequents.
(a) B RT;inv R T ¡! 9T0:(¹ xa j T)
¹ xa
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ inv ((z)(0 j 0) j R) T0
(b) B RT;inv R T;R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00 ¡! 9T0:(¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ inv (z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R00) T0
(c) B RT;inv R T;R
#X
¡ ¡ ! M ¡! 9T0:(¹ xa j T)
¿
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ inv ((z)(0 j 0)jMa) T0
The proofs for the ¯rst and second sequents are given in Figure 6.11. The proof for the
third sequent is not given but it is easy to see that it has similar structure as the proof
for the second one.
We note that in the above example it is necessary to consider an extension of
D!¼;
: » in order to describe the invariant set. The following results of soundness of the
encoding of bisimulation take into account such extensions. We call a strati¯ed de¯nition
D a consistent extension of another strati¯ed de¯nition D0 if all the de¯nition clauses
appearing in D0 also appear in D.
The proof of the adequacy of the encoding of one-step transitions in the extended
calculus is basically the same as in the proof of Proposition 6.4. The additional clauses for
replications do not complicate the proof of the proposition. The soundness of the bisim
and lbisim still hold for the ¼-calculus with replication. The proofs for Theorem 6.27 and
Theorem 6.28 follow the same structure as the proofs of Theorem 6.7 and Theorem 6.9.131
¢¢¢ ¡! > >R
¢¢¢ ¡! (¹ xa j T)
¹ xa
¡ ¡ ! (0 j T)
defR ¢¢¢;inv R T ¡! inv R T init
¢¢¢;inv R T ¡! inv ((z)(0 j 0) j R) (0 j T)
defR
B RT;inv R T ¡! (¹ xa j T)
¹ xa
¡ ¡ ! (0 j T) ^ inv ((z)(0 j 0) j R) (0 j T)
^R
B RT;inv R T ¡! 9T0:(¹ xa j T)
¹ xa
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ inv ((z)(0 j 0) j R) T0
9R
(a)
R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00 ¡! R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00
init ¦
9V:T
A
¡ ¡ ! V ^ inv R00 V ¡! ¢¢¢
R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00 ¾ 9V:T
A0
¡ ¡ ! V ^ inv U V ;R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00 ¡! ¢¢¢
¾ L
8U8A0 R
A
¡ ¡ ! U ¾ 9V:T
A0
¡ ¡ ! V ^ inv U V ;R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00 ¡! ¢¢¢
8L;8L
B RT;R
A
¡ ¡ ! R00 ¡! 9T0:(¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ inv (z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R00) T0
^L
(b)
where ¦ is
T
A
¡ ¡ ! V ¡! T
A
¡ ¡ ! V
init
T
A
¡ ¡ ! V ¡! (¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! (¹ xa j V )
defR inv R00 V ¡! inv R00 V
init
inv R00 V ¡! inv (z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R00) (¹ xa j V )
defR
T
A
¡ ¡ ! V;inv R00 V ¡! (¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! (¹ xa j V ) ^ inv (z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R00) (¹ xa j V )
^R
T
A
¡ ¡ ! V;inv R00 V ¡! 9T0:(¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ inv (z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R00) T0
9R
9V:T
A
¡ ¡ ! V ^ inv R00 V ¡! 9T0:(¹ xa j T)
A
¡ ¡ ! T0 ^ inv (z)(0 j ¹ xa) j R00) T0
9L;^L
Fig. 6.11. Some derivations in Linc with D!¼132
To maintain this same structure, it is necessary that we can always delay the application
of the ºR rule in a derivation (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4).
Proposition 6.26. Let P and Q be processes and ® an action. The transition P
®
¡ ¡ ! Q
is derivable in ¼-calculus if and only if the sequent :; : ¡! hP
®
¡ ¡ ! Qi; is provable in
Linc with any consistent extension of D!¼.
Theorem 6.27. Let P and Q be two processes. If the sequent
:; : ¡! ¹ u . lbisim L¹ u P Q;
where L is a ground term and the free names in P and Q are in the list L ¹ u, is provable
in Linc with any consistent extension of D!¼;
: »l
then P
: » Q.
Theorem 6.28. Let P and Q be two processes. If the sequent
:; : ¡! ¹ u . lbisim L¹ u P Q;
where L is a ground term and the free names in P and Q are in the list L ¹ u, is provable
in Linc with any consistent extension of D¼;
: »l
then P
: » Q.
The relations given by bisim and lbisim clauses can be shown to be equivalent
relations.
Theorem 6.29. The following formulas
8P:bisim P P; 8P8Q:bisim P Q ¾ bisim Q P and
8P8Q8R:bisim P Q ^ bisim Q R ¾ bisim P R
are provable in Linc with any consistent extension of the de¯nition D!¼;
: ». Similarly,
the formulas
8L8P:lbisim L P P; 8L8P8Q:lbisim L P Q ¾ lbisim L Q P and
8L8P8Q8R:lbisim L P Q ^ lbisim L Q R ¾ lbisim L P R
are provable in Linc with any consistent extension of D!¼;
: »l
.
Proof The proof for the re°exivity of bisim is done co-inductively with the invariant
¸P¸Q:P = Q. The proof for the symmetry of bisim is done by case analyses on the
bisim clause (by defL) and does not involve co-induction. The proof of the transitivity
property makes use of co-induction with the invariant ¸P¸R 9Q:bisim P Q^bisim Q R.
In all cases there is no need for using defL on any predicate other than bisim. The proofs
are done by synchronizing left and right introduction rules. We show here a subproof for
the transitivity property. In this case, after applying instances of 8R and an instance of
ºR followed by instances of ^R, we obtain the premises
bisim P Q;bisim Q R ¡! 9Q:bisim P Q ^ bisim Q R;133
which is trivially provable, and
(1) bisim P Q;bisim Q R ¡! 8A8P0 [(P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0) ¾ 9R0:(R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0)
^ 9Q0:bisim P0 R0 ^ bisim Q0 R0]
(2) bisim P Q;bisim Q R ¡! 8X8P0 [(P
#X
¡ ¡ * P0) ¾ 9R0:(R
#X
¡ ¡ * R0)
^ 8w:9Q0:bisim (P0w) (Q0w) ^ bisim Q0w R0w]
(3) bisim P Q;bisim Q R ¡! 8X8P0 [(P
"X
¡ ¡ * P0) ¾ 9R0:(R
"X
¡ ¡ * R0)
^ rw:9Q0:bisim (P0w) (Q0w) ^ bisim Q0w R0w]
and their symmetric variants (by interchanging P and R). The proof for sequent (1) is
shown in Figure 6.12. Here the rule scheme R1 denotes the sequence of rules 8R;8R;¾
R, R2 denotes defL;^L, R3 denotes 8L;8L;¾ L, and R4 denotes 9L;^L¤. The proofs
for sequent (2) and (3) follow the same structure. The symmetric variants of (1) ¡ (3)
are obtained from the proofs of (1) ¡ (3) via the substitution [P=R;R=P]. The proofs
for the corresponding formulas involving lbisim are done analogously.
6.6 Conclusion and related work
We have shown that the operational semantics of one-step transitions of ¼-calculus
can be encoded naturally in Linc, making use of the higher-order nature of the logic. With
the additional feature of de¯nitions in Linc we can reason about certain properties of the
transition sytem, namely, bisimulation and congruence relations between processes. The
dynamics of names, i.e., the scoping constraint and freshness of names, in ¼-calculus
are captured properly by the use of quanti¯ers 8 and r in Linc. In particular, the
di®erent proof-level binders in Linc (i.e., global and local signatures) generated by 8 and
r capture precisely the di®erent nature of names that are implicit in ¼-calculus, that
is, there are names that are instantiable and names that are not. The scoping between
names is handled by the alternation of quanti¯ers. The use of r in the encoding of
one-step transition makes it possible to reason about certain negative behavior, e.g., to
show that some process does not make any transitions. This aspect of r turns out to
be crucial in proving the completeness of one of our encodings of bisimulation.
We have given two encodings of late bisimulation: bisim and lbisim. Both are
sound with respect to the notion of bisimulation in ¼-calculus, but the ¯rst one is not
complete while the second is. We retain the bisim encoding because we think it looks
natural and it does in fact generate an equivalent relation (Theorem 6.29). We would
like to think that bisim gives rise to the \true" bisimulation, while other variants of
bisimulation can be obtained from bisim with appropriate logical theories. To make our
point clear, let us recall the counterexample to the completeness of bisim (Example 6.8).
For the proof of bisimulation in this example to succeed, it is necessary to do case
analyses on the possible name w can take. We take this literally when we consider
the ¯x in lbisim, by enumerating all the free names in the processes being checked for
their bisimilarity. However, what the informal proof in the example suggests is that this
enumeration might be too strong. In fact, what we need to check is only whether w is a
or it is not a. This suggests another, cleaner, approach to encoding bisimulation: simply134
P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¡! P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0
init
¦
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0;bisim P0 Q0;bisim Q R ¡! ¢¢¢
9Q0:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ^ bisim P0 Q0;bisim Q R ¡! ¢¢¢
R4
8A8P0:P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¾ 9Q0:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ^ bisim P0 Q0;bisim Q R;P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¡! ¢¢¢
R3
bisim P Q;bisim Q R;P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0 ¡! 9R0:R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0 ^ 9Q0:bisim P0 Q0 ^ bisim Q0 R0
R2
bisim P Q;bisim Q R ¡! 8A8P0 [(P
A
¡ ¡ ! P0) ¾ 9R0:(R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0)
^ 9Q0:bisim P0 R0 ^ bisim Q0 R0]
R1
where ¦ is the derivation
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ¡! Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0
init
¦1
bisim P0 Q0;9R0:R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0 ^ bisim Q0 R0 ¡! ¢¢¢
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0;¢¢¢;8Q08A:Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0 ¾ 9R0:R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0 ^ bisim Q0 R0 ¡! ¢¢¢
R3
Q
A
¡ ¡ ! Q0;bisim P0 Q0;bisim Q R ¡! 9R0:R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0 ^ 9Q0:bisim P0 Q0 ^ bisim Q0 R0
R2
and ¦1 is
¢¢¢ ¡! R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0
init
¢¢¢ ¡! bisim P0 Q0 init
¢¢¢ ¡! bisim Q0 R0 init
¢¢¢ ¡! bisim P0 Q0 ^ bisim Q0 R0 ^R
¢¢¢ ¡! 9Q0:bisim P0 Q0 ^ bisim Q0 R0 9R
¢¢¢ ¡! R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0 ^ 9Q0:bisim P0 Q0 ^ bisim Q0 R0
^R
bisim P0 Q0;R0 A
¡ ¡ ! R0;bisim Q0 R0 ¡! 9R0:R
A
¡ ¡ ! R0 ^ 9Q0:bisim P0 Q0 ^ bisim Q0 R0
9R
Fig. 6.12. A proof of transitivity of bisim.135
add the law of excluded middle on names to the encoding of bisim. More precisely,
consider the following encoding of late bisimulation
bisiml P Q
4
= (8x8y:(x = y) _ (x = y ¾ ?)) ¾ bisim P Q:
We conjecture that this encoding is sound and complete. Note that we need to mention
explicitly the excluded middle in bisiml because it is not a theorem in intuitionistic
logic. This brings forward another interesting conjecture: the bisim encoding is sound
and complete in classical logic. The notion of distinction can also be encoded explicitly
as the assumptions in the form x = y ¾ ?. That is, a distinction D is encoded as the
conjunction
FD ´
^
fxi = yi ¾ ?g(xi;yi)2D:
We conjecture that the notion of D-bisimilarity can be faithfully encoded as
(8x8y:(x = y) _ (x = y ¾ ?)) ¾ FD ¾ bisim P Q:
The encoding of one-step transitions of ¼-calculus has been done in several set-
tings. In [34], processes are encoded directly as formulas in linear logic and the re°exive
and transitive closures of one-step transitions is shown to be captured by logical en-
tailment. However, this work considers only the fragment of ¼-calculus without the
restriction operator. Formalization of ¼-calculus has also been done in the Calculus of
Construction in [25, 13], in the concurrent logical framework by Watkins, et.al., [7], and
in FM-logic [16]. In the latter, the restriction operator is interpreted by the new quanti-
¯er [17, 45] in the logic. In these encodings bisimulation is not considered. The encoding
of bisimulation for a class of abstract transition systems, without name binding and
value passing, has been studied in [31] in the logic FO¸¢IN. The encoding of simulation
for ¯nite ¼-calculus is considered in [37]. In this work, to encode freshness of names, a
sort of \counter" is maintained in the encoding of simulation such that each creation of
new names results in an increase of the counter. The declarativeness of the encoding
is thus somewhat compromised and reasoning about the properties of the encoding is
complicated by details concerning the representation of the counter.136
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Summary of accomplishments
In this thesis we present the logic Linc which is designed to be used as a meta-logic
for specifying and reasoning about operational semantics. The logic Linc is an extension
of FO¸¢IN with the additional features of generalized induction and co-induction proof
rules, and a new quanti¯er r. The quanti¯er r focuses on the intensional reading of
universal quanti¯er, and is mainly used for reasoning about generic judgments. As a
connective, the quanti¯er r is rather weak; it commutes with all other connectives.
Its role is essentially in maintaining the scoping of locally bound variables within the
formula. The logic Linc also allows quanti¯cation over ¸-terms which makes it possible
to support higher-order abstract syntax. Together with r and the (co-)induction rules,
this provides the ability to perform analyses on object systems involving abstractions, as
we have shown in the encoding of ¼-calculus. We have shown that the notion of names in
computation systems can be encoded naturally in Linc using quanti¯ers. We have proved
the cut-elimination and consistency of Linc, extending the proof of McDowell and Miller
for the logic FO¸¢IN. The proof of cut-elimination is actually based on the technique of
reducibility, originally due to Tait and later extended by Martin-LÄ of. The main technical
achievement of our proof of cut-elimination is in formalizing the notion of reducibility
in the presence of co-induction. We argue that with the inclusion of co-induction in the
framework of reducibility, the co-induction rules must be \strati¯ed" in order to get a
well-founded reducibility ordering.
We illustrate the application of Linc in specifying and reasoning about data
structures natural numbers and (in¯nite) lists, abstract transition systems (CCS and
¼-calculus), object-logic and evaluation of the lazy ¸-calculus. These examples illustrate
the use of both ¯rst-order encoding and higher-order encoding, and the induction and
co-induction proof principles. In these encodings, except for the object-logic and ¼-
calculus encodings, r does not play any signi¯cant role. Some of these applications have
been previously done in FO¸¢IN, where the induction and co-induction proofs are done
indirectly via natural number induction. We show that their encoding in Linc admits
more direct proofs making use of structural induction and co-induction. We also note
that since Linc is a consistent extension of FO¸¢IN, all previous applications done in
FO¸¢IN can be carried out in Linc without any essential modi¯cations. The expressive
power of the full Linc is illustrated in the ¼-calculus example. Here the interpretation
of the restriction operator as the quanti¯er r plays a crucial role in establishing the
adequacy result for the encoding of late bisimulation.137
7.2 Future work
Our current formulation of induction and co-induction rules is not strong enough
to express (co-)inductive proofs which require explicit reference to local signatures. This
means that certain forms of judgments, such as the one we have shown in the object-
logic encoding, cannot be proved within Linc. One reason for this lack of expressiveness
is that the current formulation of (co-)induction treats de¯nition clauses as de¯ning
predicates, instead of atomic judgments. This is obvious in the ¹L rule, where only
the right premise of the rule shares the local signature with the conclusion. In order to
formalize the (co-)induction rules which act on atomic judgments, we need to rede¯ne
the notion of de¯nition to take into account the local signatures. This is not unlike the
notion of raised de¯nition given in De¯nition 2.9. De¯nition clauses should be relating
judgments, instead of formula, e.g., we can have the de¯nition clause of the form
xy . p(H xy)
4
= y . 8x:B p(H xy):
Notice that the local signatures on the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the def-
inition clause are di®erent. Let us refer to this notion of de¯nition as generic de¯nition.
As in raised de¯nition, a generic de¯nition actually represents a family of de¯nitions
obtained by raising. The above de¯nition clause, for example, can be seen as the repre-
sentative of the de¯nition clauses
xy . p(H xy)
4
= y . 8x:B p(H xy):
xyz . p(H1 xy z)
4
= yz . 8x:B p(H1 xy z)
. . .
In the formalization of the induction rule ¹L on generic de¯nition, instead of substituting
the inductive predicate with an invariant formula, we need to substitute the invariant
(which is now a judgment) for the \atomic judgments" in the body of the de¯nition
clause. Since formulas and judgments are of di®erent syntactic categories, in order
for the ¹L rule to be well-formed, the substitution of the inductive predicate with the
invariant must be done indirectly via another intermediate de¯ned predicate, whose body
is the actual invariant. For example, the induction rule for the above de¯nition can be
formalized as follows.
H ; y . 8x:B q (H xy) ¡! xy . q xy §; xy . q t;¡ ¡! C
§; xy . pt;¡ ¡! C
¹L
where xy . q xy is de¯ned by some invariant D. The co-induction rule ºR is de¯ned
dually. Of course, this extension from de¯nition to generic de¯nition must be done
carefully in order not to destroy cut-elimination.
To get the cut-elimination result for Linc, we need to impose the level restriction
on both de¯nitions and the ºR rule. It is not clear how the restriction on ºR can
be removed while retaining the cut-elimination proof using the reducibility technique.
It would be interesting to investigate the strong normalization proofs for type systems138
with co-inductive data types [19, 20] to see how their proofs can be carried over to
sequent systems. The level restriction on de¯nitions can probably be weakened to allow
arbitrary monotone de¯nitions. It would also be interesting to explore another notion
of strati¯cation of de¯nitions using the regular word assumption [51] to allow direct
inductive proofs involving higher-order abstract syntax.
There is a prototype implementation of Linc in ¸Prolog, available at
http://www.cse.psu.edu/~tiu. This prototype has been used to verify most results in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. However, this prototype is currently limited to be a proof-
checker and the level of automation is still minimal. We consider adding a tactical
language in the style of [15] to improve the proof automation. A serious implementation
would require more study on the proof search properties of Linc. It is true that with
induction and co-induction there is no hope of automation in general. Nevertheless, a
large subset of the logic may still admit some uniformity in proof search. A fragment
of Linc without r but with (co-)induction has also been separately implemented in the
Hybrid system [2, 41].
Another interesting direction for future work is to investigate the connection be-
tween explicit co-induction rule with circular proofs, which is particularly attractive from
the proof search viewpoint. This could be realized by directly proving a cut-elimination
result for a logic where circular proofs, under termination and guardedness conditions,
completely replace (co)inductive rules. Alternatively, we could reduce \global" proofs in
such a system to \local" proofs in Linc, similarly to [54].139
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